THE  MORALITY 
OF  NATIONS 


By 
C.  DELISLE  BURNS 


< >* 

LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  OF 
CALIFORNIA 

SAN  DIEGO 
^_ 


©.  <a -M- 


34 


\i  Vy  «-»(.—    ^<S 


£  V» 


THE   MORALITY  OF  NATIONS 


THE 
MORALITY  OF  NATIONS 

AN  ESSAY  ON  THE  THEORY 
OF  POLITICS 


BY 


G.    DELISLE    BURNS 


"  Remota  iustitia,  quid  sunt  regua  uisi 
magna  latrocinia." — De  Oiv.  Dei,  lib.  iv. 


NEW  YORK  :  G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 
LONDON  :  UNIVERSITY  OF  LONDON  PRESS 

1916 


PREFACE 

The  situation  during  the  past  year  will  probably 
result  in  changing  many  of  the  political  ideas  by 
which  we  are  governed  :  for  any  intense  experi- 
ence has  a  tendency  to  produce  new  intellectual 
schemes,  or  at  least  to  shatter  the  cherished  idols 
of  calmer  days.  We  require  new  ideas  in  order 
to  control  new  forces  and  direct  them  as  far  as  we 
can  in  the  course  of  which  we  approve  ;  and  the 
need  of  such  new  ideas  becomes  urgent  at  a  time 
which  may  be  either  one  of  reconstruction  or  of 
renewed  evil. 

It  has  become  obvious  that  although  our 
political  situation,  both  in  domestic  and  in  foreign 
issues,  is  unique  and  new,  we  have  only  the  con- 
ceptions of  our  great-grandfathers  with  which  to 
master  it.  But  the  tools  made  for  simpler  tasks 
are  inadequate  for  the  material  upon  which  we 
must  now  use  them.  To  deal  with  the  modern 
State  as  though  it  were  the  -nroT^ig  of  Aristotle  or 
the  Leviathan  of  Hobbes  is  like  trying  to  face 
heavy  guns  with  a  Macedonian  phalanx  or  to 
pierce  armour-plate  with  a  cavalier's  rapier.  Our 
intellectual  weapons  are  obsolete. 


vi  PREFACE 

It  is  not  my  purpose,  however,  to  establish  a 
completely  new  theory  of  the  State  nor  to  deny 
the  correctness  of  the  greater  part  of  what  is 
embodied  in  our  tradition  ;  but  certain  con- 
clusions seem  to  flow  from  the  situation  which 
has  been  growing  up  during  the  past  fifty  years. 
These  are  of  interest  first  because  some  German 
writers  have  seemed  to  imagine  that  German 
"  Kultur  "  has  its  source  in  the  German  State  or 
that  the  "  expansion  "  of  this  State  might  cause 
an  increase  of  Kultur  among  the  unenlightened. 
The  merely  controversial  situation  may  be  put 
aside  :  for  it  is  perfectly  clear  that  even  if 
"  Kultur  "  could  be  attained  by  the  extension  of 
the  activities  of  the  German  State,  we  do  not 
propose  to  endure  the  benevolent  imposition  of 
such  compulsory  enlightenment.  The  main  point 
is  that  our  ideas  of  the  State  are  changing,  and 
that  German  State-worship  is  antiquated. 

It  was  good  journalism  a  few  months  ago  to 
accuse  Treitschke  and  Nietzsche  of  poisoning  the 
German  mind  ;  but  clearly  it  is  Hegel,  and  not 
either  of  these  two,  whose  influence  in  State- 
worship  and  the  Kultur-Staat  is  most  pernicious. 
Treitschke  was  a  good  historian  who  accepted  his 
political  theories  ready-made  from  the  Hegelians, 
and  no  one  hated  the  State  more  than  Nietzsche  ; 
but  Hegel  was  the  official  guide  for  the  Prussian 
bureaucracy,    and    his    philosophy    subordinated 


PREFACE  vii 

every  portion  of  social  life  to  the  State.  It  is 
known  that  he  was  ignorant  of  science,  but  it 
is  not  generally  admitted  that  he  was  ignorant 
of  history.  His  limitations,  however,  are  not 
of  great  importance,  since  it  is  an  idea  and  not 
a  man  which  must  be  attacked.  And  again,  our 
own  philosophy  of  the  State  in  the  Utilitarians 
is  as  obsolete  as  Hegel's.  Not  all  false  ideas 
were  made  in  Germany.  Even  Plato  and  Aris- 
totle are  inadequate  for  understanding  the  present 
political  situation. 

To  all  these,  however,  and  to  the  commen- 
tators upon  them,  we  acknowledge  a  debt,  for  we 
owe  to  them  the  reasoning  which  we  must  use 
against  them.  It  might  have  been  well  if  some 
of  their  dead  theories  had  not  been  exhumed  by 
diplomatists  anxious  to  find  reasons  for  what  they 
did  blindly.  But  many  ghosts  stalk  the  world 
and  lead  men  on  to  battle  too  :  such  are  "  Evolu- 
tion," or  "  Kultur,"  or  "  inevitable  conflict,"  or 
the  "  logic  of  history,"  or  the  "  Balance  of 
Power,"  and  many  more  which  shall  be  name- 
less. Men  are  still  as  enslaved  to  dead  ideas 
as  when  the  barbarians  followed  the  ghost  of 
departed  Rome.  But  these  ideas  once  lived,  and 
we  owe  to  them,  if  we  know  them  in  history,  the 
ability  to  see  the  new  ideas  which  are  now  abroad. 

In  no  section  of  political  thought,  however, 
will  there  be  greater  changes  than  in  that  which 


viii  PREFACE 

relates  to  the  moral  obligation  of  States.  Mr. 
Asquith,  quoting  Mr.  Gladstone,  has  said  that 
England  desires  to  "  see  the  enthronement  of  this 
idea  of  Public  Right  as  the  governing  idea  of 
European  policy ;  as  the  common  and  precious 
inheritance  of  all  lands,  but  superior  to  the  pass- 
ing opinion  of  any.  The  foremost  among  the 
nations  will  be  that  one  which,  by  its  conduct, 
shall  gradually  engender  in  the  minds  of  the 
others  a  fixed  belief  that  it  is  just."  Morality 
is  established  as  between  individuals,  but  it  is 
still  insecure  in  the  relationship  between  States. 
We  desire  to  establish  it. 

But  what  are  the  principles  of  right  ?  They 
cannot  be  pious  opinions  that  a  nation  should  keep 
treaties  or  should  be  honest.  Such  principles 
are  too  vague.  They  are  like  the  old  Kantian 
command  to  do  one's  duty.  The  real  problem 
begins  in  the  attempt  to  discover  what  is  one's 
duty.  So  now  the  chief  problem  is  to  find 
out  what  the  moral  relationship  between  States 
really  is. 

Again,  innumerable  books  and  pamphlets  have 
dealt  with  the  causes  of  the  war  :  and  it  has 
appeared  as  if  these  causes  were  all  historical,  as  if 
what  now  happens  were  altogether  explained  by 
reference  to  what  happened  before.  But  the 
causes  of  the  war  were  partly  what  men  desired  to 
happen.     That    is    to    say,   principles   as   well   as 


PREFACE  ix 

events  led  us  to  the  crisis  :  principles,  therefore, 
must  be  considered  as  a  corrective  to  the  tendency 
of  history  in  making  events  seem  "  inevitable." 
Change  your  ideas  of  what  is  right  and  half  the 
so-called  logic  of  history  evaporates  into  thin  air. 

We  must  distinguish  history  from  politics,  or 
any  subject  in  which  moral  judgments  are  passed. 
The  history  of  events  is  no  ground  for  moral 
judgments  ;  although  the  consequence  of  events 
may  be  referred  to  as  indicating  why  this  or 
that  event  is  to  be  approved.  The  historian  has, 
strictly  speaking,  no  special  knowledge  of  the 
science  of  moral  judgment  :  he  is  an  authority  on 
what  occurred  ;  but,  without  special  training  of  a 
non-historical  kind,  he  is  no  authority  on  what 
ought  to  have  occurred  or  what  ought  not  to  occur. 
And  in  passing  moral  judgments  or  in  the  dis- 
cussion of  principles  the  historian  often  flounders 
as  ludicrously  as  the  biologist  who  tries  to  write 
metaphysics. 

We  need,  therefore,  a  criticism  of  inherited 
conceptions  of  the  State,  a  review  of  the  present 
moral  relationship  between  States,  and  an  indication 
of  the  tendencies  which  are  transforming  the 
whole  of  International  Politics. 

Such  are  the  excuses  I  have  to  offer  for  an 
attempt  which  is  perhaps  too  ambitious.  It  must 
be  regarded  as  a  mere  essay  in  a  subject  which, 
despite  the  efforts  of  International  Lawyers,  has 


x  PREFACE 

been  too  much  neglected.  The  problems  are,  of 
course,  more  complicated  than  a  statement  of 
general  principles  might  seem  to  imply  ;  and,  no 
doubt,  there  are  many  mistakes  in  the  solutions 
suggested.  But  my  purpose  is  rather  to  direct 
attention  to  facts  than  to  inculcate  any  doctrine 
about  them. 

I  have  to  thank  my  friend,  Mr.  G.  P.  Gooch, 
for  reading  through  the  proofs  and  correcting 
some  of  my  mistakes  :  and  I  have  also  to  thank 
my  wife,  whose  unblushing  scepticism  has  made 
my  statements  more  careful  than  they  would 
otherwise  have  been. 

C.  Delisle  Burns. 

November  fpij:. 


CONTENTS 


I     Morality  and  Nationality       .  .  .         i 

What  is  a  nation  ?  Does  nationality  make  any 
difference  to  moral  action  ? 

II     The  State  and  other  Institutions  .  .       26 

Institutions  gradually  differentiated.  In  early  times 
the  "political"  includes  other  purposes,  not  now. 

III  The  State  and  other  States  ...       43 

The  State  used  to  be  considered  in  isolation :  and 
was  at  one  time  more  isolated.  Now  all  States 
interpenetrate. 

IV  The  State  and  Nationality     ...       59 

The  State  a  territorial  organisation.  It  brings 
nations  together ;  it  does  not  and  should  not  keep 
them  apart. 

V     Foreign  Interests  .....       76 

What  interdependence  is  there  ?  Trade,  investment 
and  ideas. 

VI     Foreign  Policy        .....       96 

How  are  these  interests  maintained  and  developed  ? 
Secretariats  and  Embassies  :  the  good  and  the  evil 
in  them. 

VII    Alliance  .         .         .         .         .         .120 

Special  connection  of  some  States.  The  moral  effect 
of  alliances  :  good  and  evil. 


xii  CONTENTS 

CHAP.  PAGE 

VIII     International  Rivalry     ....     139 
Independence  to  be  maintained.     But  individuality 
of  the  group  can  be  maintained  by  a  civilised  form 
of  rivalry. 

IX    The  Morality  of  Nations  at  War   .  .159 

Even  war  does  not  destroy  the  whole  moral  relation- 
ship of  combatants.  Restrictions  to  the  use  of 
force. 

X     Peace  Relations      .  .         .         .         .     179 

Peace  not  negative  but  positive.  Modern  peace  a 
new  situation. 

XI    Needs  of  the  State         .         .         .         .196 

Changing  ideas  of  the  relation  of  the  citizen  to  his 
own  State.  The  State  needs  chiefly  a  growth  of 
moral  responsibility. 

XII    The  Comity  of  Nations    ....     220 
Tendencies    towards   action    in    common    between 
States.     New  ideas  of  "other"  States. 

XIII     Conclusion      ......     238 

Social  sentiment  and  institutions.  Differentiation  of 
function. 

Index      .......     253 


THE  MORALITY  OF  NATIONS 

CHAPTER    I 

MORALITY    AND    NATIONALITY 

It  may  be  taken  for  granted  that  there  is  a 
moral  relationship  between  some  human  indi- 
viduals. This  is  quite  distinct  from  an  economic 
or  physical  relationship.  But  individuals  are  not 
isolated,  since  groupings  of  all  kinds  exist — 
families,  nations,  states,  companies,  clubs  and 
labour  unions.  And  the  moral  relationship  holds 
between  all  members  of  the  same  group,  and 
between  members  of  some  different  groups.  It 
may  hold  between  all  members  of  all  groups  ;  but 
this  is  not  generally  admitted  in  practice,  and  at 
any  rate  the  moral  relationship  between  citizens 
of  different  states  seems  to  be  somewhat  different 
from  that  which  holds  between  citizens  of  the 
same  state. 

Hence  arises  an  idea  of  group-morality,  or  of 
a  special  kind  of  morality,  as  between  nations  or 
States.  States  are  spoken  of  as  acting  rightly  or 
wrongly,  as  a  club  or  company  may  be  supposed 


2       THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

to  act.1  The  fact  is,  of  course,  that  individuals 
sometimes  act  in  the  name  and  for  the  interests 
of  the  group  to  which  they  belong,  and  their 
action  on  such  occasions  is  apt  to  be  governed 
by  different  principles  from  those  which  are  sup- 
posed to  govern  their  action  in  their  own  private 
interest.  But  group-morality  is  not  simply  the 
governing  rule  of  the  action  of  representatives  ; 
it  really  is  in  some  sense  the  morality  of  all 
members  of  the  group  in  so  far  as  these  allow 
action  in  their  behalf  to  be  of  this  or  that  kind, 
or  in  so  far  as  they  are  willing  to  receive  the 
benefit  of  actions  based  upon  principles  which 
they  would  theoretically  repudiate.  The  morality, 
for  example,  of  a  company  is  both  the  morality 
of  its  representatives  and  that  of  all  the  active 
participants  in  the  action  or  passive  sharers  of 
the  result. 

There  may  be  some  who  would  say  that  the 
principles  governing  the  relations  of  citizen  to 
citizen  should  be  the  same  as  those  governing 
the  relations  of  citizen  to  alien.  But,  in  any 
case,  the  existence  of  groups  must  make  some 
difference  to  morality  ;  and  we  may  be  inclined  to 
suppose  that  a  diplomatist,  for  example,  may  be 

1  Cf.  Westlake,  International  Law,  Vol.  I.  p.  3.  "Indi- 
vidual men  associated  in  the  state  are  moral  beings,  and  the 
action  of  the  state  which  they  form  by  their  association  is 
their  action,  the  state  then  must  also  be  a  moral  being." 


MORALITY   AND   NATIONALITY      3 

most  unselfish  in  his  private  action  but  cannot  so 
readily  allow  the  interests  of  those  he  represents 
to  give  place  to  others,  except,  of  course,  in  cases 
where  justice  clearly  demands  it.  Or,  again,  the 
individual  may  be  less  responsible  for  the  action 
of  his  company  or  state,  where  the  interests 
of  many  have  to  be  considered,  than  he  is  in 
considering  only  his  own  interests. 

The  whole  subject  of  vicarious  responsibility 
and  vicarious  action  is  under  discussion  at  present; 
and  perhaps  writers  on  Ethics  have  too  long 
continued  to  deal  with  the  hypothetical  indi- 
vidual, for  it  seems  that  very  few  even  of  our 
"  moral "  acts  are  individual  acts  in  the  old 
Kantian  sense.  But  here  we  shall  speak  only 
of  that  section  of  such  morality  which  is  con- 
nected with  political  life  and  political  institutions. 
We  need  to  discuss  what  principles  do  in  fact 
govern,  and  what  should  govern  the  relationship 
of  citizen  to  citizen  and  of  citizen  to  alien.  Or 
we  may  suppose  that  our  problem  is  to  discover 
what  differences  the  existence  of  nationality 
or  of  States  makes  or  ought  to  make  to 
morality. 

The  problem  is  partly  that  which  Hugo  de 
Groot  first  faced.  He  found  that  jurists  had 
considered  (1)  the  municipal  law  of  States,  and 
(2)  the  law  common  to  all  States  ;  but  not  (3) 
the   law  governing   the   relationship   of    State   to 


4       THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

State.  But  in  the  spirit  of  his  time  he  began1 
the  study  of  law  with  the  discussion  of  morality^ 
and  In  the  study  and  positive  development  of 
International  Law  he  has  had  many  successors, 
but  in  the  study  of  International  Morality  almost 
none.2  The  existence  of  Law,  however,  even  if 
ineffective,  may  be  taken  as  evidence  of  some 
sort  of  morality.  We  no  longer  go  to  the 
"  Law  of  Nature  "  as  the  basis  for  International 
Law,  but  only  to  the  consent  of  the  parties,  and 
though  we  have  gained  by  the  suppression  of  an 
abstract  Nature  we  have  lost  something  by  not 
concerning  ourselves  with  that  morality  which, 
in  some  sense  or  other,  must  be  what  is  partly 
embodied  in  the  Law. 

Law  is  evidence  for  morality  ;  but  dangerous 
evidence,  because  Law  deals  largely  with  crime 
or  offences  against  morality.  It  is  pathological. 
The  more  positive  evidence  for  morality  is  the 
unwritten  and  unsystematic  sentiment  of  approval 
or  disapproval.  There  may  be  no  Moral  Code 
for  nations  in  the  sense  of  formulated  principles  ; 
but  there  certainly  is  in  the  minds  of  civilised 
man  an  "  ought  "  and  "  ought   not  "  with  respect 

1  De  Jure  Belli  et  Pads,  proleg.  Jus  illud  quod  inter  populos 
plures  aut  populorum  rectores  intercedit  .  .  .  attigerunt  pauci, 
universim  ac  certo  ordinetractavit  hactenus  nemo.  The 
"  temperamenta  belli "  in  Book  III  are  based  expressly  on 
Christianity. 

2  Cf.  Lawrence,  International  Law,  Ch.  I.  and.  II. 


MORALITY   AND    NATIONALITY      5 

to  group-action  as  with  respect  to  the  action  of 
individuals.  And  this  distinction  of  right  and 
wrong  and  the  reasons  or  evidence  upon  which 
it  is  based  may  be  discovered  by  considering  how 
far  the  relationship  of  States  is  moral. 

For  this  purpose  we  shall  have  to  speak  first 
of  the  groups  which  are  in  relation  to  one  another, 
since  their  nature  must  in  some  way  be  decided 
before  any  general  conceptions  of  value  can  be 
reached  as  to  the  principles  which  do  govern  or 
should  govern  their  action.  But  common  speech 
has  established  the  word  "  International "  as  in- 
dicating a  particular  kind  of  law,  and  it  may 
be  used  as  indicating  also  a  particular  kind  of 
morality.  We  do  not  speak  of  "  Inter-State " 
law,  because  of  an  inherited  confusion  of  the 
nation  with  the  State.1  For  this  reason  we  must 
begin  by  discussing  the  nature  of  a  nation. 

The  conception  of  nationality  which  is  accepted 
almost  everywhere  at  present  is  comparatively 
modern,  and  this  because  the  fact  to  which  it 
refers  is  new.  For  although  in  one  sense  nations 
have  existed  and  nationality  has  been  recognised 
even  in  the  earliest  times,  the  meaning  we  give 
to   the    terms    involves   another   sense.      In    this 

1  Thus  Westlake  {foe.  cit.)  says  that  for  International  Law 
"  a  nation  means  a  state  considered  with  reference  to  the 
persons  composing  it"  ;  but  that  is  not  the  common  meaning, 
nor  is  it  the  best  for  any  subject  but  International  Law. 


6       THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

other  sense  nations  are  new  and  nationality  is 
a  new  principle.1 

A  summary  of  the  evidence  must  be  given, 
although  the  full  details  must  be  left  for  pro- 
fessional historians.  For  here  what  is  intended  is 
a  discussion  of  the  events  of  history  in  view  of 
certain  principles  which  are  not  those  of  history. 
The  material,  however,  which  we  have  to  judge  is 
historical.  We  must  consider  the  group  called 
a  nation  in  the  events  which  are,  as  it  were,  the 
marks  of  its  growth.  And  as  examples  of  the 
subject-matter  of  which  we  shall  have  to  speak, 
it  is  as  well  to  take  Germany  and  Italy  and 
Belgium. 

As  a  beginning  the  geographical  ghost  must  be 
laid.  In  considering  the  conflict  between  nations, 
the  map  has  so  great  an  effect  on  the  imagination 
that  we  tend  to  think  of  Germany  or  Italy  as 
certain  portions  of  the  earth's  surface.  The 
distinction  between  nations  is  thought  of  as 
spatial,  and  the  "country"  whose  growth  we 
watch  in  history  is  carelessly  identified  with  a 
geographical  region.  But  if  Germany  and  Italy 
are  at  war  it  is  not  clods  of  earth  that  fight,  how- 
ever intimate  the  connection  may  be  between  the 

1  Cf.  Bluntschli's  Theory  of  the  State  (English  trans.  1901), 
Book  II.  Ch.  IV.  There  he  speaks  of  nationality  ;  but,  as 
we  shall  see,  without  sufficient  perception  of  its  result  on 
institutions. 


MORALITY   AND   NATIONALITY      7 

blood  and  bone  which  makes  an  army  and  the  soil 
of  the  land  to  which  it  belongs.  The  geographi- 
cal ghost  is  only  dangerous  in  so  far  as  it  tends  to 
substitute  an  abstract  for  a  concrete  conception. 
If  we  give  a  concrete  meaning,  for  history  and 
not  for  geography,  to  words  such  as  England, 
Germany  and  Italy,  we  must  feel  distinctly  that 
nations  are  groups  of  men  and  women.  The 
colours  of  the  map  are  the  colours  of  blood  ;  and 
where  this  is  not  true  the  current  of  common 
blood  tends  to  change  the  boundary  of  States. 
The  men  and  women  who  are  of  one  blood, 
whether  or  not  under  a  special  form  of  govern- 
ment, tend  to  act  together.  A  nation,  then,  is 
primarily  a  group  of  men  and  women  related 
physically.  The  further  explanation  of  the  term 
may  be  left  until  we  have  watched  groups  of  this 
kind  in  action,  for  it  is  from  physical  relationship 
that  nearly  all  powerful  nations  have  arisen. 

Let  us  take  then,  first,  the  growth  of  modern 
Germany.  That  group  of  men  and  women  which 
we  at  present  call  Germany  may  be  traced  back  in 
their  ancestors,  for  our  present  purpose,  to  the  dim 
beginnings  of  European  history  ;  but  we  shall  not 
retail  the  well-known  adventures  of  the  German 
tribes,  nor  the  vicissitudes  of  German  towns  and 
Principalities  during  the  Middle  Ages.  It  is 
sufficient  to  notice  that  this  descent  appears  to  be 
of  very  great  importance,  even  to  a  politician  like 


8       THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

Prince  von  Biilow.1  Physical  relationship,  there- 
fore, is  recognised  as  one  of  the  bases  of  a  modern 
nation.  In  the  Renaissance,  however,  the  vicissi- 
tudes of  the  Middle  Ages  in  that  part  of  the 
world  were  continued.  The  group  of  men  and 
women  who  were  the  ancestors  of  the  present 
German  people,  although  physically  related,  were 
divided  in  language  and  in  interests.  At  the  end, 
as  we  may  call  it,  of  the  Renaissance  period,  at 
the  French  Revolution,  the  ancestors  of  our 
present  Germans  were  divided  into  eight  hundred 
groups.  Then  came  the  Napoleonic  wars,  and 
the  barriers  between  these  groups  were  broken 
down.  The  conqueror  could  hardly  have  imagined 
the  result.  He  strengthened  the  groups  by 
uniting  them  ;  by  removing  dynastic  boundaries 
he  permitted  the  free  circulation  of  blood  in  the 
race  and  enabled  the  different  groups  to  find  their 
common  interest.  But  for  a  time  the  new  dykes 
which  Napoleon  established  kept  back  the  rising 
flood  ;  and  there  were  remnants,  too,  of  the  old 
division  of  the  groups.  From  1815  to  1830  the 
Germans  oscillated  between  the  separatism  of  their 
past  history  and  the  tendency  towards  future 
union.  Movements  in  the  groups  of  men  and 
women  during  1830  and  until  1848  were  resisted 
by  officials,  until  at  last  it  became  evident  that 
these  movements  could  be  used.  The  question 
1  Cf.  Imperial  Germany.     Home  policy,  p.  111  (ed.  19 14). 


MORALITY   AND   NATIONALITY      9 

then  arose  as  to  the  principle  according  to  which 
the  distinct  groups  were  to  be  organised,  and 
opposition  appeared  between  the  tendencies  of 
Prussia  and  Austria. 

The  war  of  1864  against  Denmark  for  Schles- 
wig-Holstein  did  not  solve  the  problem,  for  the 
allies  fell  out.  The  war  of  1866  followed,  and 
the  grouping  of  Germans  in  the  North  was 
definitely  secured  by  Prussia.  From  that  year 
till  1 87 1  the  history  moves  forward  along  the 
line  of  increase  of  common  sentiments  and  de- 
crease of  separatism.  A  successful  war  made  all 
the  different  remaining  groups  feel  the  benefits  of 
union,  and  the  German  Empire  was  established. 
Without  doubt  the  movement  was  directed  by 
Bismarck  ;  but  in  a  sense  the  statesman  was  a  tool 
in  the  hands  of  the  very  force  he  seemed  to 
master.  The  German  nation  was  being  born,  and 
its  nature  was  never  quite  grasped  even  by  the 
mind  which  seemed  to  the  eyes  of  hero-worship 
to  have  created  it.  A  group  of  men  and  women 
whose  ancestors  were  divided  in  interest  is  now 
content  to  subordinate  minor  purposes  to  the 
ambition  which  they  all  feel  in  common.  That  is 
the  force  which  we  call  a  nation.1 

The  making  of  Italy  shows  the  same  features, 
except    that    there    was    in    addition    an    ancient 

1  Jellinek.  Das  Recht  des  Moderncn  Staates  (p.  115,  ed. 
1905).     Das  Wesen  der  Nation  ist  dynamischer  Natur. 


io    THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

political  union  surviving  as  a  memory,  and  the 
struggle  towards  nationality  necessitated  conflict 
with  a  foreign  government.  No  Rome  guided 
German  unity,  in  spite  of  the  effective  use  by 
politicians  of  the  mediaeval  ghost  of  an  Empire  ; 
and  not  many  Germans  were  under  foreign 
domination  before  the  German  Empire  existed.1 
In  Italy,  on  the  other  hand,  more  than  physical 
relationship  and  kindred  dialects  served  as  a  basis 
for  the  uniting  of  divided  groups.  Here,  too, 
the  Napoleonic  wars  made  insecure  the  old  bar- 
riers, and  the  vague  sentiments  of  the  French 
Revolution  influenced  "the  people."  But  the 
new  force  which  we  call  the  Italian  nation  hardly 
existed  until  success  against  Austria  had  freed 
Lombardy,  until  Garibaldi  entered  Naples,  or 
even  until  the  downfall  of  Napoleon  III  made  it 
possible  for  the  North  Italians  to  enter  Rome. 
Here  again,  then,  what  we  have  to  watch  is  the 
gradual  perception  by  divided  groups  of  men  and 
women  that  they  have  a  common  interest  and  a 
common  tradition.  Their  gospeller  Mazzini  was, 
indeed,  too  much  aloof  from  immediate  issues  to 
transform  the  crude  elements  of  national  ambition 
in    the   way  he  wished.     He  said  that  a  nation 

1  Of  course,  the  excuse  for  the  war  concerning  Schleswig- 
Holstein  was  the  existence  of  a  German  population  in  the 
Duchies,  and  Alsace-Lorraine  was  supposed  to  be  in  some 
sense  "  German,"  having  been  violently  added  to  France  in 
earlier  times. 


MORALITY   AND   NATIONALITY     n 

should  claim  not  its  own  aggrandisement,  but  its 
right  to  serve  humanity  as  a  distinct  group.  The 
result  in  Italy,  however,  was  a  force  with  no  very 
idealistic  tendency.  As  a  force  it  still  continues 
and  grows,  and  perhaps  is  seeking  a  direction  in 
which  to  move. 

Lastly,  we  may  quote  Belgium  as  an  example 
of  the  same  sort  of  force.  In  1815  the  groups 
inhabiting  what  is  now  Belgium  were  summarily 
combined  with  the  groups  which  now  make 
Holland.  Dissatisfaction  and  a  growing  percep- 
tion of  distinction  from  the  Dutch  led  in  1830, 
at  the  time  of  the  "July"  Revolution  in  Paris, 
to  risings  in  Liege,  Louvain  and  Brussels.  The 
result  was  the  formation  by  European  agreement 
of  the  Kingdom  of  the  Belgians.  The  group 
had  asserted  their  common  ambition  and  their 
distinction  from  all  other  groups.  They  were 
not  all  of  the  same  blood  or  language,  but  their 
traditions  and  purposes  were  the  same.  It  is 
of  interest  to  note  that  in  the  eighteen-sixties 
Napoleon  III  and  Bismarck  were  bargaining  in 
the  old,  futile,  "  pre-nation,"  way  as  to  whether 
the  Belgians  should  be  absorbed  by  France. 
The  new  group,  however,  survived  :  and  to  such 
an  effect  that  the  attack  of  August  19 14  has 
cemented  by  common  risk  diverse  races  into  one 
complete  nation. 

Such  is  the  evidence  :  and  these  are  but  recent 


12     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

examples  of  the  new  force.  For  much  the  same 
may  be  said  of  the  coming  of  group-consciousness 
in  the  British  Dominions  over  the  Seas,  or  in 
France  or  in  Russia.  From  such  examples  one  may 
judge  of  the  nature  of  what  we  now  call  a  nation  ; 
and  as  a  force  whether  for  co-operation  or  for 
opposition,  this  is  what  is  now  meant  by  nationality.1 
We  may  therefore  assert  that  a  nation  is,  first, 
a  group  of  men  and  women  related  in  blood. 
It  has  been  observed  that  in  settled  civilisation, 
where  for  about  a  century  immigration  has  not 
greatly  affected  a  group,  every  member  will  be 
literally  a  relative  of  every  other.  It  takes 
only  a  few  generations  of  intermarriage  to 
make  the  duke  a  relative  of  the  tramp,  where 
social  caste  is  not  supreme.  Physical  formation 
tends  to  be  like  in  the  members  of  the  group, 
and  this  would  naturally  lead  to  likeness  in 
language,  custom  or  desires,  although  we  should 
not  speak  of  physical  likeness  as  the  cause  of 
these.  It  follows  that  new  nations  may  be 
formed  by  intermarriage  and  that  the  physical 
relationship  remains  important  even  when  it  is, 
as  in  the  case  of  England,  entirely  subordinated 
to  the  other  elements  in  nationality. 

1  I  use  "  nationality  "  to  mean  the  quality  uniting  men  and 
women  of  the  same  nation.  It  is  sometimes  used  to  mean 
what  I  have  called  a  "  nation "  when  that  group  is  not 
politically  independent.     Cf.  Bryce,  S.  America,  p.   424.. 


MORALITY   AND   NATIONALITY     13 

A  common  language  also  seems  to  be  usual  in 
a  nation.  Other  things  being  equal,  a  nation  is 
stronger,  the  group  is  more  closely  knit,  in  pro- 
portion to  the  effectiveness  and  common  use  of 
a  language.  This  again  gives  a  special  kind  of 
likeness  to  the  members  of  the  group  ;  for  men 
and  women  cannot  use  the  same  terms  without 
forcing  their  desires  into  the  same  moulds  or 
establishing  the  same  customs.  Further,  the  use 
of  a  common  language  tends  to  intermarriage 
and  so  reinforces  the  more  primitive  basis  of 
nationality  in  blood.  And  it  is  to  be  noticed 
that  a  common  language  is  not  a  merely  physical 
fact.  It  is  not  the  sound  which  makes  the  nation 
but  the  meaning.  Thus  we  distinguish  language 
from  the  cries  of  beasts  and,  although  beasts  may 
be  physically  related,  they  cannot  form  what  we 
call  a  nation  because  of  the  lack  of  that  sympathy 
for  which  language  stands.  Perhaps  also  it  is 
necessary  to  distinguish  a  language  from  a  dialect  ; 
for  not  until  dialect  gives  place  to  language  does 
a  nation  appear.  But  this  means  that  the  range, 
subtlety  and  effectiveness  of  speech  has  increased ; 
for  dialect  differs  in  these  points  from  language. 
Not  mere  intelligibility,  then,  makes  a  common 
language,  but  effective  co-operation  in  thought 
upon  universal  issues.1 

1  This  does  not  appear  in  the  ordinary  histories  of  litera- 
ture, which  treat   the   English   language  as   a   mere    manner 


i4     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

But  neither  blood  nor  language  have  the 
importance  in  this  matter  which  belongs  to 
tradition.1  A  common  tradition  knits  a  group 
more  closely  than  physical  relationship  or  common 
language.  Men  whose  ancestors  have  fought  for 
the  same  cause  or  used  peace  for  the  same  ends 
are  more  securely  united  than  even  those  of  the 
same  physical  family.  In  fact  it  is  a  tradition  of 
purpose  attempted  that  gives  the  human  ''family" 
its  most  potent  value.  The  finest  element  in 
aristocracy  is  the  inheritance  of  some  tradition  ; 
and  this  inheritance  the  Middle  Ages  endeavoured 
to  make  possible  for  the  lowest-born  by  monasti- 
cisrn,  in  which  one  entered  the  "  family  "  of  the 
founder.  Tradition  has  bound  men  together 
even  when  they  were  hardly  conscious  of  it  ; 
and  the  most  decadent  results  of  in-breeding 
among  "  nobilities "  have  often  been  given  an 
artificial  stamina  by  noblesse  oblige.  In  larger 
societies  tradition  has  brought  villages  to  fame 
and  endowed  hill-tribesmen  with  human  dignity, 

of  expression  with  hardly  an  understanding  of  what  in  the 
subject-matter  expressed  is  characteristic  and  what  is  interna- 
tional and  what  universal. 

1  For  example,  the  formation  of  the  English  Nation  by 
tradition  uniting  men  of  alien  blood  (British,  Saxon,  Norman) 
and  diverse  languages  shows  how  far  back  this  element  of 
Nationality  may  be  supposed  to  go.  There  is  no  clearer 
statement  of  this  element  of  Nationality  than  in  Renan's 
Qiiest-ce  qifon  nation?  {Conf.faite  en  Sorbonne,  1882). 


MORALITY  AND   NATIONALITY     15 

so  much  so  that  we  must  count  it  one  of  the 
chief  formative  elements  in  human  grouping. 
Thus  in  the  case  of  Belgium  a  common  purpose 
overrides  the  distinction  of  race  and  language 
between  Walloon  and  Fleming  ;  and  this  is  but 
an  extreme  instance  of  the  same  case  which  we 
find  in  the  union  of  Breton  and  the  Gens  du 
Midi  in  France. 

To  define  more  clearly  what  is  meant  by  a 
common  tradition,  there  must  be  in  the  first  place 
a  common  history.  If  it  is  an  eventful  history, 
a  short  period  of  common  adventure  will  make  a 
group  of  families  into  a  nation  :  if  not  much  has 
been  risked,  then  many  centuries  will  be  neces- 
sary. Thus  more  was  done  for  the  development 
of  the  national  force  in  England  during  the  few 
years  of  risk  in  Elizabeth's  reign  than  during  the 
centuries  of  desultory  warfare  which  preceded. 
More  was  done  for  unifying  the  confused  groups 
of  Revolutionary  France  in  the  few  months  of 
risk  of  foreign  invasion  in  1792  than  had  been 
done  by  the  ardent  constitution-makers  of  the 
preceding  years. 

It  is  not  enough,  then,  to  say  that  men  must 
have  a  common  memory  :  for  not  merely  the 
fact  of  a  common  history,  but  the  kind  of  history 
is  important.  Adventure  in  common  is  more 
uniting  than  a  shared  commonplace  :  and  this  is 
the   reason  why  war  seems  to   be    so   important 


1 6     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

for  the  making  of  a  nation.  The  advocates  of 
war  do  not  simply  believe  it  to  be  a  regrettable 
necessity,  but  they  look  to  the  risk  it  involves 
as  the  only  means  by  which  men  can  learn  their 
common  interest  as  a  nation.  Risk,  and  there- 
fore war,  since  this  has  been  the  chief  source  of 
danger  to  all  primitive  groups,  has  been  the  great 
formative  cause  of  nationality.  It  not  only 
makes  men  forget  private  interest  in  a  common 
cause,  but  it  defines  more  clearly  the  lack  of 
common  interest  in  an  alien  group. 

We  say,  then,  that  tradition,  as  the  force  for 
national  unity  and  the  diversity  of  nations,  has 
meant  war  :  and  war  may  still  act  in  this  way. 
Of  that  we  shall  speak  later.  It  is,  however, 
necessary  to  say  that  this  by  no  means  proves 
war  to  be  essential  to  the  realisation  of  nation- 
ality. With  those  who  are  mentally  incompetent 
to  realise  any  danger  but  the  physical,  and  with 
those  who  are  unable  to  grasp  any  but  the  crudest 
common  interests  or  the  crudest  differences  from 
others,  war  will  always  be  thus  effective,  but  we 
may  hope  that  those  who  are  more  developed 
will  not  always  need  to  be  governed  by  the 
necessity  for  the  undeveloped  to  be  taught 
common  interests.1 

1  Of  course,  that  war  has  knit  men  together  is  no  excuse 
for  planning  war,  as  the  fact  that  disease  has  taught  men 
endurance  is  no  excuse  for  increasing  disease.     To  praise  war 


MORALITY   AND   NATIONALITY     17 

There  are  other  risks  besides  those  of  foreign 
conquest,  as,  for  example,  the  risk  of  domination 
by  a  caste  or  a  clique  ;  and  this  risk  also  unites 
men  and  makes  nations.  In  the  English  Revolu- 
tion, and  still  more  in  the  French  Revolution, 
this  danger  is  seen  actively  driving  the  most 
diverse  men  together.  There  is  also  the  danger, 
most  effective  in  earlier  times,  of  disease  and 
famine.  Even  the  presence  of  a  volcano  will 
make  men  brothers.  And  there  are  dangers,  not 
grasped  by  the  majority  but  unconsciously  effec- 
tive, of  mental  decay  or  moral  deterioration, 
the  fear  of  which  is  the  real  reason  for  men's 
willingness  to  support  such  activities  as  national 
Education.1 

A  tradition,  however,  looks  forward  as  well  as 
back.  It  implies  a  common  purpose  or  a  common 
ideal.2  The  group  which  is  united  by  a  living 
tradition  generally  holds  (1)  the  same  sort  of 
character  the  best,  and  (2)  the  same  sort  of  life 
the  most  desirable.    Yet  neither  the  ideal  character 

is  like  praising  the  man  who  burns  down  his  house  in  order 
to  be  certain  of  the  domestic  affection  of  those  who  dwell  in  it 
(cf.  Graham  Wallas,  The  Great  Society). 

1  Perhaps  historians  will  look  back  to  the  United  States  as 
an  example  of  a  nation  which  has  not  been  formed  by  war,  so 
much  at  least  as  earlier  nations  have. 

2  I  give  the  word  tradition  this  meaning  as  well,  because 
it  seems  that  what  has  united  in  the  past  is  this  common 
ideal :  and  it  is  because  it  was  an  ideal  that  the  memory  of  the 
past  is  so  valuable. 

c 


1 8     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

nor  the  ideal  life  may  be  yet  in  existence  :  the 
present  circumstances  in  the  group  may  only  tend 
in  the  admired  direction.  The  ideals  imagined 
may  have  only  a  vague  basis  in  fact,  and  yet  they 
may  unite  as  if  they  were  established  facts. 

It  is  difficult,  of  course,  to  state  in  a  formula 
the  nature  of  the  character  admired  in  England. 
Nor  is  any  statement  of  it  to  be  found  in  treatises 
on  Ethics.  It  is  expressed  more  clearly  than 
elsewhere  in  contemporary  novels  and  drama  : 
but  to  be  understood  the  admiration  must  be 
watched  in  the  crowd  at  a  cricket-match,  in  the 
audience  at  a  political  meeting  or  in  the  coteries 
of  clubs  and  universities.  Expressing  it  inexactly 
and  in  a  general  way  one  might,  we  may  suppose, 
contrast  the  character  admired  among  us  with 
that  admired  by  Prussians,  in  so  far  as  they  do 
not  seem  to  understand  what  we  should  call 
playing  the  game,  and  they  set  a  value  upon 
"  dignity  "  which  we  do  not.  The  French  also 
differ  from  us  in  seeming  to  think  us  too  solemn, 
while  our  popular  superstition  accuses  the  French 
of  frivolity.  These  absurdities  stand  for  the  real 
distinctions  in  characters  admired.  Thus  character 
admired  unites  men.  They  accept  as  desirable 
the  existence  of  human  beings  of  intelligence  or 
sobriety  or  strong  emotion  or  stern  intentness. 

But  also  the  kind  of  life  we  hold  desirable 
makes  our  tradition.     Personal  independence  we 


MORALITY   AND   NATIONALITY     19 

value  highly,  and  we  are  willing  to  risk  egoism 
in  order  to  secure  individuality.  The  organisa- 
tion of  the  group  is  a  further  question  which 
must  be  dealt  with  in  defining  the  nature  of  the 
State  ;  but  we  may  say  here  that  all  organisation 
is  by  us  supposed  to  make  the  life  of  the  indi- 
vidual more  free  ;  and  we  think  that  the  greater 
the  variety  of  individuals,  the  finer  the  life  of 
each  in  the  group.  This  ideal  is  clear  not  only 
from  the  arguments  of  the  great  English  Indi- 
vidualists, Mill  and  Sidgwick,  but  even  from  the 
expression  of  ideals  in  romance. 

Perhaps  it  is  not  fair  to  summarise  the 
Prussian  ideal  of  life,  but  it  appears  to  be  clear 
from  its  expression  in  literature  that  independ- 
ence of  the  individual  is  by  them  somewhat 
suspected.  They  seem  to  think  that  a  group  is 
finer  the  more  homogeneous  the  individuals  are  who 
compose  it  :  and  we  do  not  deny  that  such  a  group 
is  more  easily  governed,  but  they  seem  to  think  that 
orderly  and  smooth-running  government  is  an  end. 

Again,  the  French  desire  generally  a  different 
kind  of  life  from  ours  or  the  Prussian.  They 
appear  to  us  sometimes  to  tend  to  bureaucracy 
and  the  adoration  of  petty  officials.  To  them  we 
appear  "  haphazard."  And  other  like  contrasts 
may  be  found  in  the  kinds  of  life  desired  by 
Italians,  or  Spaniards,  or  Japanese.  Thus  the 
kind  of   life   desired  is   one  of  the   elements  of 


20     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

tradition,  in  so  far  as  it  unites  men  for  a  common 
purpose  :  and  it  is  not  unusual  for  the  ignorant 
to  suppose  that  there  is  something  deficient  in  a 
kind  of  life  which  they  do  not  desire. 

Tradition,  however,  is  most  powerful  when  it 
is  embodied  in  a  characteristic  form  of  religion. 
In  early  times  the  group  is  united  and  distin- 
guished from  other  groups  by  some  form  of 
ritual :  the  king  is  the  priest  and  group-customs 
are  rites.1  Sometimes  a  religion  is  enough  to 
keep  a  "  nation  "  in  existence  in  spite  of  diverging 
language.     The  Jews  are  an  example. 

As  civilisation  develops  and  religion  becomes 
more  closely  connected  with  morality,  the  kind  of 
life  and  character  admired  (the  moral  standard) 
is  fixed  and  developed  by  religious  sanctions. 
Where  the  religious  group  is  coterminous  with 
the  blood  and  language  group,  where  the  physical 
or  intellectual  relatives  have  the  same  ritual  and 
creed,  the  nation  is  stronger.  Patriotism  and 
orthodoxy  are  inseparable  and  are,  in  the  minds 
of  the  majority,  identified.  Such  is  the  situation 
in  most  of  Ireland  and  in  Poland :  and  even  in 
more  complex  nations  there  is  often  a  tendency  to 
reaction  by  the  identifying  of  national  enthusiasm 
with  some  special  form  of  creed.2 

1  The  theme  is  well  worn  :  cf.  Frazer,  Golden  Bough  ;  Jane 
Harrison,  Themis ;  and  Durkheim. 

2  As,  for  example,  in  Dimnet's  France  herself  again. 


MORALITY   AND   NATIONALITY     21 

Where  the  religious  ritual  and  creed  is  not 
precisely  the  same  throughout  the  whole  group, 
as  in  England  and  in  Germany,  there  is,  neverthe- 
less, a  certain  general  resemblance  in  the  religious 
attitude  of  most  citizens  which  is  sufficient  to 
support  the  distinction  of  the  group  at  least  from 
extremely  distant  groups  such  as  the  Japanese. 
But  in  the  differentiation  which  follows  a  higher 
civilisation,  the  national  differences  are  often  quite 
unconnected  with  religious  differences.  In  every 
case,  however,  religion  seems  to  have  an  important 
influence  on  the  formation  of  nationality.  So  far, 
then,  we  may  go  in  indicating  what  makes  a  nation  : 
but  the  nature  of  nationality  may  be  understood 
also  from  the  results  it  has  had  in  the  political  sphere. 

The  result  of  common  blood,  language  and 
tradition  has  generally  been  the  establishment  of 
common  institutions,  which  distinguish  this  group 
from  the  other.  And  these  institutions  have  been 
for  many  different  purposes.  The  first,  in  the 
development  of  history,  has  been  religion  :  in  fact 
the  nation,  like  the  tribe  or  the  family,  has  often 
been  a  religious  union,  long  before  it  was  a 
political  whole.  The  result  is  national  priesthood 
and  ritual :  and  when  nations  arise  at  a  later  stage 
in  civilisation  the  result  is  a  national  Church.  In 
a  developed  culture  educational  institutions  tend  to 
be  distinct  and  characteristic  of  different  national 
groups. 


22     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

But  for  our  present  purpose  the  political  institu- 
tions are  the  most  interesting.  They  are  of  many 
kinds,  and  not  all  nations  have  contrived  to 
establish  a  unique  form  of  the  highest  political 
institution  called  the  State.1  Sometimes  the 
State-organisation  is  accepted  from  aliens  while 
the  regional  administration  remains  national  and 
distinctive.  But  every  State  is  the  institutional 
result  of  some  national  sentiment  or  tradition, 
even  when  the  institution  is  imposed  upon  other 
nations.  And  it  is  now  often  regarded  in  England 
as  desirable  that  there  should  be  a  closer  corre- 
spondence than  there  is  between  the  distinctions 
of  nationality  and  the  distinctions  of  political 
institutions.    - 

The  consciousness  of  nationality  has  produced 
a  plan  of  action  called  Nationalism,  according  to 
which  each  nation  should  have  its  own  supreme 
political  organisation.2  In  its  exaggerated  form 
this  would  mean  that  every  nation  should  be  a 
State  ;    and   this,   whether   practicable   or   not,   is 

1  Since  there  is  magic,  black  or  white,  in  words,  it  is  as  well 
to  note  that  State  (Staat,  etat,  stato)  means  simply  "  established." 
It  comes  into  use  from  the  phrase  "  status  reipublicae."  Cf.  a 
full  treatment  in  Jellinek,  op.  cit.,  Ch.  V,  p.  123. 

It  is  absurd  to  treat  nationality  as  a  political  fact  only  ;  it 
is  also  a  religious  or  a  cultural  fact,  and  is  only  political  in  so 
far  as  it  expresses  itself  in  a  political  institution. 

2  It  is  well  to  remember  that  this  ideal  is  recent.  The 
French  Directorate  of  1795,  etc.,  declared  a  policy  of  "  natural 
boundaries "  which  still  affects  German  statesmen. 


MORALITY   AND    NATIONALITY     23 

of  interest  for  our  present  purpose  because  it 
establishes  the  distinction  now  accepted  between 
a  nation  and  a  State.  It  has  been  maintained  that 
every  nation  should  have  its  own  Church,  and 
in  every  such  theory  the  institutional  system  is 
distinguished  from  the  group  united  by  blood, 
language  and  tradition. 

When  we  turn,  with  this  conception  of  nation 
and  nationality,  to  discover  what  difference  such 
facts  make  to  morality  we  find  that  nationality 
which  has  not  resulted  in  distinct  States  makes  no 
difference  at  all.  Differences  of  blood,  language 
and  tradition  seem  to  make  no  difference  to  the 
arrangement  of  conflicting  interest  according  to 
the  same  moral  criteria  which  are  used  between 
members  of  the  same  family. 

But  where  the  political  institutions  differ,  the 
moral  relationships  of  men  seem  to  differ.  No 
one  would  maintain  that  the  moral  relationship  of 
inhabitants  of  Scotland  and  England  differs  from 
that  of  one  Englishman  to  another.  Issues  to  be 
decided  between  Englishmen  are  decided  in  the 
same  way  as  between  an  Englishman  and  a  Scots- 
man or  an  Indian,  allowing,  of  course,  for  peculi- 
arities of  local  law.  For  no  one  imagines  that 
the  Englishman  must  "expand"  as  against  the 
Scotsman,  or  that  where  it  is  doubtful  whose 
interests  should  suffer  it  must  be  decided  by  force 
of  arms.     Again,  Slavs  under  Austrian   rule  are 


24     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

treated  as  rebels  if  they  refuse  to  fight  Slavs  of 
Serbia;  and  thus  it  seems  that  the  moral  attitude 
towards  people  living  under  different  political 
institutions  is  supposed  to  be  different  from  the 
normal,  whether  or  not  these  others  are  of  the 
same  nation.  Moral  criteria,  then,  are  accepted  as 
between  nations  but  not  altogether  between  States  : 
so  that  it  may  seem  as  if  the  differing  institutions 
created  a  new  moral  situation  or  an  absolutely 
unmoral  situation. 

We  shall  have,  then,  to  examine  into  the  nature 
of  this  astonishing  institution  called  the  State, 
which  seems  to  have  so  strange  an  effect  upon 
morality.  We  may  put  aside  altogether  the  idea 
that  the  relationship  between  citizens  of  diverse 
states  is  unmoral.  It  has  been  maintained  by 
Machiavelli  ;  and  although  Treitschke  and  von 
Bulow  and  even  Bismarck  were  probably  not 
competent  to  think  out  what  their  writings  imply, 
it  seems  to  be  maintained  also  by  them.  A  State 
is  not  mere  power  nor  a  natural  force  like  electri- 
city :  or  rather  if  anyone  chooses  to  use  the  word 
in  that  sense  he  is  not  thinking  of  what  we  call 
the  supreme  political  institution.1  That  such 
institutions  are  related  morally  we  take  as  proved 

1  I  need  hardly  say  that  the  German  tradition  is  opposed  to 
Treitschke,  as  is  apparent  in  Kant,  Fichte  and  Hegel ;  and  in 
Bluntschli's  The  State  has  a  moral  nature  (ist  ein  sittliches  Weseri) 
and  moral  duties. 


MORALITY   AND   NATIONALITY     25 

by  the  existence  of  intercourse  and  the  limitations 
of  warfare ;  but  what  precisely  those  moral  rela- 
tionships are  we  shall  have  to  discuss  later.  It  is 
sufficient  to  note  here  that  they  are  moral  and  are 
accepted  as  such  by  implication  even  in  those 
works  which  seem  to  argue  that  they  are  not. 

The  fundamental  issue  first  to  be  decided  is  as 
to  the  nature  of  the  State.  And  this  can  only  be 
discovered  by  noticing  the  current  conceptions  of 
it  and  making  such  corrections  as  the  present  facts 
seem  to  necessitate.  The  result  will  be  not  a 
finished  philosophy  of  the  State,  but  an  indication 
of  present  tendencies  in  the  morality  of  citizens  as 
related  to  citizens  of  other  States. 


CHAPTER   II 

THE    STATE    AND    OTHER    INSTITUTIONS 

The  question  "What  is  a  State?"  has  been 
answered  in  many  great  works  ;  but  since  new 
facts  have  come  into  prominence  in  recent  years 
the  old  answers  are  quite  inadequate.  The  con- 
ceptions which  arose  from  Greek  city  life,  from 
the  Mediaeval  Empire,  from  Renaissance  Juris- 
prudence and  even  from  the  Nineteenth  Century 
democracy  are  no  longer  adequate  to  explain  what 
we  now  experience.  Each  is,  as  Bacon  said  of 
Scholastic  philosophy,  "  subtilitati  naturae  longe 
impar  "  :  and  all  must  be  replaced  or  corrected. 

Summarily  one  may  say  that  there  have  been 
four  great  conceptions  of  the  State — not,  of  course, 
merely  four  ways  of  using  the  word  but  four  ways 
of  regarding  the  same  fact.  These  are  the  Greek, 
the  Mediaeval,  the  Renaissance  and  that  of  the 
Nineteenth  Century.  These  four  philosophies  have 
some  common  features,  since  all  are  really  theories 
of  the  same  fact  :  and  this  fact  in  its  general 
features  may  be  described  somewhat  as  follows. 
Institutions  of  many  kinds  exist,  of  which  some 

26 


STATE  AND  OTHER  INSTITUTIONS    27 

are  subordinate  to  others,  not  necessarily  in  im- 
portance but  in  organisation.  That  political  organ- 
isation which  is  not  subordinated  to  any  other  and 
which  generally  unites  men  of  the  same  race  and 
language  is  what  is  referred  to  in  all  theories  of 
the  State.1  Organisation,  then,  is  fundamental  to 
the  idea  of  a  State  and  not,  for  example,  to  that 
of  a  nation.  But,  further,  I  think  we  may  say 
that  such  organisation  must  be  conscious.  In 
this  way  State  organisation  seems  to  differ  from 
that  of  the  family,  although  the  distinction  is 
perhaps  only  one  of  degree.  The  "  democratic  " 
State  implies  organisation  consciously  accepted  or 
even  originated  by  the  majority  of  its  members, 
whereas  the  despotic  or  oligarchic  State  is  an 
organisation  accepted  as  unquestioningly  by  the 
greater  number  as  is  the  family  or  the  tribe. 

This  also  is  common  to  all  States,  of  the  Greek 
as  well  as  of  the  modern  type,  that  they  are 
organisations  for  the  attainment  of  the  common 
"  political "  good  of  those  organised.  But  a 
political  good  is  distinct  from  a  religious,  in- 
dustrial, economic,  artistic  or  scientific  good  : 
although  all  these  goods  may  have  been  attained 

1  I  take  the  sovereign  State  of  International  Law  as  the  real 
State  and  not,  for  example,  the  "  State  "  of  New  York  :  but  I 
do  not  wish  to  imply  that  the  State  is  sovereign  over  organisa- 
tions of  another  kind,  nor  even  that  "  sovereign  "  implies 
complete  independence. 


28     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

in  the  past  by  the  use  of  one  institution.  I  shall 
endeavour  to  show  in  what  follows  that  the  State 
is  not  now  for  the  purpose  of  an  undefined  or 
unlimited  common  good,  but  only  for  the  common 
good  of  a  certain  kind  :  and  I  shall  suppose  that 
political  good  is  a  civilised  life  which  may  pro- 
vide opportunity  for  varied  interests  or  activities. 
The  political  good,  then,  does  not  include  the 
whole  of  "  the  good  life,"  as  it  would  to  Aristotle 
or  to  any  Greek,  but  may  be  regarded  as  the 
necessary  condition  for  attaining  the  artistic,  scientific 
or  religious  good.  The  general  will  is  now  organ- 
ised for  different  purposes  in  different  ways  :  or 
we  may  be  more  exact  and  say  that  there  are 
different  general  wills  even  "  in  the  same  person." 
But  the  State  is  always  in  all  philosophies  re- 
garded as  at  least  the  sovereign  organisation  for  the 
attainment  of  political  common  good.1  No  doubt  much 
more  may  be  included  in  all  past  philosophies, 
but  this  is  all  that  it  is  necessary  for  us  to  assume 
as  common  in  order  to  show  the  deficiencies  of 
our  inherited  conceptions. 

Allowing,  therefore,  for  the  common  features 
of  all  "  States "  in  all  civilised  periods,  there  are 

1  It  will  be  understood  that  "  sovereign  "  here  means  only 
highest  of  all  institutions  (of  the  same  group)  which  are  of  the 
same  political  order.  The  State  is  thus  "  sovereign  "  over  a 
municipality  which  exists  for  departmental  order  and  liberty  : 
and  is  not  sovereign  over  institutions  which  exist  for  other 
purposes. 


STATE  AND  OTHER  INSTITUTIONS    29 

nevertheless  great  differences  between  the  modern 
State  and  all  supreme  political  institutions  of  earlier 
times.  But  these  earlier  institutions  were  the 
evidence  'for  our  inherited  theories  of  the  State. 
It  would  not  then  be  strange  if  such  theories 
seemed  inadequate  for  dealing  with  present  prob- 
lems. Indeed,  although  there  is  something  common 
to  the  modern  State  and  the  political  institutions 
of  earlier  times,  there  is  much  that  makes  the  old 
conceptions  difficult  to  apply  to  the  present  situa- 
tion. In  the  first  place,  the  present  meaning  of 
politics  indicates  the  change,  since  we  now  dis- 
tinguish politics  from  religion,  education  or  culture. 
But  it  is  only  in  recent  times  that  institutions  for 
entirely  different  purposes  have  been  recognised 
to  exist  independently  of  the  State.  Churches 
did  not  exist  in  Aristotle's  time,  international 
scientific  associations  were  not  of  much  impor- 
tance in  Hobbes's  day,  and  trade  unions  were 
negligible  in  Hegel's  day.  Now  a  civilised 
man  belongs  to  more  than  one  institution, 
and  the  different  institutions  are  used  for  en- 
tirely different  purposes.1  We  must  therefore 
point  out  the  peculiarities  of  the  earlier  political 
institutions  in  the  four  great  periods  of  political 

1  "  When  a  body  of  men  .  .  .  bind  themselves  to  act 
together  for  any  purpose  .  .  .  they  create  a  body  which  by 
no  fiction  of  law  but  by  the  very  nature  of  things  differs  from 
the  individuals  composing  it."  Dicey,  quoted  in  Maitland 
(Coll.  Papers,  III.    Body  Pol). 


3o     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

thought,  especially  with  respect  to  the  purposes 
for  which  political  institutions  were  supposed  to 
exist.  They  have  either  included  much  more 
than  we  expect  of  the  State  or  they  have  implied 
a  sharing  of  social  functions  with  other  institutions 
which  is  impossible  now. 

(A)  The  Greek  ■polls.  The  modern  State  is  so 
essentially  different  from  the  Greek  City-State 
that  it  will  not  be  necessary  to  go  through  all 
the  distinctions.  But  we  must  notice  that  polis 
stands  for  an  institution  supplying  nearly  all  the 
needs  of  civilised  life — religion,  politics,  music, 
painting,  and  part  of  education.  Naturally  such 
an  institution  is  absolute,  and  its  maintenance  is 
the  necessity  of  any  civilised  life  whatever.  But 
no  such  institution  exists  now.  The  theories 
about  it  are  too  vague  :  for  as  metaphysics  or 
tl  philosophy "  once  meant  what  is  now  divided 
into  astronomy,  physics  and  logic,  so  "  politics " 
once  meant  what  is  now  divided  up  into  different 
studies  of  social  structure.  Thus  Aristotle  on 
"  politics"  discusses  flute-playing  and  Plato  poetry  : 
for  the  polis,  which  no  longer  exists,  was  the 
object  of  their  study.  Now,  as  politics  no  longer 
deals  with  the  polis,  so  the  word  "  State  "  does  not 
generally  stand  now  for  what  supplies  our  religious, 
intellectual  or  artistic  needs,  and  perhaps  not  even 
for  an  institution  supplying  our  food  and  cloth- 
ing,  although    to    the    modern    mind    economics 


STATE  AND  OTHER  INSTITUTIONS    31 

and  politics  are  not  clearly  distinguished.  So 
that  whatever  the  institution  may  be  which  we 
call  a  State,  the  conceptions  due  to  the  absolutism 
and  universalism  of  the  polls  do  not  apply  to  it. 
Those  ideas  of  Plato  and  Aristotle  which  imply 
that  there  is  one  institution  supplying  all  civilised 
needs  are  simply  obsolete.  The  Roman  "  urbs  " 
was  in  a  sense  new,  especially  when  it  became  an 
"  orbs  "  ;  and  there  existed  also  "  collegia  "  which 
embodied  other  purposes  than  the  political  ;  but 
the  old  theory  of  the  omnipotent  polls  which 
supplied  the  whole  of  civilised  life  still  seemed 
to  be  sufficient. 

(B)  The  Mediaeval  Regnum.  On  the  downfall 
of  Rome  new  institutions  came  into  prominence. 
One,  called  the  Church,  was  non-racial,  and  aimed 
at  being  Cosmopolitan  :  it  supplied  artistic  and 
educational  as  well  as  religious  needs.  There 
were  also  the  feeble  Empire  and  many  half- 
independent  organisations  for  supplying  political 
needs,  particularly  order,  directed  and  sometimes 
established  by  warriors.  These  came  into  con- 
tinual conflict,  as  to  the  limits  of  their  functioning, 
with  the  universal  Church.  They  were  called 
generally  regno, ;  but  no  such  institution  now 
exists.  The  conceptions  due  to  mediaeval  king- 
ship, as  keeping  order  and  having  no  direct 
interest  in  education  or  culture,  are  obsolete. 
The  Greek-Roman  conception  included  too  much 


32     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

in  politics,  the  mediaeval  excluded  too  much  from 
it.  The  relation  to  the  only  other  type  of  institu- 
tion, the  Church,  was  too  simple  to  apply  to  our 
modern  situation  \l  and  other  institutions,  gilds 
and  universities  seemed  to  exist  at  the  pleasure  of 
the  King  or  the  Pope. 

(C)  The  Renaissance  Sovereign  State.  The  medi- 
aeval struggle  practically  ended  in  the  defeat  of 
the  Church,  and  the  old  regna  put  on  the 
sacredness  of  their  opponent.  The  new  institu- 
tion was  in  some  sense  a  reaction  towards  the 
po/tSy  in  so  far  as  the  State  then  claimed  to 
be  supreme  over  religion.  But  no  State  con- 
trived to  become  a  Church ;  and  men  united  for 
political  purposes  were  quite  divided  for  religious 
or  artistic  or  cultural  purposes.  The  State  as  a 
political  institution,  however,  was  regarded  as  more 
important  than  any  other  institution,  and  every 
other  association  or  institution  for  civilised  life 
seemed  to  owe  its  existence  to  this  Leviathan. 
As  opposed  to  egoistic  individualism  there  seemed 
to  be  only  one  social  bond,  that  of  citizenship  ; 
so  that  the  only  loyalty  was  patriotism,  and  the 
only  institution  for  which  a  man  should  give  his 
life  was,  not  church  or  university,  but  the  State, 
identified  in    practice  with  the  King. 

1  Largely  because  the  "Church"  included  too  much  among 
its  purposes  for  it  to  be  regarded  as  equivalent  to  any  single 
institution   now  existing. 


STATE  AND  OTHER  INSTITUTIONS    33 

(D)  The  Nineteenth  Century.  The  French  Revo- 
lution disturbed  the  Renaissance  situation  but 
resulted  in  little  change  of  the  current  political 
conceptions.  For  the  continued  growth  of  new 
institutions  was  hardly  marked  in  the  new  theories 
of  the  State.  The  new  political  institutions 
were  practically  national  ;  and  affection  based 
upon  blood,  language  or  tradition,  being  directed 
to  the  maintenance  of  the  State,  exalted  the  State 
still  more  as  compared  with  Church,  economic 
unions  or  cultured  societies.  Mediaevalists  pro- 
tested against  the  Erastianism,  but  the  position  of 
superiority  to  all  other  institutions  was  granted 
to  the  State  grudgingly  in  England  and  gladly  in 
France,  Germany  and  Italy.  Even  in  England 
the  suspicion  of  the  omnipotent  State,  which  can 
be  felt  in  the  Utilitarians,  was  expressed  as  though 
the  opposite  to  State-worship  could  only  be  an 
isolating  Individualism.  There  was  no  word  of 
other  social  bonds.  The  new  situation  had  led 
to  a  correction  of  Greek  u  politics,"  Mediaeval 
simplicity  and  Renaissance  absolutism  ;  but  a 
further  change  due  to  industrialism  and  the  closer 
contact  of  nations  was  to  make  political  theory 
even  of  the  nineteenth  century  hopelessly  inade- 
quate. The  world  changed  too  quickly  for  the 
slowly  moving  wits  of  the  philosophers. 

Present  Political  Theory.     In  theory  the  modern 
State   still  continues  to   be   a   mixture   of   Greek 


34     THE    MORALITY    OF   NATIONS 

polisi  Mediaeval  regnum  and  Renaissance  "  sove- 
reign "  ;  but  in  fact  the  modern  State  gener- 
ally does  not  supply  religion  or  food  and  clothing, 
even  if  it  makes  the  supply  of  such  needs  possible 
by  law  and  order.  The  theory  of  politics  still 
continues  to  deal  with  issues  which  no  practical 
politician  would  dare  to  touch  ;  whereas  in  fact 
men  treat  politics  as  being  concerned  supremely 
with  the  State,  and  in  this  with  one  only  of  their 
common  interests.  A  man  who  belonged  to  a 
State  only  and  not  to  a  Church  or  an  academy  or 
a  company  or  an  artistic  society  or  a  trade  union, 
would  not  be  conceived  to  be  a  whole  man. 
Clearly,  then,  one  man  may  belong  to  many  insti- 
tutions for  many  different  purposes,  and  the  State 
is  one  among  these  ;  but  only  superior  to  others 
if  the  purposes  of  citizenship  are  more  valuable 
to  us  than  other  purposes,  or  if  we  get  more  of 
what  we  value  by  belonging  to  the  State  than  we 
get  by  belonging  to  any  other  institution.  But 
the  State  is  still  regarded  as  sacred  by  many  who 
have  given  up  the  sacredness  of  kings.  And 
perhaps  the  theological  unorthodoxy  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  will  have  to  be  followed  by  political 
unorthodoxy  in  the  twentieth.  For  we  are  now 
aware  of  the  genesis  of  the  State,  and  no  longer 
regard  it  as  descended  from  heaven.  Facts  force 
themselves  on  our  notice,  while  we  still  strive  to 


STATE  AND  OTHER  INSTITUTIONS     35 

believe  in  a  confused  medley  of  the  observations 
of  dead  thinkers. 

Of  all  the  obsolete  conceptions  of  the  State  the 
Hegelian  is,  perhaps,  the  most  obsolete,  in  regard 
to  the  purposes  for  which  social  organisation  is 
supposed  to  exist.  The  State  is  made  into  an 
absolute  institution,  including  and  transcending 
all  others  ;  and  with  such  a  conception  it  is 
natural  to  conclude  that  "  Kultur  "  in  its  widest 
sense,  and  everything  which  makes  life  civilised, 
is  due  to  the  wonderful  State.  The  last  absurdity 
is  reached  when  this  mysterious  and  all-powerful 
organisation  is  identified  with  Prussian  bureau- 
cracy. But  happily  no  Hegelian  State  exists  ;  for 
even  German  "  Kultur "  is  not  dependent  upon 
the  German  State  alone.  The  State  being  one  of 
many  institutions,  it  is  well  to  recognise  that  its 
position  with  regard  to  other  institutions  is  not 
that  of  inclusion  or  transcendence.  A  citizen  may 
belong  to  a  Church  which  counts  among  its 
members  citizens  of  other  States  than  his  ;  or  he 
may  belong  to  a  company  of  scholars  much  more 
closely  in  contact  than  are  the  citizens  of  any  State  ; 
or  he  may  belong  to  a  non-national  capitalist  com- 
pany or  a  labour  union.  To  each  of  these  insti- 
tutions he  belongs  for  a  special  purpose  ;  each  he 
maintains  for  a  special  gain  which  he  expects  from 
it.     And    even    when,    as    in    the    case    of  some 


^6     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

Nonconformist  religious  bodies  or  some  trade 
unions,  all  the  members  are  citizens  of  one  State, 
it  does  not  follow  that  the  common  citizenship 
has  anything  to  do  with  the  membership  of  the 
other  institutions. 

When  one  man  belongs  to  many  institutions 
the  institutions  may  indeed  be  unified,  but  their 
distinction  is  not  obliterated  :  just  as  when  one 
man  eats  a  dinner  and  hears  a  symphony,  the 
dinner  and  the  symphony  remain  distinct.  Again, 
when  a  man  uses  many  institutions,  one  insti- 
tution need  not  be  "  superior "  to  the  other,  in 
sense  of  including  the  other.1  The  value  of  this 
institution  may  be  greater  than  the  value  of  that, 
as  we  value  more  what  we  derive  from  this  than 
what  we  derive  from  that :  but  it  does  not  appear 
to  be  obvious  that  the  State  is  necessarily  and 
in  every  instance  more  valuable  than  any  other. 
And  further,  if  we  do  make  estimates  of  the 
value  of  what  we  get  from  different  institutions, 
it  does  not  follow  that  there  is,  or  should  be,  any 
institution  which  is  "  sovereign  "  over  all.  When 
many  "  goods  "  are  compared,  there  is,  of  course, 
an  absolute  good  :  but  the  absolute  good  is 
different   in    kind — it   is    not  one   among    many, 

1  The  general  thesis  is  worked  out  by  Maitland,  following 
Gierke  (Pol,  Theory  in  the  Middle  Ages) ;  also  in  Figgis,  The  Church 
in  the  Modern  State,  the  independence  of  religious  association  is 
asserted.  In  Guild  Socialism  the  same  kind  of  thesis  is  com- 
bined with  what  seems  an  antiquated  view  of  a  federal  state. 


STATE  AND  OTHER  INSTITUTIONS     37 

it  is  a  universal  and  can  never  be  a  particular. 
Good  dinners,  good  literature,  good  music,  good 
order  and  freedom  are  all  "  goods  "  necessary  in 
the  civilised  life  ;  but  one  could  not  attain  this 
life  by  sacrificing  all  such  "goods"  and  aiming 
at  "the  good."  When  we  say,  then,  that  the 
State  is  not  sovereign  over  all  other  institutions, 
we  do  not  imply  that  the  Church  or  any  other 
institution  is  sovereign.  Modern  life  is  an 
orderly  democracy  of  varied  interests  ;  and  the 
relation  of  the  institutions  which  supply  those 
interests  is  therefore  democratic.  The  distinction 
of  value  between  the  purposes  for  which  institu- 
tions exist  may  indeed  subordinate  one  institution 
to  another  when  there  is  conflict  ;  but  normally 
they  exist  side  by  side  in  co-ordination  which  is 
not  subordination  to  anything  but  the  law  of 
their  own  existence. 

The  State,  by  contrast  with  other  institutions, 
may  be  regarded  as  providing  the  opportunity  for 
the  enjoyment  of  those  "  goods "  which  other 
institutions  supply  ;  but  no  special  form  of  State 
must,  as  we  shall  see,  be  therefore  supposed  to 
be  the  necessary  means  for  other  institutional 
ends.1     Law  and  government  in  general  are  the 

1  The  State  is  the  highest  institution  for  a  political  purpose, 
but  not  the  only  institution  even  for  this.  Subordinate  to  it 
are  municipal  councils,  provincial  governments,  etc.  Of  course, 
it  is  sovereign  over  these. 


38     THE    MORALITY  OF   NATIONS 

means  of  State-action  ;  and  the  purpose  is  order 
and  liberty — as  much  order  as  does  not  involve 
tyranny,  and  as  much  liberty  as  does  not  in- 
volve license.  But  the  State  does  not  provide 
art  or  science  or  religion  in  modern  times, 
although  none  of  these  could  exist  without  order 
and  liberty.  The  State  is  one  among  many 
institutions  which  seem  to  be  necessary  for  the 
civilised  life,  and  political  theory  must  therefore 
explain  its  relation  to  these.  This,  however,  is 
not  necessary  for  my  present  purpose,  if  it  is 
clear  that  the  relationship  will  be  based  upon  the 
purposes  for  which  the  different  institutions  exist. 
It  may  be  held  that  although  the  State  does 
not,  it  should  provide  all  the  needs  of  civilised 
life  ;  but  this  form  of  Socialism  seems  to  be  as 
obsolete  as  Prussian  despotism.1  The  refutation 
of  it  is  to  be  found  in  the  historical  law  of  the 
differentiation  of  function  in  institutions  ;  and 
we  take  this  law  as  the  general  statement  indi- 
cating the  characteristic  purpose  of  the  modern 
State.  To  take  a  non-controversial  example  : 
the  mediaeval  Church  supplied  music,  painting, 
drama  and  even,  in  early  times,  dancing,  as  well 
as  what  we  now  call  religion  and  morality.  The 
Church  building  of  the  mediaeval  town  represents 

1  It  is,  indeed,  of  German  manufacture.  State  Socialism 
has  direct  affinities  with  the  Hegelian  State-philosophy,  and 
that  again  with  Prussian  administration. 


STATE  AND  OTHER  INSTITUTIONS     39 

in  its  singleness  the  many  different  buildings 
which  we  now  call  the  concert-hall,  the  art- 
gallery,  the  museum,  the  theatre  and  sometimes, 
as  in  the  festa  asinaria^  the  music-hall.  On  the 
plan  of  a  mediaeval  city  one  finds  no  theatres  or 
art-galleries  :  not  because  the  needs  now  supplied 
in  such  buildings  were  not  felt,  but  because  one 
institution  supplied  them  all.  Since  the  Renais- 
sance, however,  learning  and  art  have  been 
supplied  by  new  institutions,  and  the  Church 
has  been  more  and  more  limited  in  its  function  ; 
but  it  has  gained  by  that  limitation  in  definiteness 
and  in  effectiveness  so  far  as  religion  is  con- 
cerned. And  the  same  may  be  argued  of  the 
modern  State  :  for  we  by  no  means  accept  the 
Spencerian  idea  that  the  limitation  of  State 
function  means  that  the  State  does  less  than  it 
did.  Although  the  function  of  the  State  is 
strictly  political,  its  sphere  of  action  now  is  much 
greater  than  in  the  days  when  one  institution 
provided  both  the  political  and  the  other  needs 
of  civilised  life.  The  limitation  of  State  function 
does  not,  by  any  means,  degrade  the  State,  as  the 
limitation  of  the  functions  of  a  Church  does  not 
degrade  the  Church.  We  give  more,  and  we 
expect  more  of  the  modern  State  ;  and,  indeed, 
we  receive  more  than  even  the  Athenians  did, 
for  specialisation  of  the  institution  has  increased 
its    power    and    the    range    of    its    effectiveness. 


4o     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

Spencer  made  the  mistake  of  supposing  that  if 
the  individual  had  greater  freedom,  the  State  must 
be  restricted ;  or  if  civilised  needs  were  supplied 
by  other  institutions,  the  State  must  become  less 
powerful.  But  such  an  idea  implies  that  there 
is  a  fixed  amount  of  shared  power,  such  that  if 
one  institution  gains  the  other  must  lose  ;  or  that 
there  is  a  strictly  bounded  sphere  of  action  within 
which  all  distribution  of  function  must  take 
place  :  whereas,  in  fact,  power  increases  and  the 
sphere  of  institutional  activity  is  always  expand- 
ing. So  that,  although  there  are  many  more 
institutions  than  there  once  were,  each  does  more 
than  any  single  comprehensive  institution  did  in 
the  past  ;  and  also — but  this  is  a  different  issue 
— although  the  individual  is  "  freer,"  the  State, 
so  far  from  being  restricted,  is  more  and  more 
active.  Indeed,  its  power  is  not  merely  correc- 
tive, it  has  even  become  directive.  The  limitation 
or  specialisation  of  function  is  therefore  by  no 
means  a  restriction  of  power. 

When  we  consider  not  the  English  State  only, 
but  each  civilised  State  in  turn,  we  see  every- 
where how  much  more  the  State  has  still  to  do 
than  it  has  ever  yet  done,  quite  apart  from  the 
changes  in  the  relationship  of  State  to  State  which, 
as  we  shall  see  later,  are  a  basis  for  more  action. 
We  have  a  long  way  to  go  in  extending  liberty. 
Men   are    not  free  who  are  born   under-fed  and 


STATE  AND  OTHER  INSTITUTIONS     41 

brought  up  in  surroundings  which  are  physically 
cramping  or  intellectually  barren.  And  where 
one  man  is  not  free,  the  whole  society  to  which 
he  belongs  is  not  free,  since  its  development  is 
restricted  by  the  restriction  of  its  citizen.  The 
State,  therefore,  must  extend  its  activities  in  this 
direction.  And,  again,  order  is  not  yet  estab- 
lished among:  the  new  economic  forces  which 
industrialism  has  created  ;  for  competition  is 
leading  to  monopoly  and  monopoly  to  discontent 
and  disorder.  Supply  and  demand  are  hopelessly 
confused,  for  there  is  a  glut  of  some  articles  and 
a  scarcity  of  others.  The  relation  of  classes  also 
is  not  orderly,  since  the  law  is  often  at  the  mercy 
of  caprice  and  the  poor  man  often  appeals  in 
vain.  All  this,  then,  is  also  material  for  State 
action.  So  that  when  we  say  that  the  practical 
politician  is  not  directly  concerned  with  religion 
or  art,  we  do  not  mean  that  there  is  less  to  be 
done.  On  the  contrary,  there  is  much  more  to 
be  done  than  such  politicians  imagine. 

Again,  we  are  but  on  the  frontiers  of  the 
problem  which  arises  out  of  the  control  by  the 
State,  not  of  individuals,  but  of  organised  groups. 
Institutions  which  exist  for  other  purposes  than 
the  maintenance  of  law  and  order  have  to  submit 
to  regulation  for  the  sake  of  law  and  order. 
Thus  a  Church  may  not  be  a  department  of 
State,  but  it  must  be  prevented  from  persecuting  ; 


42     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

a  trade  union  may  not  exist  for  the  benefit  of 
those  who  do  not  belong  to  it,  but  it  must  be 
prevented  from  injuring  them  ;  a  trust  or 
company  may  not  owe  its  existence  to  the  State, 
but  its  action  must  be  limited  in  the  interest 
of  the  body  of  citizens.  Indeed,  the  problems 
of  modern  political  theory  are  innumerable 
although  the  State  is  not  any  longer  what 
it  was  for  our  grandfathers.  The  massing  of 
inhabitants  in  great  cities,  the  manufacture  for 
a  world  market,  the  diversification  of  modern 
interests,  the  subtleties  of  modern  finance,  have  all 
gone  to  produce  the  new  situation.  And  in  that 
complexity  we  must  distinguish  the  different 
groupings  of  men  and  the  diverse  institutions 
which  men  use  in  common  for  different  purposes. 
One  institution  has  inherited  the  religious, 
another  the  cultural,  another  the  economic,  and 
another  the  political  purpose  of  the  old  Greek 
polls.  And  the  various  changes  of  history  have 
caused  a  continual  redistribution  of  function  until 
at  last  we  have  arrived  at  the  twentieth  century — 
which  is  not,  of  course,  the  end  of  time. 

But  whatever  the  State  may  be  ultimately 
proved  to  be,  it  is  clear  that  it  is  not,  with  respect 
to  other  institutions  for  civilised  life,  what  our 
traditional  philosophy  has  imagined  it  to  be. 


CHAPTER    III 

THE    STATE    AND    OTHER    STATES 

Not  only  by  contrast  with  institutions  used 
for  other  than  political  purposes  is  our  State 
different  from  the  political  institutions  of  the 
past,  but  also  by  reference  to  its  relationship 
with  other  States.  Supreme  political  institutions 
may  be  said  to  be  of  the  same  order  ;  and  it  is  in 
this  purely  political  sphere  also  that  the  modern 
State  differs  from  7roA<£  and  regnum  and 
"  sovereign."  Its  relationship  to  other  institu- 
tions of  the  same  order  is  absolutely  vital  to 
its  nature  ;  so  that  it  is  utterly  impossible  to 
regard  the  modern  State  as  isolated.  But  the 
inherited  theory  of  the  State  implies,  even  when 
it  does  not  express,  the  idea  that  "  foreign 
relations  "  are  a  matter  for  an  appendix  or  a 
short  chapter,  while  the  "  essence  "  of  the  State 
is  discussed  under  the  heading  of  law  and 
government.  Obviously  the  isolation  of  the 
State  for  purposes  of  discussion  is  largely  due 
to  the  importance  of  the  problem  regarding  the 
relationship  between  the  group  (nation,  families, 

43 


44     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

etc.)  and  the  institutions  of  the  group.  In 
modern  times  the  importance  of  understanding 
this  relationship  has  not  diminished.  There  is 
much  thought  of  nationality  and  group  character  : 
and,  of  course,  political  institutions  are  of  great 
importance  for  maintaining  and  developing  this. 
Internal  or  domestic  political  problems  are  not 
any  less  important  :  but,  admitting  this,  we  may 
nevertheless  maintain  that  no  State  can  be  under- 
stood at  all  if  it  is,  even  by  implication,  imagined 
to  be  the  only  State  in  existence. 

Let  us,  then,  put  aside,  for  the  present,  the 
question  of  nationality  and  consider  first  the 
false  philosophical  isolation  of  the  State. 

To  the  most  cursory  view  of  the  facts  it  is 
obvious  that  the  State,  our  present  organisation 
for  political  life,  is  normally  and  continuously 
in  contact  with  other  States.  The  sending  of 
occasional  embassies  has  given  place  not  only 
to  continued  diplomatic  intercourse  but  to  the 
most  intricate  business  of  the  consular  service. 
State  organisation  is  changed  in  one  place  because 
of  some  method  adopted  in  some  other  States,  as, 
for  example,  the  influence  of  "  foreign  systems  " 
may  be  seen  in  English  official  education.  Or 
again,  English  parliamentary  institutions  cause  a 
modification  of  those  in  other  States.  The 
existence  of  a  military  system  in  Germany  makes 
it  necessary  for  France  to  adopt  the  same  system. 


THE   STATE  AND  OTHER  STATES     45 

And  the  interrelation  is  not  always  in  the 
direction  of  assimilating  institutions  :  for  con- 
tinuous economic  intercourse  makes  the  German 
State  resist  the  growth  of  industry  for  the 
promotion  of  agriculture,1  while  in  the  United 
States  industry  is  more  and  more  protected 
against  "high  finance."  In  the  progress  of 
economic  differentiation  one  group  tends  to 
become  predominantly  industrial,  another  pre- 
dominantly agricultural,  and  so  on  :  the  institu- 
tions of  the  two  groups  tend,  therefore,  to  differ 
more  and  more.  But  they  differ  because  of 
their  interdependence.  This  interdependence,  then, 
is  of  importance  in  considering  the  nature  of 
the  State. 

When,  however,  we  turn  to  the  traditional 
philosophy  of  the  State  we  find  no  recognition 
of  such  facts  ;  partly,  as  we  must  allow,  because 
the  prominence  of  this  interdependence  is  a  new 
fact  which  has  not  been  so  noticeable  in  the  past, 
but  partly  because  of  the  concentration  of  atten- 
tion upon  other  facts.  If  we  follow  the  line  of 
history  farther  and  farther  back  into  the  past, 
the  philosophical  theory  of  the  State  is  seen  to 
be  more  and  more  inadequate  to  explain  present 
facts. 

The  Hegelian  State  lives  and  develops  by 
absorbing  its  own  vitals  ;  but  the  metaphysical 
1  Cp.  von  Biilow,  Imperial  Germany,  p.  208. 


46     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

dogmatism  of  the  "  Philosophy  of  Mind"  is  no 
worse  than  the  economic  dogmatism  of  Karl 
Marx.  He  sees  the  State  in  isolation  as  a 
changing  series  of  relations  between  citizens  ; 
and  he  barely  recognises  the  transference  of 
capital  across  boundaries  or  the  interchange  of 
industry  which  was  to  make  of  his  State 
Socialism  an  obsolete  ideal.  To  Spencer  and 
even  to  Mill  and  Sidgwick  "  the  State  "  is  the 
English  Government,  having  an  occasional  and 
unimportant  contact  with  mere  foreigners. 
Hence,  as  Hegel  and  Marx  say,  the  nature  of 
the  State  is  to  centralise,  Mill  and  Spencer  say 
the  nature  of  the  State  is  to  decentralise  ;  and 
it  does  not  dawn  upon  either  party  that  one 
State  centralises  and  the  other  decentralises 
because  there  is  a  continuous  interrelation 
between  them.  It  is  true  that  the  inter-State 
life  was  not  so  great  in  the  early  nineteenth 
century  as  it  now  is  ;  but  a  philosopher  should 
not  require  to  be  hit  on  the  head  before  he 
observes  a  new  fact. 

If  we  go  farther  back  in  history  we  find  that 
the  philosophy  preceding  that  of  the  nineteenth 
century  did  recognise  the  existence  of  many 
States.  The  Renaissance  idea  of  equal  sovereign 
States  was  an  attempt  to  understand  the  fact  of 
distinct  organisations.  Here  again,  however,  only 
one  type  of  State  is  considered — the  monarchical ; 


THE   STATE  AND  OTHER   STATES     47 

for  although  a  grudging  acknowledgment  is  made 
by  Grotius  and  by  Bodin  of  republican  forms,  the 
tendency  for  institutions  to  diverge  is  not  referred 
to  in  their  final  conclusions  as  to  Sovereignty. 
And  this  means  that  the  existence  of  States  of 
entirely  diverse  kinds  is  not  sufficiently  discussed. 
But  more  vital  still  for  my  present  purpose  is  the 
Renaissance  conception  of  the  almost  accidental 
relationship  between  States.  An  organisation 
which  is  supposed  occasionally,  by  some  diplomatic 
meeting  or  agreement  or  by  a  declaration  of  war, 
to  be  really  influenced  by  another  organisation, 
is  not  such  an  organisation  as  we  know  now  to 
be  continuously  and  normally  part  of  a  complex 
organism.  Further,  "  Sovereignty,"  so  far  as  it 
was  referred  to  external  powers  of  the  State, 
involved  the  idea  of  opposition.  Independence 
was  so  conceived  as  if  it  could  not  co-exist  with 
interdependence.  One  State,  to  the  mind  of 
the  Renaissance,  was  as  disconnected  from  another 
as  is  the  earth  from  the  moon.  It  might  be 
drawn  in  the  orbit  of  another,  or  at  certain  times 
move  together  with  another  ;  but  it  had  definite 
boundaries  and  therefore  definite  divisions  from 
all  others.  To  our  minds  one  State  is  only  so 
distinct  from  another  as  one  limb  is  distinct  from 
another  of  the  same  body  :  and  the  "  interests  " 
of  one  State  are  obviously  no  longer  confined 
within   the  boundaries   of   the  lands  over  which 


48     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

the  law  and  government  of  that  State  is 
established. 

Yet  farther  back,  in  the  Middle  Ages,  even 
the  Renaissance  distinction  of  organisations  is 
obscured  in  the  magnificent  hypothesis  of  a 
single  civilised  Europe.  This  hypothesis  and 
the  Roman  idea  of  a  single  World-State, 
outside  of  which  there  is  politically  nothing, 
separate  our  world  from  theirs  completely.  But 
Renaissance  Sovereignty  and  the  nineteenth- 
century  isolation  of  the  State  are  direct  results 
of  the  Roman  fact  and  the  mediaeval  dream. 
A  State  can  only  be  "  sovereign  "  when  there  is 
only  one  State  in  existence  :  hence  the  difficulties 
which  arise  in  the  books  on  International  Law  as 
to  the  "  limits  to  sovereignty."  The  Renaissance 
took  the  quality  which  belonged  to  the  Roman 
Empire  and  conferred  it  illogically  upon  several 
States.  And  to  the  mediaeval  dream  we  must 
look  for  the  source  of  that  "theocracy"  which 
is  conferred  upon  the  State  in  all  forms  of 
nineteenth-century  philosophy. 

Finally,  in  the  Greek  conception  of  the  State 
which  still  influences  modern  thought,  the  State  is 
completely  isolated.  For  Plato  in  the  Republic 
there  is  only  one  State  which,  by  means  of  its 
warrior-guardians,  comes  into  occasional  conflict 
with  shadowy  opponents  who  are  not  even  given 
any  definite  aims  or  organisation  of  their  own. 


THE    STATE  AND  OTHER  STATES     49 

There  is  not  the  slightest  hint  of  two  such 
Republics  in  existence  :  and  since  that  is  unim- 
portant, the  State  goes  on  its  own  way  quite 
without  reference  to  the  groupings  or  organisa- 
tions of  the  rest  of  humanity.  In  the  Laws 
Plato  acknowledges  that  peace  and  not  war  must 
be  the  normal  purpose  of  state-organisation  ;  and 
that  only  seems  to  make  matters  worse.  War 
had  at  least  introduced  the  idea  of  other  groups 
occasionally  influencing  "  the "  State  ;  but  peace 
seems  to  involve  no  interrelation  at  all.  Travellers 
may  indeed  come  from  abroad  :  we  may  learn 
from  foreigners,  and  hints  may  be  given  by 
different  actual  States  as  to  the  method  of 
organisation  in  the  State,  but  the  State  is  conceived 
as  isolated. 

Aristotle,  it  might  be  imagined,  with  his 
inductive  method,  should  have  grasped  the  fact 
that  state-organisation  was  not  isolated.  He 
knows  of  many  diverse  forms  of  organisation, 
and  is  even  said  to  have  collected  evidence  from 
many  more  constitutions  than  are  referred  to  in 
the  Politics.  But  for  him  also  there  is  only  one 
State,  when  he  is  discussing  any  one  specimen. 
He  knows  many  organisations,  but  each  in  isola- 
tion ;  and  he  hardly  allows  for  more  than  an 
occasional  alliance  or  a  war.  Trade  is  a  dangerous 
experiment  largely  because  it  seems  to  violate  the 
perfect  self-sufficiency  of  the  State. 


5o    THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

Now  it  is  obvious  that  these  theories,  until  and 
after  the  Renaissance,  represented  facts  much  more 
closely  than  they  do  now.  The  Greek  State  was 
almost  isolated  :  not  so  isolated  in  fact  as  our 
reading  of  the  philosophers  would  lead  us  to 
imagine;  and  we  should  remember  that  the  official 
relations  between  States  are  never  quite  all  the 
interconnections  which  exist.  But  on  the  whole 
we  may  assert  that  the  course  of  history  has 
brought  groups  always  closer  together  and  that 
interdependence  has  followed  on  contact.  The 
later  the  philosophy,  therefore,  the  more  inade- 
quately does  it  represent  facts  so  long  as  the  State 
is  considered  to  be  isolated.  Plato  and  Aristotle 
are  more  inadequate  than  Hegel  and  Spencer  for 
the  understanding  of  present  facts  ;  but  Hegel 
and  Spencer  were  more  mistaken  as  to  their  own 
contemporary  facts  than  were  Plato  and  Aristotle. 

Present  facts,  then,  demand  the  recognition 
of  continuous  and  normal  interdependence  of 
States.  The  nature  of  the  State  is  to  be  under- 
stood, at  least  in  part,  from  its  relations  with  other 
States  :  and  all  philosophies  which  even  imply 
that  the  State  is  isolated  are  out  of  date. 

Indeed,  one  may  say  that  the  modern  State 
must  be  understood  by  this  external  reference. 
In  the  same  sense  the  individual  cannot  be  under- 
stood in  isolation,  but  only  by  continual  reference 
to  society  or  to  his  relations  with  other  individuals. 


THE   STATE  AND  OTHER  STATES     51 

The  individual,  in  our  sense  of  the  word,  does  not 
exist  prior  to  society  ;  but  the  contrary  rather  is 
true.  For  the  change  which  we  call  progress 
is  marked  by  the  appearance  of  the  unique  and 
differentiated  "  person,"  after  the  long  period  in 
which  the  group  so  overshadows  all  action  and 
thought  that  the  personality  can  hardly  be  said 
to  exist  at  all.  So  also  the  modern  States  arise 
after  the  vague  groupings  of  Feudalism  and 
Medievalism  (whether  Western  or  Eastern)  ; 
and  each  arises  only  in  close  contact  with  other 
individualised  or  distinct  States,  in  definite  relation 
to  it.  In  that  sense  the  modern  State  is  a  new 
fact,  and  the  observations  of  Plato,  Bodin,  Hegel 
and  Sidgwick  do  not  refer  to  it.  But  we  have 
preferred  to  be  more  polite  and  to  say  only  that 
some  elements  in  the  fact  have  not  been  considered. 
Even  the  self-regarding  or  internal  organisation  of 
the  State  is  naturally  posterior  and  even  logically 
dependent  upon  its  relations  with  other  States.1 
Thus  Hegel  should  have  recognised  that  his  ideal 
bureaucracy  was  due  to  the  contact  with  France  ; 
and  Spencer  should  have  seen  that  his  view  of 
governmental  "  interference "  was  due  to  the 
industrial  superiority  of  England  in  contact  with 
the  Continent. 

The    relations    of    State  with   State,   then,   are 

1  It  is  seen  by  Sidgwick  that  taxation  for  "  defence  "  makes 
a  vast  difference  to  the  internal  economy  of  a  State. 


52     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

absolutely  vital  in  the  discussion  of  the  nature 
of  the  State.  What  those  relations  are  in  detail 
we  shall  see  later.  Obviously  the  relation  most 
prominent  in  early  State  history  is  that  of  pure 
opposition  or  war.  Thus  to  many  war  is  of  the 
essence  of  the  State.  But  it  is  doubtful,  to  say 
the  least  of  it,  whether  even  in  the  earliest  times 
the  less  prominent  and  less  obtrusive  relations  of 
peace  are  not  more  genuinely  effective  in  creating 
the  State.  Historians  have  neglected  the  unobtru- 
sive and  have  made  what  was  striking  into  what 
was  most  real  ;  but  even  they  have  not  been  able 
to  explain  the  situation  as  it  is  at  present  except 
by  grudging  references  to  non-warlike  influence 
of  State  on  State.  Whatever  the  relations  are, 
or  have  been,  between  States,  it  is  clear  that  a 
reference  to  them  will  profoundly  modify  the 
current  conception  of  the  State. 

In  the  first  place,  it  will  follow  that  State 
systems  tend  to  assimilate  but  also  to  differ  :  to 
differ  in  some  elements  and  to  assimilate  in  others. 
The  isolation  of  the  State  or  a  grudging  reference 
to  external  relations  results  in  a  too  great  emphasis 
on  assimilation.  Thus  Herbert  Spencer  senten- 
tiously  announces  that  State  action  is  gradually 
restricted  with  the  progress  of  civilisation,  depend- 
ing, in  fact,  upon  a  partial  statement  of  what  was 
occurring  in  England  in  a  short  and  exceptional 
period  of   history.     Had  he  seen  the  influences 


THE   STATE  AND  OTHER  STATES     53 

passing  from  Germany  or  France  he  would  have 
perceived  that  even  the  English  State  was  soon  to 
be  compelled  to  take  over  more  and  more  the 
direction  of  private  enterprise,  if  for  no  other 
reason,  at  least  in  order  to  stand  even  with  the 
centralising  tendency  of  France  and  Germany. 

Hegel,  on  the  contrary,  in  the  manner  of  his 
own  Absolute,  declares  to  a  credulous  Germany 
that  the  State  is  absolute.  But  if  he  had  seen  the 
influences  passing  from  England  he  would  have 
allowed  for  the  freer  play  of  individuality  as  one 
of  the  results  of  State  organisation. 

Political  interdependence,  which  had  really 
always  existed  and  grew  very  rapidly  in  the 
nineteenth  century,  has  now  become  obvious. 
International  Law  has  established  itself  as  a 
science  ;  capital  and  industry  pass  across  State 
boundaries  ;  and  a  shock,  whether  to  credit  or 
to  secure  government,  in  one  State  immediately 
affects  all  others.  But  philosophy  lags  behind. 
No  new  conception  of  the  State  has  developed 
out  of  these  new  facts  ;  and,  since  philosophy 
affects  common  life  more  than  the  practical  man 
cares  to  admit,  the  lack  of  a  new  philosophy 
involves  the  handling  of  new  situations  with  the 
primitive  or  clumsy  conceptions  of  Plato  or  Hegel. 

When  the  interdependence  of  States  is  recog- 
nised it  will  follow  that  the  philosophical  idea 
of  the  State  will   no  longer  be  that  of  a  single, 


54    THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

self-sufficient  organism,  but  rather  that  of  a 
functioning  organ  in  a  grouping  more  or  less 
organised.  The  relations  of  the  citizens  will  not 
be  confined  to  the  boundaries  of  their  State  but, 
through  their  State,  even  in  the  political  sphere, 
they  will  be  seen  to  be  in  continuous  contact  with 
citizens  of  other  States.  And  further,  the  state- 
organisation  itself  will  be  seen  to  differ  progres- 
sively from  that  of  other  organisations  with  which 
it  is  in  contact,  in  proportion  as  the  differentiation 
of  economic  function  or  of  religious  ideal  develops 
in  this  or  that  State. 

It  is  to  be  understood  that  such  conscious 
interdependence  is  not  yet  established.  The 
current  phrases  of  politics,  whether  practical  or 
theoretical,  indicate  no  very  new  conception  of 
the  State  or  of  the  relationship  between  States. 
To  the  mind  of  the  average  citizen  the  word 
State  does  not  normally  indicate  any  reference 
to  his  relationship  with  citizens  of  other  States, 
although  in  crises  the  fact  that  he  is  so  related 

D 

by  his  State  is  forced  upon  his  attention.  The 
intimate  relationship  which  he  then  recognises 
of  his  State  with  other  States,  existed  before  he 
recognised  it  and  influenced  his  own  action  with- 
out his  being  conscious  of  it.1  An  antiquated 
theory  implying  the  isolation  of  the  State,  ob- 
scured his  view  of  modern  facts  :  but  the  new 

1  e.g.  in  his  payment  of  taxes  for  Navy  and  Army,  etc. 


THE   STATE  AND  OTHER  STATES     55 

contact  was  increasing,  and  gradually  it  has  forced 
itself  upon  our  attention. 

The  result  of  the  new  situation,  acting  upon 
ordinary  life  and  not  being  recognised  for  what  it 
is,  has  been  disastrous.  In  the  first  place,  facts 
unrecognised  have  been  left  ungoverned.  So 
long  as  we  neglect  what  we  may  call  a  natural 
force  we  are  at  its  mercy  :  when  we  recognise 
it  for  what  it  is  we  may  contrive  to  turn  it  to 
our  own  advantage.  By  such  advances  do  we 
"  master  the  lightning."  The  State  has  been 
considered  and  criticised  from  the  point  of 
view  of  law  and  government  concerning  its 
own  citizens  :  and  the  results  of  criticism  have 
been  improvements,  for  example,  in  criminal 
law  or  in  local  administration.  An  institution 
conceived  to  exist  for  a  certain  purpose  has  been 
found  to  be  not  fulfilling  that  purpose  well,  and 
new  methods  have  been  suggested  or  tried.  This, 
however,  was  due  to  a  concentration  upon  the 
internal  purposes  of  the  State  ;  which  involved  a 
neglect  or  a  complete  subordination  of  the  other 
elements  in  the  same  institution. 

We  do  not  maintain  that  the  State  was  an 
institution  originally  devised  for  bringing  groups 
politically  into  contact.  The  historical  origin  of 
the  present  situation  is  another  question.  The 
obvious  fact  is  that  the  institution  does  now  bring 
groups  into  continuous  and  normal  contact,  and  it 


$6     THE    MORALITY  OF   NATIONS 

is  now  used  for  that  purpose.  But  the  use  of 
the  State  for  what  we  call  "  foreign "  relations 
has  not  been  adequately  considered,  since  it  has 
made  no  real  difference  to  our  conception  of 
what  the  State  is.  Being  conceived  as  essentially- 
isolated,  it  is  almost  impossible  by  means  of  an 
appendix  or  an  occasional  hint  to  correct  the 
original  assumption  :  and  the  tacit  assumption 
has  been  that  the  modern  State  is  a  Trohig  or  a 
regnum  or  a  "sovereign";  whereas  in  fact  the 
situation  has  changed. 

Here,  then,  is  a  political  institution  essentially 
in  contact  with  other  institutions  of  the  same 
order  ;  whose  internal  structure  is  continually 
affected  by  that  contact  ;  whose  utility  to  the 
group  of  which  it  is  the  highest  political  institu- 
tion is  due  to  the  fact  that  it  relates  them  to  other 
groups  so  organised  ;  whose  history  and  character 
is  modified  and  sometimes  developed  by  long 
periods  of  amity  and  occasional,  less  important, 
episodes  of  war.  But  that  contact  has  been  left 
to  be  governed  by  the  play  of  any  accidental 
or  natural  forces  which  might  supervene,  to  be 
violently  transformed  by  unreasoned  passion,  to 
be  crudely  used  for  selfish  ends.  The  wonder  is 
that  foreign  policy  in  the  civilised  modern  States 
has  not  been  still  more  blind  and  unprincipled 
than  it  has.  For  where  reason  has  not  entered, 
passion  fills  the  void, 


THE  STATE  AND  OTHER   STATES     57 

The  dangerous  effects  of  an  obsolete  idea  being 
used  to  master  a  modern  situation  may  be  avoided. 
It  does  not  follow  that  evil  practical  results  must 
necessarily  occur.  The  second  and  more  general 
reason,  then,  for  supposing  that  it  is  important  to 
recognise  the  non-isolation  of  the  State  is  that 
such  results  might  follow  even  if  they  have  not 
so  far  followed.  For  this  reason,  quite  apart 
from  immediate  and  obvious  difficulties,  it  is 
useful  to  examine  the  State  from  a  new  point 
of  view. 

First,  then,  we  must  discover  what  kind  of 
interdependence  has  come  into  existence  ;  for 
Grotius  knew  that  States  needed  one  another, 
and  the  need,  to  his  mind,  was  for  alliance 
against  foes,  keeping  ofT  famine  or  resisting 
revolution.  But  our  interdependence  is  some- 
what more  subtle.  And  next,  before  we  proceed 
in  detail  to  show  how  the  new  situation  has 
changed  the  idea  of  the  State,  we  may  indicate 
here  the  general  features  of  the  change.  Foreign 
policy  will  no  longer  seem  to  be  a  subsidiary 
interest  of  citizens.  The  action  of  their  State 
with  respect  to  foreign  States  will  seem  to  be  of 
vital  importance  in  everyday  politics. 

Further,  the  purpose  of  the  State  with  respect 
to  foreign  States  will  be  seen  to  be  not  that  of 
mere  opposition  or  exclusiveness.  The  character- 
istic individuality  of  each  State  will  be  seen  to  be 


58     THE   MORALITY    OF   NATIONS 

best  attained  by  contact  with  other  States.  And 
lastly,  the  State  itself  will  be  seen  to  be  other  than 
an  armed  band,  since  all  that  is  of  value  in  its  law 
and  government  will  be  perceived  to  have  been 
attained  not  through  war  but  in  spite  of  war. 
Whether  any  institution  can  ever  embody  the 
new  attitude  which  is  growing  up  in  the  contact 
of  States,  whether  Comity  will  ever  lead  to  Con- 
cert, may  be  left  undecided  ;  since  whatever  the 
future  may  bring  forth,  the  present  is  sufficiently 
different  from  the  past  to  demand  our  closest 
attention. 


CHAPTER   IV 

THE    STATE    AND    NATIONALITY 

Of  all  the  institutions  and  organisations  by 
which  we  attain  to  the  civilised  life  the  State  may 
seem  to  be  the  most  fundamental,  because  of 
its  connection  with  nationality.  Churches  even 
claiming  to  be  national  pass  beyond  any  one 
nationality  ;  economic  or  cultural  associations 
make  no  appeal  to  distinctions  of  blood,  language 
and  tradition.  But  the  law  and  government 
under  which  the  civilised  man  lives  seem  to 
represent  that  fundamental  difference  which  he 
generally  regards  as  his  nationality.  This  is  not, 
however,  the  situation  with  respect  to  more  than 
half  the  civilised  world.  Not  all  men  living 
under  law  and  government  recognise  in  that 
system  the  expression  of  their  own  nationality. 
In  the  United  States,  the  new  nationality  being 
still  formless,  the  political  institutions  are  regarded 
in  a  more  abstract  way,  as  essentially  good,  not 
as  traditionally  valuable.  In  Ireland,  India, 
Egypt,  Finland,  Poland,  the  southern  portions 
of    Austria-Hungary,    in     French,    German,    or 

59 


60    THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

Italian  parts  of  Africa  and  Asia,  men  live  more 
or  less  contentedly"  under  a  law  and  government 
which  is,  whether  good  or  bad,  certainly  not 
national.  And  when  war  breaks  out  the  English- 
man fights,  as  he  knows,  not  merely  for  an 
institution  but  for  that  tradition  which  he  calls 
England  :  and  yet  on  the  same  side  fight  the 
Irish  and  the  Indians,  as  the  Algerians  fight  for 
u  France "  and  "  Italia  Irridenta "  for  Austria. 
Although  some  fight  for  the  nation,  all  fight 
for  the  State.  The  fundamental  nature  of  the 
State,  then,  must  be  discovered  in  part  from  this 
contrast. 

If  we  seek  an  explanation  of  all  this  in  the 
traditional  conceptions  of  the  State,  we  are  left 
somewhat  unsatisfied.  Our  idea  of  political  in- 
stitutions is,  of  course,  due  to  the  thought  of 
our  ancestors  on  their  own  institutions  ;  and  our 
state  is,  no  doubt,  in  part  the  effect  of  what  were 
their  supreme  political  organisations.  But  there 
has  been  in  the  past  no  clear  distinction  between 
nationality  and  citizenship.  This  was  due,  per- 
haps, to  the  nature  of  the  nfaig,  or  the  Roman 
civitas,  or  the  Mediaeval  regnum,  or  the  Renais- 
sance sovereign  State.  And  where  no  distinction 
was  conscious,  no  consideration  could  be  given 
to  the  influence  of  nationality  on  government,  or 
of  government  on  nationality.  We  make  no 
complaint  against  our  authorities.     The   modern 


THE   STATE   AND   NATIONALITY     61 

State,  however,  depends  upon  the  contact  between 
nationality  and  State,  between  the  tradition  of  a 
group  and  its  political  institutions. 

It  may  be  said  that  the  fact  of  nationality 
makes  no  difference  to  the  idea  of  the  State  ; 
the  State  is  a  political  organisation,  whether  it 
be  the  organisation  of  Frenchmen  or  Englishmen. 
And,  of  course,  we  do  not  deny  that  there  must 
be  some  likeness  between  all  organisations  which 
we  call  States.  But  we  contend  that,  because 
the  fact  of  nationality  has  been  inadequately  con- 
sidered, the  likeness  between  States  has  been 
exaggerated  ;  or,  to  put  the  same  statement  in 
another  form,  certain  elements  have  been  sup- 
posed to  be  essential  to  the  idea  of  the  State 
which  were  only  essential  to  the  organisation 
adopted  by  one  nation.  That  is  to  say,  the 
characteristics  of  nationality  have  been  taken  for 
the  characteristics  of  state-organisation. 

One  example  of  this  may  be  found  in  the 
common  confusion  of  patriotism  with  loyalty. 
The  difference  of  words  really  indicates  a  dis- 
tinction in  the  emotions,  for  patriotism  is  more 
passionate  and  loyalty  more  intellectual  ;  and, 
again,  patriotism  is  restricted  by  reference  to  one 
object  only,  one's  national  group  ;  but  loyalty 
may  be  used  with  respect  to  one's  club  or  trade- 
association  as  well  as  to  the  Government  under 
which  one  lives.     Thus,  through   confusing  the 


62     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

two  emotions,  we  may  be  led  to  confuse  the  two 
objects  to  which  they  generally  refer. 

In  the  development  of  the  theory  of  the  State 
the  confusion  leads,  in  the  first  place,  with  Plato, 
to  the  conception  of  physical  relationship  of 
citizens  as  fundamental  to  state  organisation. 
With  Aristotle  the  State  must  be  an  organisation 
of  a  number  so  restricted  that  each  is  known  to 
the  other.  That  is  to  say,  the  conception  had 
not  yet  arisen  that  conscious  allegiance  to  a  system 
of  law  and  government,  and  not  birth,  was  what 
made  a  citizen.  Hence  the  two  theories  of  citizen- 
ship which  confuse  International  Law  :  sometimes 
citizenship  is  due  to  birth  and  is  inalienable,  but 
sometimes  it  is  due  to  free  choice  and  may  be 
changed.  Sometimes  both  theories  are  worked 
with,  illogically,  at  the  same  time  in  the  same  State. 

The  Roman  Empire  practically  and  the  medi- 
aeval Empire  theoretically,  subordinated  or  neg- 
lected the  national  grouping.  And,  in  the 
later  Middle  Ages,  being  a  subject  was  no  more 
due  to  conscious  choice  than  was  membership  of 
the  universal  Church.  By  birth  everyone  was 
a  Christian,  by  birth  a  subject.  And  when,  in 
the  Renaissance,  distinct  States  were  recognised, 
racial  or  national  differences  were  still  regarded 
as  negligible.  Even  in  religion  the  character- 
istics of  the  national  group  were  not  in  theory 
acknowledged,  for  the  divergence  of  religions  was 


THE   STATE   AND   NATIONALITY     63 

that  of  distinct  rulers,  not  of  races.  The  Augs- 
burg "  cuius  regio,  eius  religio  "  does  not  mean 
"  there  shall  be  national  churches,"  but  "  the 
religion  of  the  district  shall  be  that  of  the  man 

o 

who  rules  the  district." 

Again,  in  the  German  theories  of  the  State  the 
fact  of  national  grouping  was  neglected,  so  that 
the  peculiarities  of  the  German  character  are 
made  the  grounds  for  universal  laws  of  state- 
organisation  ; 1  and  Marx,  in  the  true  Hegelian 
manner,  omits  what  his  theory  cannot  explain — 
that  national  sentiment  is  stronger  than  economic 
common  interest.  When,  therefore,  the  old  idea 
of  the  State  is  corrected  by  reference  to  the 
modern  fact  of  nationality,  it  is  seen  (i)  that 
citizenship  is  more  conscious  and  nationality  more 
emotional,  and  (2)  that  the  resulting  organisation 
may  owe  its  features,  not  to  the  essence  of  the 
State,  but  to  national  character. 

The  relation  between  nationality  and  state- 
organisation  has  been  vaguely  recognised  by 
Mill,2  by    Sidgwick 3   and   by   Bluntschli  ; 4    but 

1  As  Kant's  Categorical  Imperative  is  a  German  pastor,  so 
Hegel's  Absolute  is  a  German  official.  The  transcending  of 
the  individual  is  German,  not  human. 

2  Representative  Government,  Ch.  XVI. 

3  Elements  of  Politics,  Ch.  XIV.  The  "  ought  to  be  "  of  pure 
Nationalism  is  corrected  by  Sidgwick's  fear  of  revolution,  but 
no  justification  is  attempted  of  an  Imperial  State,  i.e.  one  in 
which  there  are  many  nations. 

4  Theory  of  the  State,  Bk.  II.  Ch.  IV. 


64    THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

no  further  correction  in  the  old  idea  of  the  State 
is  made  than  is  involved  in  the  ideas  that,  as  far 
as  possible,  the  national  group  ought  to  have  a 
state-organisation  of  its  own.  It  is  seen  that 
where  national  patriotism  does  not  coincide  with 
State  loyalty  the  established  situation  tends  to  be 
unsafe,  whether  (as  in  Germany  or  Italy  before 
i860)  many  states  divide  one  nation  or  (as  in 
the  Austrian  Empire)  many  nations  divide  one 
State  ;  and,  so  far,  there  is  a  distinct  gain  in  the 
recognition  of  important  facts. 

We  omit,  for  the  present,  the  discussion  of 
Empires,  but  it  seems  that  there  is  no  reason 
why  the  same  system  of  law  and  government 
should  not  be  for  the  good  of  more  than  one 
nation.  And  if  the  good  of  the  separate  nation- 
alities, in  so  far  as  it  is  common,  is  attained  by 
the  same  system,  there  is  no  adequate  reason  for 
supposing  that  Nationalism  is  the  only  principle 
of  state-organisation.  In  any  case,  the  import- 
ance of  the  nation  would  have  to  be  recognised 
as  a  fact. 

Now,  the  situation  has  changed  considerably 
since  the  last  of  the  great  theories  of  the  State 
was  made  ;  and  the  importance  of  nationality, 
both  as  affecting  the  State  and  as  affected  by  the 
State,  is  comparatively  new.  The  new  elements 
in  the  political  situation  must,  therefore,  be  given 
prominence.     What  relation,  in  present  fact,  has 


THE   STATE   AND   NATIONALITY     6S 

nationality  to  the  State  ?  It  has  one  relation 
which  has  almost  everywhere  been  recognised, 
so  long  as  the  importance  of  nationality  has  been 
known  ;  but  it  has  some  other  relations  which 
have  been  very  imperfectly,  if  at  all,  perceived. 
The  first  and  fundamental  relation  of  nationality 
to  the  State  is  expressed  in  the  idea  that  the  State 
is  a  territorial  organisation.  The  other  relations 
concern  the  contact  of  nationalities  in  and  through 
state-systems.  This  second  class  of  relations  has 
not  been  considered  by  theorists  or  by  practical 
politicians,  largely  because  of  the  false  conceptual 
isolation  of  States,  of  which  we  have  spoken. 
The  importance  of  nationality  has  been  conceived 
to  be  sufficiently  recognised  when  each  State  has 
been  seen  to  be  the  expression  of  some  nation- 
ality. The  second  issue,  the  contact  between 
nations,  has  been  left  unconsidered.  This  second, 
then,  we  must  put  aside  for  the  present,  until 
we  have  summarily  expressed  the  accepted  idea  as 
to  the  intimate  relationship  of  one  State  with  one 
nation. 

The  State  is  the  highest  political  institution. 
Its  contrasts  and  contacts  with  other  institutions 
have  been  described.  Here  it  is  only  necessary 
to  say  that  the  State  represents  not  the  common 
interests  of  those  who  are  intellectual,  or  musical, 
or  religious,  but  chiefly  the  common  interest  of 
those  who  live  in  the  same  district.     That  district 


66     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

is  small  when  communication  is  difficult  or 
organisation  ineffective  (city-states)  ;  it  is  larger 
when  the  citizen  gives  place  to  the  subject,  making 
government  easier  (Mediaeval  regna  and  Renais- 
sance sovereign  States)  ;  and  it  is  larger  still  when 
geographical  obstacles  are  overcome  by  science 
(modern  States).  But  always  the  system  of  law 
and  government  has  some  reference  to  the  land. 
Hence  the  idea  of  territorial  sovereignty.  Now 
that  which  limits  effective  political  organisation  is 
one  of  the  causes  of  distinct  nationality,  geographi- 
cal environment.  Therefore,  whereas  the  common 
interests  of  the  cultured,  or  the  musical,  or  the 
religious,  or  the  "  workman,"  may  be  represented 
by  what  are  called  "  international "  institutions, 
the  common  interests  of  those  who  live  together 
are  represented  by  national  institutions.  Indeed, 
the  so-called  international  institutions  are  really 
non-national,  since  for  their  purposes  the  distinc- 
tion of  an  Englishman  from  a  Frenchman  may  be 
neglected. 

For  political  purposes,  however,  these  distinc- 
tions cannot  be  neglected.  How  then  are  they  or 
should  they  be  reflected  in  the  State  ?  To  the 
idea  of  Nationalism  we  have  already  referred.  It 
is  recognised  that  national  character  ought  to  be 
represented  in  some  way  in  political  organisation. 
Extreme  Nationalism  might  imply  that  each  nation 
should  be  a  separate  "  sovereign  "   State  ;  but  a 


THE   STATE   AND   NATIONALITY     67 

moderate  form  of  the  ideal  would  not  be  opposed 
to  an  Imperialism  which,  within  one  system  of 
law  and  government,  allowed  for  distinct  interests 
of  different  nationalities.  It  remains  reasonable, 
therefore,  to  suppose  that  the  supreme  political 
organisation  should  either  have  within  its  frontiers 
only  one  nation  or  that,  if  it  has  more,  the  separate 
local  interests  should  be  preserved.  Whatever 
the  ideal,  however,  the  facts  imply  the  recogni- 
tion that  the  State  sometimes  is  national  (Holland, 
Denmark,  etc.)  and  sometimes  is  not  national. 
But  all  the  greater  modern  States  are  not  national, 
in  the  sense  that  within  the  same  state-system 
different  nationalities  continue  to  exist.  There  is 
no  Great  Power  at  present  which  has  not  under 
the  same  law  and  government  peoples  of  different 
blood,  language  and  tradition.  And  within  such 
boundaries  these  distinct  peoples,  willingly  or  un- 
willingly, are  related  to  one  another  morally,  and 
never  as  merely  opposing  forces.  All  this  is 
recognised. 

We  turn  now  to  the  effect  of  state-organisation 
or  nationality.  Two  different,  and  perhaps  com- 
plementary, movements  have  been  developing 
since  the  Napoleonic  wars.  One  is  towards 
Imperialism  ;  the  other  towards  regionalism  or 
Nationalism.  The  first  is  to  be  seen  in  the  increase 
of  territory  and  population  under  the  same  law 
and  government  (England  in  Egypt,  India,  etc.  ; 


68     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

Germany  in  South-West  Africa,  the  Cameroons, 
etc.  ;  France  in  Tunis  and  Algeria  ;  the  United 
States  in  the  Philippines).  The  second  tendency 
may  be  found  in  the  increase  of  distinct  national 
sentiment  among  the  Finns,  the  Poles,  the  Slavs, 
the  Irish  or  the  Indians.  This  second  tendency 
has  developed  with  developing  democracy,  while 
the  extending  of  territory  has  led  to  the  rule  of 
the  few.  In  either  case  the  peculiar  importance 
of  nationality,  either  as  a  democratic  basis  for 
government  or  as  an  obstacle  to  specialist  or 
oligarchic  government,  has  been  frequently 
recognised. 

Now  the  peculiar  fact,  not  sufficiently  recog- 
nised, is  that  it  is  precisely  within  the  vast 
Empire-states  that  the  sense  of  nationality  has 
been  most  consciously  developed.  Nationalism  is 
the  gospel  not  of  small  States,  but  of  sections  of 
large  States  ;  and  it  has  generally  expressed  the 
vague  feeling  that  the  national  character  was  not 
embodied  in  the  established  system.  Hence  it 
has  been  disruptive  so  far  as  practical  politics 
is  concerned.  It  aimed  at  the  dissolution  of 
existing  state-systems  and  their  rearrangement 
upon  a  purely  national  basis.  On  the  other 
hand,  Imperialism,  based  upon  the  proved  advan- 
tage which  comes  from  an  identity  of  law  and 
government  established  over  vast  territories,  set 
itself  rather  to  oppose  the  ambitions  of  National- 


THE   STATE   AND   NATIONALITY     69 

ism.  If  Nationalism  was  destructive  of  inherited 
state-systems,  Imperialism  tended  to  destroy 
nationality  in  the  name  of  the  State.  And  both 
really  implied  the  acceptance  of  the  same  idea  ot 
the  State  ;  although  to  one  the  State  was  abhorrent 
and  to  the  other  sacred,  in  particular  instances. 
Hence  it  was,  and  is,  that  Nationalism  when  the 
nation  is  weak  so  readily  turns  into  Imperialism 
when  the  nation  is  strong. 

In  all  this  both  Nationalism  and  Imperialism 
have  implied  the  acceptance  of  an  antiquated,  and 
by  no  means  valid,  conception  that  the  purpose 
of  state-organisation  was  to  oppose  nations  one  to  the 
other.  Nationalism  would  keep  them  apart,  Im- 
perialism would  suppress  one  by  means  of  the 
other.  But  nations,  we  must  remember,  are 
groups  of  men  and  women,  not  land  or  territory  ; 
States  arise  because  these  groups  are  separated  by 
land  or  territory  ;  and  it  by  no  means  follows 
that  States  must  perpetuate  the  situation  out  of 
which  they  arise  in  a  sphere  in  which  territory  has 
no  meaning.1  If  we  only  make  the  bold  assump- 
tion   that    state-organisation,    based    as    it    is    on 

1  That  is  the  political  or  moral  sphere.  The  argument  is 
parallel  to  that  in  Rousseau's  Social  Contract.  There  it  is  said 
that  the  State  is  to  correct  physical  inequality,  giving  political 
equality  in  order  to  discover  moral  inequality.  So  here,  in 
foreign  policy,  the  State  is  to  correct  physical  division  by  pro- 
viding political  contact,  to  secure  moral  development  of  the 
group  character. 


70     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

nationality,  exists  for  bringing  groups  into  contact 
in  spite  of  local  division,  we  shall  arrive  at  a  new 
conception  of  the  State.1 

But  how  are  the  organised  groups  brought  into 
contact  ?  The  answer  must  refer  to  the  distinction 
between  Empires  and  national  States.  Within 
Empires  the  different  national  groups  are  under 
the  same  system  of  law  and  government.  The 
evil  tradition  of  military  Empires  has  affected 
some  modern  Empires,  so  that  the  system  of  law 
and  government  is  directly  aimed  at  the  suppres- 
sion of  national  differences.  The  German  Empire 
has  led  to  the  attempt  to  suppress  Polish  nation- 
ality ;  the  Russian  Empire  has  attempted  to 
suppress  Finnish.  The  British  Empire  has  not 
consciously  oppressed  nationality,  although  the 
tradition  of  the  past  hangs  about  the  minds  of 
some  of  its  administrators.  In  any  case,  there  is 
no  reason,  in  the  abstract,  why  the  use  of  the 
same  law  and  government  should  lead  to  a  sup- 
pression of  national  character  ;  and  if  it  does  not, 
then  the  state-system  would  lead  to  many  nation- 
alities living  in  contact  without  recourse  to  war  or 
without  even  the  desire  for  war.  The  contact  is 
so  far  moral.  And  further,  if  the  state-system 
allows  for  local  government,  the  distinct  nationali- 

1  Civilisation  develops  by  this  contact :  where  there  is  no 
contact  development  is  slow,  as  with  Incas  and  Aztecs  in 
America.     Cf.  Bryce,  South  America,  p.  574. 


THE   STATE   AND   NATIONALITY     71 

ties  will  develop  distinct  individualities  while  they 
are  in  contact  one  with  the  other.  The  very  con- 
tact, as  in  the  case  of  persons,  will  lead  each  group 
to  a  perception  of  what  is  really  valuable  in  its  own 
character  and  tradition.  So  that  the  state-system, 
in  this  case,  develops  nationality  by  amicable 
contact.1 

As  for  the  contact  between  national  States  and 
the  contact  of  Empires  as  wholes  with  respect  to 
foreign  States,  the  same  principle  holds  good.  In 
fact  men  living  under  different  systems  of  law  and 
government  are  brought  into  contact  by  those 
systems.  Every  State  has  a  Foreign  Office  with 
a  continuous  business.  In  theory,  the  citizen, 
whether  of  distinct  nationality  or  not,  is  brought 
into  contact  with  citizens  of  other  States,  through 
his  own  State. 

And  contact  is  not  supposed  to  destroy  dis- 
tinctiveness. The  Foreign  Office  is  believed  to 
represent  amicably  the  distinct  interests  of  a 
separate  State  ;  and  although  in  war  national 
differences  of  language,  custom  or  tradition,  are 
used  for  raising  antagonism,  these  differences 
are  (1)  not  allowed  to  be  noticed  when  they  exist 
as  between  allies  or  within  Empires,  and  (2)  are 
not  supposed  to  justify  eternal  war  although  they 

1  This  is  just  as  truly  a  reason  for  the  development  of 
Nationalism  within  Empires,  as  the  other  reason  is, — the 
oppression  of  one  nationality  by  another, 


72     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

do  not  end  when  peace  breaks  out.  During 
periods  of  peace  this  distinction  of  nationalities 
marked  by  the  boundaries  of  States  is  preserved 
by  amicable  contact.  One  further  step  only 
need  be  made.  Let  us  say  that  States  exist  for 
the  development  of  national  distinctions  either 
(i)  within  the  State,  or  (2)  outside  the  State,  by 
direct,  continuous  and  amicable  contact ;  and  the 
old  idea  of  the  necessary  opposition  between 
States  breaks  down.1  All  opposition  is  for  the 
purpose  of  characteristic  development,  which  is 
normally  attained  otherwise.  The  State,  then, 
so  far  from  being  an  institution  which  demoralises 
the  contact  between  distinct  national  groups,  is 
an  institution  for  relating  morally,  for  political 
purposes,  (1)  members  of  the  same  national 
group,  (2)  members  of  distinct  national  groups 
within  one  Empire,  and  (3)  members  of  groups 
under  different  States.  And  this  is  not  pious 
aspiration,  but  a  statement  of  fact  neglected  in 
the  modern  theory  of  the  State.  This  contact 
between  nations,  however,  maintained  and  de- 
veloped through  state-systems,  will  have  an  effect 

1  It  follows  that  any  State  which  is  forced  by  circumstances 
into  war,  fights  not  because  of  the  nature  of  the  State,  but 
in  spite  of  the  nature  of  the  State.  It  is  so  forced  because 
it  has  not  adequately  perfomed  the  functions  of  a  State. 
T.  H.  Green  (Princ.  of  Pol.  Obligation,  §  167)  comes  to  this 
conclusion  from  slightly  different  premises. 


THE   STATE   AND   NATIONALITY     73 

upon  the  institutions  of  political  life.1  Isolation 
would  have  one  kind  of  result  :  contact  has 
another.  This,  therefore,  is  the  further  addition 
we  must  make  to  the  accepted  ideas  with  respect 
to  state-organisations  which  in  any  way  represent 
nationality.  If  the  State  is  naturally  the  political 
organisation  of  a  national  group  in  the  sense  of 
representing  the  national  character  and  tradition,2 
then  States  will  tend  to  differ  in  certain  features 
of  their  law  and  government.  The  assimilating 
tendency,  due  to  intercourse,  will  continue  ;  but 
along  with  this  will  go  a  progressive  differentiation 
in  certain  laws  and  in  certain  methods  of  govern- 

1  That  is  to  say,  all  the  political  institutions,  not  the  State 
only.  Within  the  State,  when  many  nations  are  within  the 
same  State  (Empires),  the  subordinate  political  institutions 
(municipalities,  provincial  governments,  etc.)  will  be  affected 
by  contact  both  to  differ  in  some  points  and  to  assimilate  in 
others.  When  the  State  has  only  one  nationality  (not  an 
Empire)  the  subordinate  political  institutions  will  generally  be 
affected,  not  directly,  but  indirectly  through  the  effect  of  other 
States  upon  the  state-system  under  which  they  are.  But  even 
in  this  case  municipalities  (subordinate  political  institutions) 
sometimes  come  into  contact  and  affect  one  another  indepen- 
dently of  the  States  :  an  example  may  be  found  in  the  visits 
of  London  aldermen  to  Paris,  etc.  The  general  thesis  is 
obvious.  Nearly  all  institutions  have  been  considered  too 
much  in  their  relationship  to  their  own  members  ;  whereas 
they  are  really  used  for  and  their  character  is  influenced  by 
bringing  their  members  into  contact  with  the  members  of 
other  institutions  of  the  same  order. 

2  That  is,  either  by  a  separate  state-system  for  each  nation, 
or  by  allowing  for  the  representation  of  distinct  national 
character  within  one  system. 


74    THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

ment.  An  example  of  the  same  double  tendency 
may  be  found  among  the  individuals  of  any 
progressive  community.  Certain  elements  in 
civilised  life  tend  to  assimilate — clothes,  language, 
social  convention  ;  but  certain  other  elements — 
belief,  knowledge,  occupation,  tend  to  be  more 
and  more  different.  It  will  be  found  that  in 
state-organisation,  although  laws  of  contract, 
etc.,  tend  to  assimilate  across  the  boundaries  of 
nationality,  yet  laws  of  inheritance,  education,  or 
religion  tend  to  become  more  and  more  reflections 
of  distinct  national  character  and,  therefore,  to 
differ. 

If  this  is  true,  then  our  conception  of  the 
State  must  be  corrected  so  that  the  growth  of 
national  sentiment  shall  be  recognised  as  dif- 
ferentiating organisations  ;  and,  therefore,  the 
State  in  general  will  not  be  considered  as  neces- 
sarily and  essentially  either  socialistic  or  non- 
interfering.  The  tendencies  in  either  direction 
will  be  seen  to  be  due  to  national  character  and 
not  to  the  nature  of  the  State  :  and  of  the  State 
in  general  we  shall  say  less,  in  proportion  as  we 
recognise  that  many  different  organisations  may 
be  equally  good  for  the  political  good  of  different 
national  groups. 

This  will  not  mean  that  the  community  of 
nations  will  be  destroyed,  or  that  the  likeness 
between    races    will    be    made    impossible  :    even 


THE   STATE   AND   NATIONALITY     75 

organisations  may  become  more  alike.  But  this 
will  only  be  one  side  of  the  facts.  The  old 
opposition  between  individual  growth  and  social 
organisation,  between  national  distinctions  and 
cosmopolitanism  is  due  to  an  entirely  false  and 
quite  unconscious  idea  that  there  is  a  given 
quantity  of  rights  ;  so  that  if  the  individual  gains 
more  the  society  must  lose,  or  if  society  gains 
the  individual  must  lose  :  or,  again,  to  the  idea 
that  there  is  a  given  inexpansible  sphere  of  action, 
so  that  if  the  nation  becomes  more  distinctive 
the  human  race  must  be  more  divided. 

Both  suppositions  are  opposed  to  facts  :  for  it 
is  obvious  that  rights  increase  and  duties  are 
more  various,  and  that  the  sphere  of  human 
action  in  separate  groups  and  in  the  whole  race  is 
growing  rapidly.  We  have,  therefore,  to  allow 
in  our  theory  of  the  State  for  progressive  dif- 
ferentiation even  of  state-institutions.  In  what 
directions  States  will  differ  and  in  what  assimilate 
we  cannot  here  establish  ;  but  probably  the 
example  of  individuals  will  indicate.  In  what 
are  usually  called  "  external  "  matters  assimilation, 
and  in  internal  matters  differentiation  will  occur  ; 
and,  according  to  the  first  part  of  our  argument, 
"  internal "  matters  cannot  mean  what  the  nine- 
teenth century  used  to  oppose  to  "  foreign  " 
affairs,  but,  rather,  matters  of  education,  religion, 
and  conduct. 


CHAPTER  V 

FOREIGN     INTERESTS 

It  follows  from  what  has  been  so  far  said  that, 
since  the  nature  of  the  modern  State  is  to  be  seen 
(i)  in  its  contact  with  other  institutions,  and  (2) 
in  its  contact  with  other  States,  we  shall  have  now 
to  discuss  the  economic  or  intellectual  relations 
between  the  different  groupings  of  men,  and  to 
see  these  mainly  from  the  point  of  view  of  what 
we  have  called  the  supreme  political  institution. 

The  relation  between  States,  as  it  is  at  present 
in  normal  times,  is  the  result  of  a  process  which 
has  been  very  much  accelerated  during  the  last 
fifty  years.  Since  there  is  no  chasm  dividing  the 
changes  of  human  history,  we  may  believe  that 
the  situation  into  which  we  have  been  born  is  the 
result  of  the  whole  of  the  past  ;  and  yet  it  would 
not  be  untrue  to  say  that  the  difference  between 
our  world  and  our  grandfather's  is  immeasurably 
greater  than  the  difference  between  our  grand- 
father's world  and  that  even  of  the  ancient 
Assyrians.  From  this  point,  then,  we  may  begin, 
since  the  argument  depends  on   the  fact  that  we 

76 


FOREIGN   INTERESTS  77 

are  in  a  situation  so  new  as  to  make  obsolete  or, 
at  any  rate,  hopelessly  inadequate  the  conceptions 
of  nearly  all  the  past. 

In  two  ways  this  situation  is  new.  First,  the 
relations  between  States  are  absolutely  normal  and 
continuous,  and  affect  no  longer  only  a  small 
class  in  each,  but  practically  all  the  citizens  ;  and, 
secondly,  these  relations  are  world-wide.  Before, 
however,  we  discuss  in  detail  what  these  relations 
actually  are,  it  may  be  as  well  to  show  in  what 
sense  the  fact  of  continuous  relationship  is  new. 

The  rapidity  of  communication,  its  ease  and 
its  frequency,  are  recognised  causes  of  inter- 
dependence between  men.  But  communication 
has  been  in  the  main  not  very  different,  until  about 
1850,  from  the  very  earliest  times  of  which  we 
have  any  record.  At  different  times,  as  in  the 
great  transient  Empires  of  the  past,  the  excellence 
of  roads  or  the  effectiveness  of  organisation  has 
made  communication  for  a  short  period  more 
rapid  and  frequent.  The  Roman  cursus  publicus 
may  stand  for  a  type  of  what  could  be  done  ; 
and  in  quasi-modern  times  it  is  known  that 
stage-coaches  left  London  for  the  West  in  the 
eighteenth  century  at  the  rate  of  one  every  two 
minutes  of  the  day.  But  quite  apart  from  the 
fact  that  such  advances  were  transitory  episodes 
in  a  long  darkness  of  isolation  both  between 
States  and  between  groups  of  citizens  in  the  same 


78     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

State,  it  was  at  best  the  horse  and  the  road  upon 
which  men  depended  for  mastering  the  limitations 
of  space  and  time.  In  times  of  peace  a  letter  or 
a  piece  of  merchandise  travelled  not  much  more 
quickly  in  eighteenth-century  Europe  than  it 
had  travelled  in  ancient  Assyria.  In  war  time 
Napoleon  moved  his  troops  not  much  more 
quickly  than  did  Assur-bani-pal.  And  if  one 
refers  to  the  sea,  the  similarity  of  the  whole  past 
before  1850  is  still  more  remarkable.  Sailing 
to  China  was  not  very  different  in  1815  from 
doubling  the  Cape  with  Vasco  de  Gama  or  trading 
between  Tyre  and  Cadiz  with  the  Phoenicians. 
Nelson  watching  outside  Toulon  was  not  much 
freer  from  wind  and  wave  than  was  the  expedition 
of  Scipio  Africanus. 

There  were,  of  course,  changes,  but  nothing 
comparable  for  effect  with  the  change  since  1850. 
In  half  a  century  our  rate  of  travel  on  land  is 
ten  times  increased,  and  that  on  sea  five  times  ; 
not  to  speak  of  the  possibilities,  as  yet  barely 
developed,  of  the  air.  We  need  not  go  further 
into  detail,  since  the  transformation  of  society  due 
to  rapidity  and  ease  of  communication  is  well 
known.  We  move  troops  in  war  more  quickly, 
and  in  peace  we  move  merchandise  more  easily  ; 
and  along  with  this  ease  and  speed  has  gone  the 
frequency  of  communication.  This,  more  even 
than  the   rate   of    travel,   has   made  States  inter- 


FOREIGN    INTERESTS  79 

dependent  ;  for  although  the  communication 
between  New  York  and  Liverpool,  for  example, 
is  very  rapid  only  for  a  favoured  few  in  the  great 
liners,  yet  the  immense  quantity  of  the  slower 
shipping  makes  the  relationship  between  divided 
groups  quite  continuous. 

This  continuousness  has  become  normal.  States 
which  hitherto  came  into  contact  by  some  slight 
interchange  of  trade  now  are  affected  every  day, 
in  normal  times,  by  vast  quantities  of  import  and 
export  ;  and  although  the  volume  of  business 
within  each  State  has,  of  course,  increased  rapidly  in 
recent  years,  proportionately  to  this  the  increase 
of  "  foreign  "  business  has  been  much  greater. 
So  that  the  very  life  of  each  group  seems  to 
depend  upon  the  activities  of  other  state-groups 
to  an  extent  hardly  yet  recognised  in  our  practical 
diplomacy  and  not  at  all  recognised  in  our  current 
conceptions  of  "foreign  policy."  But  such  normal 
and  continuous  intercourse,  even  if  not  officially 
recognised  or  promoted,  must  affect  the  institu- 
tions of  the  groups  related  :  and  from  the  nature 
of  these  relations  we  shall  be  able  partly  to  judge 
the  probable  effect  on  the  institutions.  An  acci- 
dental and  occasional  intercourse  might  make 
men  only  more  desperately  alien  to  one  another ; 
a  normal  and  continuous  intercourse  might  create 
sympathy  without  destroying  distinctions. 

The  second  great  feature  of  our  present  situa- 


80     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

tion  is  that  it  is  world-wide.  For  the  first  time 
in  history  during  the  last  fifty  years  world-politics 
has  been  a  reality  :  and  we  mean  by  that,  not 
merely  the  ambitious  dreams  of  world-domination, 
but  the  simple  fact  that  nothing  can  happen 
politically  in  any  part  of  the  world  without  its 
effects  being  immediately  felt  in  every  other  part. 
The  surface  of  the  earth  now  holds  no  race  which 
is  not  somehow  connected  with  every  other.  But, 
even  in  Napoleon's  time,  although,  no  doubt, 
Austerlitz  made  some  difference  to  Egypt  and 
perhaps  India,  China  and  Japan  were  not  affected, 
and  Australia  was  practically  not  on  the  map. 
And  the  farther  back  we  go  into  the  past,  the 
more  isolated  is  whatever  civilisation  we  choose 
to  study  ;  so  that  the  Romans,  for  example,  or 
the  Chinese  could  afford  to  disregard  the  exist- 
ence of  humanity  outside  the  borders  of  their 
State.  Now,  not  only  is  the  State  continually  in 
contact  with  other  States,  but  the  effect  of  that 
contact  spreads  at  once  to  the  farthest  corners 
of  the  earth. 

This  world-politics  is  not,  of  course,  new,  if 
we  are  to  refer  to  popular  talk  or  even  to  practical 
finance,  trade  and  diplomacy.  The  situation  has 
been  recognised  to  exist  in  what  we  may  call  a 
practical  way  ;  the  trouble  is  that  the  "  practical  " 
men  have  been  dealing  with  it  according  to 
theories   which  arose   in  a  very   different  world. 


FOREIGN   INTERESTS  Bi 

The  fault  is  not  theirs.  When  they  speak  of 
"  a  place  in  the  sun,"  or  "  the  flag  of  England," 
they  do  not  recognise  that  they  are  talking  theory; 
and  there  has  been  no  new  theory  at  all  com- 
mensurate in  importance  with  the  vital  changes 
which  have  taken  place  in  fact.  The  newness 
of  the  situation,  therefore,  is  chiefly  noticeable 
from  the  point  of  view  of  theory,  if  by  that  we 
mean  our  understanding  of  it.  For  popular 
speech,  finance  and  diplomacy  have  contributed 
almost  nothing  to  new  conceptions  for  the 
management  of  the  new  facts.  But  if  the  new- 
ness is  noteworthy  for  the  purpose  of  theory, 
that  does  not  imply  any  purely  academic  interest. 
A  theory  is  desperately  practical  when  it  is  a  tool 
for  the  attainment  of  purposes  or  the  control  of 
forces  which  we  must  achieve  or  perish.  This 
generation,  however,  has  the  dangerous  and 
honourable  task  of  making  new  intellectual  tools 
by  which  to  master  the  new  material.  Former 
generations  had  tool-theories  for  a  politics  which 
was  not  in  fact  world-wide  :  coming  generations 
will  have  become  accustomed  to  world-politics. 
The  position,  therefore,  of  this  generation  is 
unique.  We  have  to  face  the  fact,  for  example, 
that  there  is  no  place  any  longer  for  "  expansion  " 
in  the  old  sense.  It  must  therefore  either  cease 
or  change  its  meaning.  And  we  have  to  grasp 
the  idea  that,  until  communication  is  opened  with 

G 


82     THE   MORALITY   OF  NATIONS 

Mars  or  with  the  Man  in  the  Moon  there  can  be 
no  further  "  external "  social  forces  working  upon 
States.  Change  must  hereafter  come  from  within 
some  group  :  and  although  new  groups  will  arise, 
since  the  whole  human  earth  is  explored,  we  shall 
not  suddenly  be  faced  by  fully-developed  groups 
as  Europe  was  faced  in  the  nineteenth  century  by 
the  Yellow  Races. 

The  change  has  affected  every  State,  partly 
through  the  many  new  world-institutions  which 
have  come  into  existence  and  partly,  in  a  direct 
manner,  by  the  political  effect  of  continuous 
political  interaction  with  other  States.  As  for 
institutions  other  than  political,  there  are  several 
religious  bodies  now  of  which  the  members  are 
in  close  contact  but  belong  to  different  States. 
Institutional  religion,  however,  even  when  inter- 
national, is  not  very  powerful  nowadays.  The 
mind  of  the  time  is  economic.  But  along  with 
the  religious  world-institutions  we  must  count 
scientific  and  artistic  societies.  These,  too,  are  now 
in  a  position  never  before  known  to  history  : 
they  count  their  members  among  men  of  every 
State.  And  there  are  also  the  powerful  economic 
institutions  called  Companies,  whether  industrial 
or  financial,  of  which  the  members  are  taken  from 
any  State.  Of  these  the  great  Armament  Firms 
are  most  interesting  ;  since  they  are  the  sources 
of   income   to   citizens   of   a   State   against  which 


FOREIGN   INTERESTS  85 

they  rouse  hostility  in  order  to  gain  income. 
That  is  to  say,  certain  gentlemen,  for  example, 
of  English  citizenship  may  be  making  money  by 
supplying  the  armies  or  navies  which  fight  against 
England  with  the  appliances  for  destroying  Eng- 
lishmen. German  genius  and  German  finance 
supplied  some  of  the  appliances  which  are  used 
by  the  Russians  for  invading  Germany.  French 
guns,  made  under  the  auspices  of  the  name  of 
Schneider,  are  used  by  Turks  against  the  allies  of 
France. 

And  not  only  Armament  Firms  but  also 
Finance  "  is  in  every  country,  like  the  Church 
in  the  Middle  Ages,  an  illustrious  stranger."  So 
that  however  we  are  taxed,  we  may  be  sure  that 
part  of  it  goes  into  the  pockets  of  citizens  of  that 
State  which  we  are  being  taxed  to  oppose.  It 
is  not  difficult  to  see  how  different  the  modern 
State  must  really  be  from  the  State  our  grand- 
fathers knew,  now  that  it  is  influenced  by  these 
complex  and  novel  forces.  The  intricate  tangle 
of  half-understood  appetites,  of  world-wide  money- 
making  and  vague  idealisms,  of  ancient  shibbo- 
leths and  modern  political  black-magic,  is  difficult 
enough  to  grasp.  And  yet  we  still  hear  the  old 
cries  "  inevitable  conflict,"  "  balance  of  power," 
"  arbitrament  of  the  sword  " — just  as  though  we 
really  knew  all  that  the  State  is  and  all  that  it 
needs. 


84     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

It  is  impossible  here  to  do  more  than  give  in 
briefest  outline  some  features  of  the  world- 
civilisation  as  it  now  exists  :  and  for  this  purpose 
it  will  not  be  necessary  to  separate  the  influences 
of  other  institutions  from  those  of  the  State  ;  but 
we  shall  have  our  attention  chiefly  bent  towards 
the  result  of  all  the  various  modern  contacts  upon 
the  existing  political  institutions.  By  this  means 
we  shall  perhaps  see  in  what  direction  to  look 
in  order  to  discover  what  the  modern  State  is  and 
what  are  its  real  interests. 

We  may  divide  the  relations  between  organised 
groups  into  three  :  those  of  trade,  of  investment 
and  of  non-material  interest. 

As  for  trade,  it  is  well  known  that  no  civilised 
State  at  present  is  isolated  or  independent.  Either 
its  citizens  depend  for  food  upon  the  activities 
of  "  foreigners,"  or  they  sell  food  to  foreigners  : 
or  again,  they  export  or  import  the  materials  of 
industry.  It  is  recognised  as  a  fact,  whether  it 
be  judged  good  or  bad,  that  highly  organised 
nations  are  not  economic  wholes  ;  and  it  would 
naturally  follow  that  they  are  not  political  wholes, 
except  in  the  belated  dreams  of  those  who  still 
continue  to  speak  of  the  sovereign  State. 

The  non-independence  of  England  may  be 
found  crudely  expressed  in  the  statistics  of  the 
Board  of  Trade.  We  may  take  as  an  example  of 
the  change  from  a  normal  to  an  abnormal  situa- 


FOREIGN   INTERESTS  85 

tion  the  contrast  between  the  trade  in  September 

19 1 3  and  September  1914,  when  the  readjustment 
to  war  conditions  had  not  yet  been  completed. 

To  cite  articles  of  food  first,  in  September  1913 
we  had  £24,407  worth  of  wheat  from  Russia  ; 
in  September  1914  only  £11,927  worth.  In 
wheat-meal  and  flour  we  had  in  September  191 3, 
from  Germany  £19,659,  from  Belgium  £1,303, 
from  France  £8,297,  from  Austria  Hungary 
£5,064,  and  from  Argentine  £5,333  ;  from  all 
which  countries  in  September  19 14  we  had 
absolutely  none.  The  changes  in  respect  to  eggs 
are  also  striking.  In  September  1 9 1 3  we  had 
from    Russia    £541,777    worth  ;     in    September 

1 9 14  absolutely    none.       The     figures     for     all 
countries  give  our  import  of  eggs  in   September 

1 913  as    worth    £910,557  ;     and    in    September 

1 9 14  as  worth   £38I,35I-     What,  then,  are   the 
interests  of  the  English  State  as  calculated  in  eggs  ? 

In  export  our  supply  of  the  needs  of  other 
groups  is,  of  course,  a  source  of  income  for 
ourselves  ;  but  we  may  suppose  that  what  we 
have  sold  has  been  of  some  value  to  the  buyers. 
Cotton  u  piece-goods "  sent  to  Germany  in 
September  1 9 1 3  was  worth  £55,470.  In 
September  19 14  we  sent  none.  To  Switzerland, 
in  September  191 3,  what  we  sent  of  the  same 
article  was  worth  £112,647;  and  although  we 
were  not  at  war  with  that  country,  in  September 


86     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

1 9 14  we  sent  absolutely  none.  War  has  destroyed 
the  normal  interdependence  even  of  neutral 
nations. 

Materials  for  industry  suffered  the  same 
change.  In  September  1 9 1 3  we  sold  textile 
machinery  to  our  ally  France  which  was  worth 
,£60,621,  in  September  1914  absolutely  none. 
The  whole  of  our  export  of  this  in  the  Septembers 
of  the  two  years  compares  thus  :  for  September 
I9I3?  £643,480:  for  September  1914,  £213,841. 
But  in  this  matter  we  must  allow  for  the  trans- 
ference of  power  in  engineering  from  construction 
to  destruction  :  it  takes  as  much  time  and  labour 
to  make  good  shells  as  would  be  represented  by 
,£400,000  a  month,  so  that  the  energy  expended 
is  not  less  though  the  direction  of  it  is  different. 

These  figures  are  taken  at  random  from  the 
innumerable  statistics  of  the  Board  of  Trade. 
They  indicate  that  England  is  clearly  not  any 
longer  independent,  in  the  old  Renaissance  sense 
of  sovereignty,  any  more  at  least  than  Yorkshire 
is  independent.  But  if  the  interests  of  the  State 
are  the  interests  of  the  citizens,  some  new  con- 
ception must  arise  out  of  the  interdependence 
of  the  citizens  of  all  States.  Such  interdepend- 
ence as  we  have  so  far  noticed  has  regard  to 
food  and  clothing  :  and  we  by  no  means  argue 
that  our  interest  in  foreign  eggs  is  our  only  or 
our  chief  interest.     It  may  be  necessary  to  sacri- 


FOREIGN    INTERESTS  87 

fice   economic   interest  :    but   at  least  we   should 
recognise  what  it  is. 

In  the  second  place,  like  trade,  Capital  also 
has  destroyed  the  old  isolation  of  States.1  As 
things  stand  at  present  it  is  calculated  that  the 
amount  of  Capital  owned  by  inhabitants  of  the 
United  Kingdom  which  is  earning  money  out- 
side these  islands  is  £3,500,000,000.  Similarly, 
inhabitants  of  France  are  dependent  on  Capital 
invested  outside  France  to  the  extent  of 
£1,600,000,000,  and  inhabitants  of  Germany  are 
dependent  upon  the  investment  outside  Germany 
of  £8oo,ooo,ooo.2  The  annual  report  of  the 
Public  Trustee  (published  April  7,  191 5)  implies 
that  property  of  Germans  and  Austrians  in 
England  and  Wales  alone  amounts  to  over 
£  1 00,000,000. 3  So  that  it  is  now  impossible  to 
suppose  that  the  financial  interest  of  the  citizen 
is  confined  to  the  development  of  the  country 
over  which  his  State  is  established. 

1  On  this  rests  the  chief  argument  of  Mr.  Norman  Angell's 
Great  Illusion.  His  economic  statements  may  be  disputed  in 
detail,  but  not  the  fact  that  the  banking  situation  has  affected 
politics.  Mr.  Angell  does  not,  however,  seem  to  make  clear 
the  distinction  between  economics  and  politics. 

2  Hobson,  Export  of  Capital,  p.  163. 

3  Registered  German-Austrian  property  is — 

Held  on  behalf  of  "enemies"      .  .     £54,000,000 

Capital  in  partnership  .  .  .  1,600,000 

Capital  in  companies  .  .  .        29,000,000 

Total    ....     £84,600,000 


88     THE    MORALITY   OF    NATIONS 

The  rapidity  in  the  growth  of  this  situation 
is  one  of  its  most  remarkable  features  :  since  in 
1827,  even  after  the  great  boom  in  foreign  invest- 
ment following  the  reconstruction  of  Europe  when 
"  peace  broke  out,"  there  was  only  £93,000,000 
of  English  money  invested  outside  of  the  United 
Kingdom.1  Other  countries  were  slow  to  come 
into  the  field  as  competitors  in  investment  outside 
their  own  boundaries  ;  but  the  rate  of  growth 
has  been  so  rapid  that  nearly  every  civilised 
country  now  has  "  interests "  in  all  parts  of 
the  world,  and  the  process  would  normally  be 
accelerated  as  new  countries  are  developed. 

In  the  various  economic  relationships  between 
States  we  must  allow  for  the  existence  of  creditor 
and  debtor  States,2  as  well  as  for  Great  Powers 
and  small  States.  Diplomacy  of  the  rule-of- 
thumb  and  selfseeking  Finance  already  know  it. 
Russia,  for  example,  is  a  debtor  State,  as  we  may 
see  by  reading  the  "  Russian  Supplements"  to  the 
Times ,  which  are  published  apparently  to  tell  us 
what  our  ally  really  is.  There  is  little  reference 
in   it   to   Russian  literature    or  Russian  art,  and 

1  Hobson,  p.  105. 

2  For  political  results,  cf.  the  influences  in  the  creation  of 
the  Chinese  Republic  in  C.  W.  Eliot's  Some  Roads  towards 
Peace  (p.  10).  Capital  cannot  exist  under  despotic  govern- 
ment (p.  15).  The  whole  report  (published  by  the  Carnegie 
Endowment  at  Washington)  is  a  good  study  of  Peace 
Relations. 


FOREIGN   INTERESTS  89 

hardly  any  to  Russian  military  force  ;  none, 
naturally,  to  Russian  political  ideas  ;  but  great 
stress  is  put  upon  the  possibilities  for  Capital  in 
Russia.  France,  on  the  contrary,  is  a  creditor 
State,  as  her  position  in  alliance  with  Russia 
proves.     She  must  follow  to  secure  her  income. 

All  this,  perhaps,  is  brutal  economics,  but  the 
political  structure,  even  as  to  domestic  affairs,  in 
each  group  is  vitally  affected  by  such  facts  as 
these.  We  cannot  speak  of  the  function  of  law 
and  government  without  reference  to  the  economic 
forces  which  may  subserve,  but  may  also  subvert, 
our  ideals. 

What  conception  of  the  relation  between  States 
results  from  all  this  ?  Certainly  not  the  concep- 
tion of  sovereignty,  which  means  that  each  State 
has  no  interests  outside  or  expects  no  other  State 
to  have  interests  within  its  boundaries.  The  little 
hedge  of  frontiers  is  somewhat  obsolete,  since  it 
is  clear  that  States  interpenetrate.  And  an  inter- 
penetration  even  of  the  purely  economic  kind 
must  certainly  have  political  effects,  for,  as  we 
shall  see,  the  creditor  State  is  often  compelled  to 
political  action  in  behalf  of  its  debtor  :  and  the 
influence  of  foreign  Capital  has  more  than  once 
made  a  difference  to  a  revolution  or  a  popular 
movement. 

But  the  interdependence  of  economics,  even 
though   it   is   vital   for    political    life,   is    not   the 


90     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

whole  of  the  present  situation.  Every  civilised 
State  has  u  interest  "  in  the  health,  general  well- 
being,  education  and  individual  development  of 
its  citizens.  These  may  be  called  non-material 
interests.  We  put  aside  for  the  present  the 
other  non-material  interests,  independence  and 
"  prestige,"  which  are  more  commonly  considered, 
since  these  are  not  new,  although  their  meaning 
is  somewhat  changed. 

In  the  third  place,  then,  the  non-material 
interests  of  organised  groups  are,  in  a  sense,  well 
known  ;  and,  in  a  more  definite  sense,  absolutely 
neglected.  Of  these  one  cannot  quote  statistics. 
Even  a  Foreign  Office  with  prejudices  in  favour 
of  "prestige"  cannot  put  down  upon  paper  exactly 
how  one  group  of  men  and  women  depends  on 
another  for  other  goods  than  food  and  clothing. 
But  the  importance  of  the  fact  will  be  recognised 
if  one  suggests  that  the  discoveries  of  Pasteur 
might  have  been  restricted  to  France,  or  those  of 
Lister  to  England.  Let  us  imagine  what  an 
advantage  it  would  be  to  England  in  war,  and 
even  in  industry,  if  a  septic  treatment  had  been 
kept  for  Englishmen.  How  much  of  the  import 
of  non-material  goods  we  can  do  without  may 
perhaps  depend  on  our  civilisation  ;  so  that  we 
may  not  presume  to  say  that  England  would 
have  lost  much  if  the  work  of  Mommsen  or 
Harnack  had  been  protected  so  effectually  as  to 


FOREIGN    INTERESTS  91 

have  helped  Germans  only.  We  may  not  presume 
to  count  it  a  gain  to  the  State  that  Kreisler  has  been 
able  to  play  in  England.  But,  speaking  with  bated 
breath  outside  the  sacred  circle  of  economics,  there 
is  a  non-material  interdependence  of  States. 

This  interchange  of  ideas  across  frontiers  was 
very  far  advanced  even  before  our  ease  of  com- 
munication was  attained.  In  the  Greek  world 
ideas  spread  from  city  to  city,  and  Rome  carried 
Greek  thought  into  far  countries  :  but  our 
modern  cosmopolitanism  of  ideas  really  began  in 
the  Middle  Ages.  It  is  well  known  that  in  spite 
of  bad  roads  and  feudal  anarchy,  scholarship, 
medicine,  law,  art  and  religion  were  able  to  pass 
from  country  to  country.  A  common  language 
did  more,  perhaps,  for  the  interchange  of  ideas 
than  even  railways  and  steamboats  have  done. 
In  any  case  scholars  and  men  of  ideas  travelled  ; 
and  at  Salerno  Englishmen  might  learn  medicine, 
at  Bologna  law,  or  at  Paris  science  and  theology. 
So  Italians  might  learn  philosophy  at  Oxford  or 
anatomy  at  Montpellier.  So  also  the  different 
groups  felt  the  religious  impulse  originating  with 
the  Italian  St.  Francis  or  the  Spaniard  St.  Dominic 
or,  slightly  later,  the  Englishman  Wyclif.  This 
is  not  the  place  to  describe  what  have  been 
the  vicissitudes  and  further  developments  of  the 
interdependence  of  groups  so  far  as  ideas  are 
concerned.     It  is  sufficient  if  it  be  clear  that  this 


92     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

interdependence  has  been  obvious  for  a  longer 
time  than  that  of  trade  and  investment.1 

The  newness  of  the  present  situation,  however, 
is  not  altogether  disproved  by  these  facts  ;  for 
there  is  no  learned  caste  now,  and  all  ideas 
spread  more  universally  within  every  group  ;  and 
again,  the  store  of  such  ideas  is  vastly  increased 
since  the  mediaeval  scholar  could  attain  the  limits 
of  practically  all  the  knowledge  of  his  day. 
Finally,  not  Europe  merely  but  the  whole  earth 
is  now  bound  together  by  common  knowledge 
and  a  common  appreciation  of  the  Arts.  So  that 
we  are  no  longer  provincial  in  our  culture,  as  we 
are  no  longer  limited  in  our  markets. 

In  the  classification  of  those  ideas  which  pass 
across  frontiers  and  continually  modify  even 
political  institutions  we  may  begin  with  practical 
scientific  ideas.  In  medicine  and  surgery  Pasteur, 
Lister  and  Ehrlich  represent  contributions  of 
three  different  groups  to  all  others.  Radium 
was  happily  not  "  protected."  And  outside  the 
purview  of  the  average  citizen  are  the  continual, 
priceless  but  unpriced,  imports  from  foreigners 
in  the  cure  of  disease,  in  sanitation,  in  surgery 
and  in  preventive  medicine.     Without  such  inter- 

1  Hobbes  {Leviathan,  II.,  Ch.  29)  fears  this  interchange  of 
ideas — naturally,  for  it  disproves  most  of  his  theory  of 
Sovereignty.  Cf.  The  Unity  of  Western  Civilization :  Essays 
collected  by  F.  S.  Marvin.  Ch.  XI.  Common  Ideals  of  Social 
Reform,  by  C.  D.  Burns. 


FOREIGN   INTERESTS  93 

change  the  modern  State  would  not  be  what  it 
is.  As  for  scientific  ideas  in  manufacture,  the 
conception  that  they  should  not  be  exported  was 
at  one  time  acted  upon  in  England.  In  1774 
an  Act  was  passed  to  prevent  spinning  machinery 
from  being  exported.  Skilled  artisans  were  for- 
bidden to  leave  the  country.  In  1823  aa  large 
seizure  of  cotton  machinery  occurred  in  London."1 
The  effort  was  never  very  effective,  and  it  was 
found  that  when  the  protection  was  removed  and 
English  scientific  ideas  were  allowed  to  benefit 
other  groups,  the  demand  for  English  machinery 
made  England  wealthier  than  she  could  possibly 
have  been  if  she  had  kept  her  ideas  to  herself. 
In  brewing  and  in  chemical  works  the  import  of 
"  foreign  "  ideas  has  been  recognised  to  have 
increased  English  resources  :  and,  even  were  it 
possible,  it  would  be  unwise,  according  to  popular 
conceptions,  to  keep  technical  science  within  State 
boundaries.  But  the  issue  is  by  no  means  faced. 
There  is  an  obvious  cash  value  in  this  sort  of 
ideas,  and  thus  it  attracts  the  lower  type  of  intel- 
ligence. Naturally,  therefore,  there  will  always 
be  a  tendency  to  secrete  technical  processes  ; 
although,  so  far,  physicians  and  surgeons  have 
not  kept  to  themselves  their  scientific  ideas,  in 
spite  of  their  financial  value. 

But  not  only  in  medicine  and  practical  science 
1  Hobson,  he.  cit.,  p.  107  seq. 


94     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

is  the  interchange  of  ideas  proceeding.  In  ideas 
as  to  social  structure  there  is  an  interdependence. 
We  may  count  these  as  municipal  or  political. 
For  example,  we  in  the  United  Kingdom  have 
used  ideas  applied  first  in  German  cities  :  "  town- 
planning  "  is  derived  in  part  from  the  German 
idea  of  the  city  beautiful.1  Municipal  control 
of  traffic  and  municipal  supplies  are  ideas  which 
have  crossed  frontiers.  Political  ideas  such  as 
that  of  National  Insurance  are  used  in  one  State 
and  copied  in  another.  Income  tax  is  an  idea 
which  seems  to  spread. 

We  may  perhaps  count  representative  Parlia- 
mentary Government  as  an  export  of  ours  :  and 
perhaps  Cabinet  Government  is  in  part  due  to 
an  import  of  ideas.  In  Education  we  send  Com- 
missioners abroad  to  bring  us  ideas  :  and  we 
receive  many  more  which  do  not  come  through 
official  channels.  So  also  other  nations  discover 
whatever  value  there  may  be  in  our  Public  Schools. 

And  outside  the  sphere  in  which  the  average 
citizen  lives  there  is  a  no  less  important  inter- 
change of  ideas  of  a  more  refined  sort,  which 
sooner  or  later  transform  the  attitude  of  humanity. 
Scholarship  so  disregards  state-boundaries  that 
English    and    French    historians    can   make    con- 

1  The  great  example  is  in  Frankfort.  Cf.  the  general  treat- 
ment in  Municipal  Government  in  Great  Britain  (1897)  and 
Municipal  Government  in  Continental  Europe  (1898),  by  A.  Shaw. 


FOREIGN    INTERESTS  95 

elusions  from  evidence  collected  by  Germans ;  or 
Danes  and  Dutchmen  can  comment  upon  English 
Literature.  In  the  larger  field  of  scholarship, 
which  concerns  our  knowledge  of  the  world  we 
inhabit  in  its  most  general  features,  there  has 
been  no  attempt  yet  to  "  protect  "  Darwin  or  to 
exclude  Weismann.  Such  are  a  few  examples 
of  the  close  interdependence  which  has  been 
developing  not  only  between  the  nations  of 
Europe  but  of  the  whole  world.  All  this  has 
transformed  civilised  life,  and  it  must  have  had 
its  influence  upon  those  institutions,  the  States, 
which  exist  for  the  protection  of  such  life. 

But  if  States  are  thus  normally  and  continuously 
in  contact,  by  trade,  investment  and  ideas,  and  if 
their  organisation  or  action  is  affected  by  this 
interdependence,  our  conceptions  of  the  interests 
of  the  State  must  change,  and  following  upon 
that,  perhaps  our  very  conception  of  what  the 
State  is.  At  least  it  is  clear  that  the  "  interest  " 
of  a  modern  State  cannot  be  rendered  in  the 
terms  of  Greek,  Mediaeval,  Renaissance  or  even 
nineteenth-century  politics.  The  intimate  and 
world-wide  relationship  of  States  in  the  midst  of 
innumerable  diverse  institutions  is  practically  new  : 
and  we  must  in  some  way  contrive  to  master  it, 
unless  we  are  to  leave  ourselves  to  the  mercy 
of  natural  forces  the  results  of  which  we  might 
by  no  means  approve. 


CHAPTER   VI 

FOREIGN    POLICY 

If  these  are  the  organised  groups  and  such  their 
interconnection,  how  are  the  relations  between 
them  to  be  arranged  ? 

The  interests  of  each  organised  group  are  to 
be  maintained  and  developed  :  and  the  morality 
of  nations  is  concerned  with  such  development, 
just  as  the  morality  of  individuals  must  consider 
the  interests  of  individuals.  Economics  may  seem 
to  be  unconnected  with  morality  ;  and  we  should 
admit  that  they  are  distinct  from  it,  since  a  man 
may  be  wealthy  or  cunning  and  yet  not  moral. 
But  morality  among  individuals  involves  some 
reference  to  material  well-being,  for  it  is  useless  to 
consider  the  height  of  virtue  if  the  possibility  of 
bare  life  is  not  secured.  A  great  part  of  ethical 
theory  is  rendered  futile  by  elaborate  discussion 
of  free  will  without  any  reference  to  economic 
conditions  in  which  all  men  live  :  and  economics 
itself  is  often  barren  of  interest  because  of  the 
exclusion  of  moral  issues.  Now  in  the  case  of 
the  States,  however  high  our  ideals,  no  one  is 
likely  at  present  to  forget  the  economic  interests 

96 


FOREIGN   POLICY  97 

involved  :  but  here  we  must  suppose  them  to  be 
subordinated  to  some  kind  of  morality.  Foreign 
policy,  then,  is  to  be  considered  not  so  much  with 
a  view  to  the  recording  of  facts,  but  with  regard 
to  the  principles  upon  which  it  may  be  supposed 
to  be  based.  And  first,  since  bare  life  must  be 
secured,  foreign  policy  is  for  the  maintenance  of 
the  material  interests  of  the  State.  Diplomacy 
is  much  concerned  with  commercial  treaties  and 
the  arrangement  of  loans,  which  are  presumably 
for  the  benefit  of  all  the  States  concerned. 

There  is  also  the  interest  involved  in  indepen- 
dence, since  it  is  implied  in  what  has  so  far  been 
said  that  foreign  domination  is  unendurable  to  any 
organised  nation.  The  most  peaceful  policy  must, 
none  the  less,  be  one  which  promotes  and  develops 
the  characteristic  differences  of  the  State  from 
other  States.  The  purpose  of  foreign  policy  is, 
then,  also  to  forestall  any  movements  which  might 
diminish  national  independence,  not  only  those 
of  a  warlike  nature;  just  as  a  man's  relationship 
to  his  fellows  must  not  be  allowed  to  cause  a  loss 
of  the  man's  individuality.  There  is  a  point  in 
the  art  of  life,  which  is  the  practice  of  morality, 
at  which  it  becomes  necessary  to  take  measures 
for  self-defence — not  only  against  mere  danger 
to  life  and  limb  but  also  against  danger  to  in- 
dividuality and  character.  In  a  sense  this  is  of 
more  importance  than  economic  interest,  since  it 

H 


98     THE    MORALITY    OF   NATIONS 

is  more  valuable  to  be  able  to  do  what  we  like 
than  to  have  a  sufficient  income  :  but  one  cannot 
really  exist  without  the  other.  Foreign  policy, 
then,  does  not  treat  the  State  as  merely  a 
financial  association.  It  expresses  other  interests 
than  wealth  in  manoeuvring  for  national  character 
and  independence. 

It  is  often  said  that  self-preservation  is  the  basis 
of  all  moral  action,  and  that  may  be  argued  :  but 
it  is  sometimes  said  that  self-preservation  is  the 
highest  law,  and  that  is  false.  Even  for  the  State 
self-preservation  is  not  the  highest  law,  if  by  that 
it  is  meant  that  the  State  may  do  anything  in 
order  to  preserve  its  existence.  Such  a  state- 
ment would  imply  either  that  the  State  is  above 
morality  or  that  morality  has  nothing  to  do  with 
actions  done  in  behalf  of  the  State.1 

This  error  lies  at  the  root  of  Treitzschke's  over- 
estimation  of  the  status  of  an  army  in  a  civilised 
State.  He  goes  so  far  as  to  say  that  for  the 
preservation  of  a  certain  kind  of  organisation  all 
and  every  means  is  justifiable.  It  is  not  "the 
people "  who  must  be  protected,  since  their 
blood  does  not  change  if  the  forms  of  govern- 
ment change,  but  "  the  State."  This  involves 
that  an  armed  force  is  of  predominant  importance 
in  the  State  ; — as  if  the  State  had  no  higher 
purpose  than  its  own  security.  Its  interests, 
1  Cf.  Machiavelli  :  D'iscorsi,  iv. 


FOREIGN    POLICY  99 

however,  demand  a  policy  which,  within  moral 
limits,  gives  it  independence. 

But  the  interests  involved  are  not  all  economic 
and  military.  The  interchange  of  ideas,  the  de- 
velopment of  character  by  contact,  the  exchanging 
of  medicinal  discoveries  or  educational  plans — 
all  these  are  also  interests  of  every  State  which 
aims  at  civilised  life,  and  foreign  policy  should 
subserve  these.  Thus  our  ambassador  in  Berlin 
reminded  Herr  von  Bethman-Hollweg  that  if 
England  neglected  her  treaty-obligation  to  Belgium 
her  credit  would  be  destroyed.  Sir  Edward  Grey 
and  Mr.  Asquith  also  said  publicly  that  our  national 
reputation  was  at  stake.  But  this  can  only  mean 
that  a  State  has  other  interests  than  the  economic 
or  the  military,  and  interests  other  than  mere 
independence. 

How  are  these  interests  at  present  expressed 
and  what  attempts  are  made  to  develop  them  ? 
It  becomes  necessary  for  an  answer  to  look  into 
the  diplomatic  system  :  but  this  need  only  be 
done  here  in  the  most  summary  fashion. 

The  general  features  of  the  system  are  two  : 
Secretariats  and  Embassies. 

Secretariats  vary  in  character  in  different  States. 
They  are  sometimes  the  agencies  of  autocratic 
government  and  sometimes  representative  of  the 
popular  will  :  and  all  bear  marks  of  their  growth 
as  results  of  the  Renaissance  state-system. 


ioo     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

But  for  our  purpose  here  it  makes  no  difference 
to  whom  the  Secretaries  are  responsible,  if  they 
are  supposed  to  act  in  the  interest  of  the  whole 
State.  What  is  of  more  interest  is  to  discover 
what  moral  attitude  is  implied  with  respect  to 
other  States  ;  and  this  will  naturally  change  slightly 
with  the  intellectual  standing  of  the  representa- 
tive officials,  or  with  the  activity  among  the 
citizens  in  general  in  managing  their  officials. 
The  whole  system  of  continuous  communication, 
however,  carries  with  it  certain  fundamental 
amenities,  and  it  would  be  impossible  now,  as 
it  was  in  the  Middle  Ages,  for  any  State  to 
do  without  special  officers  for  intercourse  with 
other  States. 

A  Foreign  Secretary  is  generally  supposed  to 
promote  friendly  relations  in  normal  times,  and 
with  most  countries  if  not  with  all.  The  State 
for  which  he  acts  and  other  States  to  which  he 
speaks  are  generally  taken  to  be  in  moral  relation- 
ship such  that  the  ordinary  difficulties  of  com- 
merce, crime  or  "  incidents,"  may  be  arranged 
according  to  principles  of  morality  rather  than 
the  mere  appeal  to  force. 

We  may  now  pass  to  the  consideration  of 
Embassies.  The  Ambassadorial  system  was  prac- 
tically contemporaneous  in  growth  with  the  idea 
of  suzerainty  as  established    in    the  Renaissance. 


FOREIGN   POLICY  101 

Louis  XI  (1461-1483)  of  France  is  counted  the 
first  to  keep  permanent  agents  at  foreign  courts,1 
but  they  were  regarded  by  both  sides  as  spies. 
The  attitude,  however,  quickly  changed  with  the 
appointment  of  chivalrous  gentlemen,  until  in 
our  day  the  office  of  an  Ambassador  is  generally 
regarded  as  friendly  to  the  State  to  which  he  is 
accredited.  The  social  amenities  are  no  small 
matter  in  the  creation  of  a  moral  attitude  ;  and 
civilised  States  generally  recognise  some  moral 
bond  between  them.  The  rupture  of  diplomatic 
relations  with  Serbia  after  the  murder  of  King 
Alexander,  in  June  1903,2  was  intended  to  show 
moral  disapprobation.  All  the  great  powers  with- 
drew their  representatives  ;  and  Great  Britain 
only  renewed  diplomatic  intercourse  in  1906. 
Thus,  even  though  no  clear  moral  code  may  be 
established  in  the  intercourse  between  States,  it 
is  generally  taken  for  granted  that  the  relation- 
ship is  in  some  way  moral. 

The  immunities  of  person  and  property  which 
are  spoken  of  in  International  Law  are  simply 
conditions  of  free  intercourse.  They  are  them- 
selves indications  of  the  progress  we  have  made 
since  (1)  occasional  intercourse  could  be  arranged 
by  special  envoys,  and  (2)  since  States  could  afford 
to  regard  all  foreigners  as  prospective  enemies. 

From  this  system,  combined  with  the  more 
1  Lawrence,  International  Law,  par.  121.  '  Ibid.,  par.  125. 


io2     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

modern  growth  of  the  Consular  System,  has  arisen 
a  vast  amount  of  business  between  States,  some 
of  it  simply  solutions  of  incidental  difficulties,  and 
some  producing  more  permanent  arrangements  on 
general  issues. 

These  arrangements  are  Treaties,  and  their 
many  kinds  are  discussed  by  international 
lawyers.  But  since  scientific  international  law 
is  not  based  upon  any  supposed  law  of  Nature, 
but  only  on  the  consent  of  the  States  which  make 
the  treaties,  their  binding  force  in  law  is  practically 
indefinable.1  It  is  seen  that  States  must  keep 
their  promises  ;  but  it  is  also  admitted  that  no 
treaty  holds  in  all  circumstances.  Morality  is  not 
unfairly  indicated  thus :  "  On  the  one  hand  good 
faith  is  a  duty  incumbent  on  States  as  well  as 
individuals,  and  on  the  other  no  age  can  be  so 
wise  and  good  as  to  make  its  treaties  the  rules 
for  all  time."2 

In  1878,  by  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina  were  given  to  Austria  to  "  occupy 
and  administer."  That  treaty  was  regarded  by 
Austria  in  1908  as  out  of  date  :  and,  indeed, 
circumstances  had  changed.  In  October  of  that 
year  she  therefore  extended  her  sovereignty  over 

1  Lawrence,  §  132.  When  and  under  what  conditions  it  is 
justifiable  to  disregard  a  treaty  is  a  question  of  morality  rather 
than  of  law. 

2  Ibid.,  %  134- 


FOREIGN   POLICY  103 

the  provinces,  and  later,  by  diplomatic  despatches, 
the  new  situation  was  acknowledged.1 

o 

It  is  unnecessary  to  speak  of  the  breaking  of 
the  treaty  regarding  Belgium  by  Germany  in 
August  1 9 14,  since  so  much  has  already  been 
written  on  that  point.  It  is  sufficient  to  note  that 
the  real  moral  issue  was  not  whether  treaties 
in  general  bind,  but  whether  the  circumstances 
in  this  instance  had  been  contemplated  by  the 
treaty-makers  :  and  it  is  quite  clear  that  they 
had.     The  treaty  was  therefore  morally  binding. 

All  these  moral  problems  seem  to  be  suggested 
by  the  method  adopted  in  Foreign  Policy  ;  but 
we  cannot  let  the  matter  rest  there,  for,  whatever 
the  purpose,  the  system  seems  to  need  criticism. 
It  has  its  good  and  its  bad  qualities,  not  only 
with  respect  to  economic  effectiveness  or  the 
other  results  which  are  expected  to  flow  from  it, 
but  also  in  regard  to  morality. 

The  present  system  has  undoubted  advantages, 
and  any  sound  political  judgment  must  admit 
from  the  evidence  that  useful  work  has  been 
done  by  it.  National  interest  has  really  been 
considered  both  of  the  economic-military  and  of 
the  non-material  kind.  This  is  true  not  only  of 
England,  but  of  most  civilised  countries. 

One  cannot  deny  that  Bismarck's  policy  was 
really  a  development  of  the  interests  of  Prussia 

1  Holland,  European  Concert  in  the  Eastern  Question,  p.  292. 


104     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

as  a  whole,  although  doubt  may  exist  as  to  his 
success  in  maintaining  the  true  interests  of  other 
German  States.  The  political  impoverishment 
of  Bavaria  and  other  smaller  groups,  such  as 
Hanover,  is  hardly  compensated  even  if  they 
have  increased  their  economic  wealth  ;  and  it 
would  in  the  end  be  evil  for  the  Germans  in 
general  if  they  sacrificed  political  liberty  to 
Prussia  and  received  in  return  only  a  wage. 

The  diplomacy  of  Cavour,  antiquated  in  many 
respects,  was  in  the  main  an  establishment  of  the 
true  interest  of  all  Italians  even  outside  Piedmont. 
The  diplomacy  of  Thiers,  in  the  formation  of  the 
third  Republic,  was  in  the  best  interests  of  France 
as  a  whole. 

With  respect  to  our  own  Foreign  Policy  there 
is  great  disagreement  as  to  whether  the  true 
interests  of  the  majority  in  the  British  Isles  were 
developed  by  Palmerston  or  Disraeli.  But  at 
least  as  much  good  as  evil  has  been  done  by 
the  diplomatic  system.  There  is  a  tendency  to 
disregard  the  smooth  working  of  a  system  for 
many  years  and  to  judge  it  only  by  an  occasional 
lapse  :  and  this  tendency  must  be  corrected  as 
well  as  the  tendency  to  regard  the  established 
system  as  sacred. 

Apart,  however,  from  historical  facts  and  moral 
judgments  passed  upon  them,  it  is  possible  to 
observe  certain  features  of  the  system  which  are 


FOREIGN   POLICY  105 

valuable.  The  evidence  for  a  judgment  of  the 
system  is,  of  course,  the  nature  of  the  separate 
judgments  passed  upon  actions  in  the  past  directed 
by  its  officials  :  but  the  system  may  be  judged  as 
a  whole  in  so  far  as  it  is  an  organisation  with 
a  purpose.  The  purpose,  then,  seems  to  have 
been  and  to  be  successfully  accomplished  when 
the  following  features  of  the  system  have  been 
brought  into  play — 

Specialist  Knowledge. — The  officials,  aided  by 
tradition,  have  used  special  knowledge  of  foreign 
countries  which  is  not  in  the  hands  of  the  ordinary 
voter  or  even  of  the  average  politician.  The 
great  deficiency  in  all  government  is  not  lack  of 
good  intention,  but  lack  of  knowledge.  Men  are 
generally  willing  to  do  what  is  right  not  merely 
for  themselves,  but  for  their  group  or  even  for 
all  humanity,  but  they  do  not  know  what  it  is 
right  to  do.  It  follows  that  any  system  which 
can  preserve  and  increase  special  knowledge  on 
any  of  the  issues  with  which  political  action  is 
concerned  is,  so  far,  good.  The  benevolent  and 
uninformed  amateur  is  dangerous  in  morality 
even  of  a  private  kind,  and  in  the  complexity  of 
international  business  it  requires  special  knowledge 
of  the  facts  even  to  apply  moral  criteria  to  them. 

Mazzini,  for  example,  was  a  greater  man  than 
Cavour,  but  Cavour  had  special  knowledge  which 
was    lacking    to    the    well-intentioned    Mazzini. 


106     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

One  cannot  fairly  say  what  would  have  happened 
if  Mazzini  had  been  in  touch  with  diplomatists  as 
Cavour  was  ;  but,  probably,  if  he  had  been,  Italy 
would  not  now  be  united.  An  ethical  theorist 
unrivalled  in  his  knowledge  of  general  principles 
may  be  unable  to  deal  with  the  seemingly  trivial 
complexities  of  domestic  life,  and  a  political 
idealist  may  not  be  aware  of  the  amount  of  primi- 
tive savagery  and  low  cunning  which  still  exists. 
Security  against  Popular  Outbursts. — A  second 
advantage  of  the  official  system  is  that  it  can 
resist  any  too  sudden  or  violent  outburst  of 
political  passion.  The  voice  of  "  the  people  "  is 
very  often  nowadays  only  the  voice  of  the  city 
crowd,  faintly  re-echoed,  if  echoed  at  all,  in  the 
smaller  towns.  Sometimes  also  the  noise  is  that 
of  a  few  editors  of  newspapers  :  and  a  nation 
would  hardly  have  its  true  interests  developed  if 
it  were  committed  to  action  whenever  or  as  soon 
as  such  clamour  arose.  We  have  instances  in 
which  the  "  democratic  control  "  of  foreign  policy 
might  be  shown  to  be  more  dangerous  than  that 
of  the  officials.  Thus  in  1863  our  diplomacy 
did  not  commit  us  to  the  action  demanded  by 
many  public  meetings  at  the  time  of  the  Prussian 
attack  on  the  Danish  Duchies.  The  English 
public  were  much  excited  by  the  addresses  of 
Kossuth  in  1848,  and  Austria  appears  to  have 
feared  that  England  would  go  to  war  in  behalf  of 


FOREIGN  POLICY  107 

the  Hungarians  :  but  the  Cabinet  was  able  to 
keep  away  from  danger  in  spite  of  the  delicate 
situation  created  by  the  personal  sympathies  of 
Lord  Palmerston.  So  also,  perhaps,  we  may 
imagine  that,  although  the  war  of  1870  was 
engineered  by  Gramont  and  Bismarck,  the 
popular  clamour  in  Paris  and  Berlin  would  have 
committed  the  nations  to  war  long  before,  if  it 
had  not  been  for  the  diplomatic  system.  Whether 
the  delay  was  good  for  France  may  be  doubtful  ; 
but  it  was  certainly  good  for  Prussia. 

Continuous  Attention  and  Quick  Decision. — In  the 
method  of  working,  also,  the  diplomatic  system 
appears  to  have  advantages  :  for  specialists  can 
devote  a  continuous  attention  to  the  issues  which 
would  be  impossible  for  the  average  politician. 
Palmerston  is  said  to  have  declared  that  the 
business  of  the  Foreign  Office  needed  continuous 
labour.1  The  cursory  attention  which  the  Govern- 
ments of  all  countries,  involved  as  they  are  in 
efforts  for  social  reform  or  oppression,  in  adminis- 
tration and  in  law-making,  could  devote  to  the 
relations  with  Foreign  States  would  be  still  more 
inadequate  now  than  it  was  in  the  nineteenth 
century,  since,  as  we  have  said,  the  connections 
of  all  States  are  more  intimate.  A  further  need 
in  dealing  with  foreign  interests  is  quick  decision. 
This  may  not  be  always  the  case,  but  the  relation- 
1   Sidney  Low,  Governance  of  England,  p.  252. 


108     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

ship  between  alien  peoples  tends  to  pass  through 
periods  of  crisis  which  are  much  more  sharp  and 
sudden  than  in  the  case  of  social  unrest  within 
the  State.  This  fact  is  marked  by  the  greater 
frequency  of  wars  as  compared  with  revolutions, 
and  it  is  due  largely  to  the  ignorance  which 
generally  prevails  as  to  the  intentions  or  the 
power  of  "  foreigners."  Where  ignorance  is 
common,  panic  is  frequent.  Passion  tends  to  fill 
those  spaces  of  the  mind  which  are  left  empty 
in  the  progress  of  education  :  emotion  rushes  in, 
like  blood  to  the  head,  and  eventually  swamps 
even  the  limited  drained  land  of  reason.  Thus 
patriotism  seems  in  moments  of  crisis  to  repudiate 
all  calm  thought. 

Now  this  involves  the  necessity  for  decided 
action  in  crises,  either  to  direct,  to  subdue,  or 
to  use  the  popular  feeling.  Hence  it  was  that 
Palmerston,  himself  perhaps  too  hasty,  objected 
to  the  slow  methods  of  the  Prince  Consort  :  and 
often  in  a  crisis,  decided  action,  quickly  taken,  has 
really  maintained  the  interest  of  the  nation  where 
the  slower  methods  of  parliamentary  debate  and 
still  more  of  a  popular  referendum  would  have 
dangerously  imperilled  not  only  our  military 
effectiveness  but  also  our  reputation.1 

1  It  may  be  agreed  that  the  decision  to  go  to  war  on  the 
ground  of  Belgian  Neutrality  was  thus  well  made,  and  that  we 
could  not  possibly  have  put  the  question  to  the  vote. 


FOREIGN  POLICY  109 

So  far,  then,  we  may  count  the  diplomatic 
system  valuable  ;  but  it  has  very  great  deficiencies 
also,  and  perhaps  more  in  continental  countries 
than  in  England.  In  the  first  place,  the  system 
bears  the  marks  of  its  birth  in  a  time  when  the 
State  was  not  what  it  now  is.1  The  system  is 
hampered  by  its  inheritance. 

But  it  is  not  simply  that  an  old  organisation 
deals  with  an  entirely  new  situation.  The 
organisation  which  was  once  used  in  one  way 
might  very  easily  be  applied  to  other  activities  ; 
and  of  this  we  have  had  many  examples,  especially 
in  English  government.  Thus  the  Committee 
of  the  Privy  Council,  which  was  called  the 
Cabinet,  has  become  a  governing  body.  So  also  we 
use  the  old  system  of  Secretariat  and  Embassy  for 
dealing  with  the  new  relationship  between  States. 
But  quite  apart  from  the  disadvantages  in  the 
structure  of  the  organisation,  the  actual  working 
of  such  a  system  carries  with  it  an  inheritance 
of  ideas. 

"  What  can  be  done  and  what  cannot  be 
done "  is  often  a  sacred  gospel  to  officials, 
although     the    only    meaning    in     the    words    is 

1  See  "  Foreign  Policy  in  Middle  Ages,"  in  Stubbs' 
Lectures  on  English  History,  p.  354  seq.,  publ.  1906.  It  is 
amusing  to  read  that  Germany  and  England  are  always  united 
in  Foreign  Policy,  because  they  are  "  non-aggressive  nations " 
which  love  "  order  and  peace."  France  is  "  aggressive, 
unscrupulous,  false,"  p.   371. 


no    THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

"  What  has  been  done  and  what  has  not." l 
Every  established  institution,  as  the  price  of 
preserving  a  valuable  inheritance,  tends  to  "  pilfer 
the  present  for  the  beggar  past."  The  methods 
of  secret  interview,  of  pompous  despatches  and 
of  court  functions,  valuable  as  they  may  be  in 
preserving  the  personal  contact,  the  polite  man- 
ners, and  the  decorative  dresses  of  a  vanished 
civilisation,  are  paid  for  too  highly  if  they  involve 
the  transfer  of  attention  and  timely  labour  from 
the  task  of  understanding  or  expressing  national 
interests. 

And  as  for  actual  guiding  ideas,  first,  the 
principle  of  Balance  of  Power2  belongs  to  the 
Renaissance  situation,  where  the  relationship  of 
States  was  not  so  intimate  and  continuous,  in 
economics  and  ideas,  as  it  is  to-day.  It  is  not 
a  false  principle  if  applied  to  the  situation  out 
of  which  it  arose  ;  but  that  situation  has  simply 
disappeared.      It    continues    to    exist    as  a  ghost 

1  Cf.  letter  of  Sir  R.  Morier  to  Sir  W.  White,  March  21, 
1877.  "  The  abiding  fact  ...  is  the  absolute  and  uncon- 
ditional ineptitude  of  our  International  machinery.  .  .  .  The 
departmental  people  at  the  F.  O.  are  the  worst  offenders. 
Their  hatred  of  anything  that  rises  above  routine  or  carries 
with  it  the  promise  of  a  policy  would  be  amusing  if  one  could 
look  at  it  with  indifferent  eyes." — Life  of  Sir  W.  White,  by 
by   H.   S.  Edwards,  1902. 

2  This  can  only  mean  in  theory  that  States  may  be  treated 
as  units,  to  be  put  together  or  taken  apart  as  economic  or 
military  power  changes  in  each.  In  practice  it  is  the  attempt 
to  overbalance  military  force  in  our  favour. 


FOREIGN   POLICY  in 

in  the  corridors  of  the  Foreign  Office,  and  in  the 
portfolios  of  Imperial  Chancellors.  It  was  the 
primitive  method  of  securing  independence  of 
governmental  development.  Next  there  is  a 
primitive  conception  of  natural  enmity  to  foreigners 
which  remains  in  some  at  least  of  the  Secretariats. 
Treitzschke  calls  this  a  "veiled  hostility,"  and  since 
warfare,  according  to  him,  justifies  every  kind 
of  deceit  or  trick,  it  follows  that  during  times 
of  so-called  peace  any  State  may  deceive  or  trick 
its  neighbours  ;  and  not  only  States  which  pro- 
fess the  Machiavellian  immorality  suffer  from 
the  tendency  to  treat  foreigners  as  naturally  to 
be  deceived. 

The  conception  which  began  as  that  of  an 
Ambassador  being  a  spy  in  a  foreign  country 
continues  in  so  far  as  the  Ambassador  may  use 
his  privileges  to  inform  his  Government  of  any 
weakness  among  their  neighbours ;  and  it  would 
be  interesting  to  know  what  connection  there  is 
between  the  Secret  Service  which  every  civilised 
State  seems  to  use,  and  the  privileged  repre- 
sentative of  that  State  in  the  very  heart  of  a 
foreign  country. 

And  even  more  prominently  the  atmosphere 
of  obsolete  ideas  hangs  round  the  official  concep- 
tion of  national  interest.  The  Secretariats  and 
Embassies  have  not  yet  grasped  the  economic 
interdependence  of  recent  years  among  all  great 


ii2     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

nations.  They  still  seem  to  imagine  that  the 
"interests"  of  the  nation  are  confined  to  the 
boundaries  over  which  their  State  is  supreme. 
Of  course,  there  is  an  immense  amount  of  com- 
mercial and  financial  business  transacted  through 
Embassies  and  Consulates.  That  is  a  good  point 
in  the  system.  What  is  wrong  seems  to  be  the 
intellectual  inability  to  grasp  that  one  State  benefits 
by  increasing  wealth  in  another. 

There  is  also  the  antiquated  tendency  to  suppose 
that  foreign  conquest  is  to  the  "  interest  "  of  the 
nation ;  although  we  suppose  that  ghost  is  more  or 
less  laid,  except  in  the  minds  of  army  officers  who 
venture  into  print. 

And,  finally,  there  is  a  complete  absence  of  any 
clear  conception  that  the  interest  of  a  nation  must 
be  treated,  for  practical  purposes,  as  the  interest  of 
the  majority.  There  is  no  real  calculation  among 
Secretaries  of  State  or  Ambassadors  as  to  the 
results  of  their  action  upon  the  lives  and  fortunes 
of  the  proletariat  ;  so  that  the  "  interest "  repre- 
sented is  often  only  the  interest  of  a  small  clique 
or  of  the  governing  class.  The  whole  body, 
perhaps,  benefits  by  the  increasing  wealth  of  the 
few  ;  but  it  would  be  interesting  to  examine 
diplomatists  on  the  social  situation  of  the  countries 
which  they  are  supposed  to  represent.  At  most 
they  seem  to  be  aware  vaguely  of  "  labour  unrest," 
or  of  discontented  people  who  object  to  the  partial 


FOREIGN   POLICY  113 

starvation  which  they  might  endure  for  the  sake 
of  their  beloved  country  and  patriotically  say 
nothing. 

But  if  the  interest  represented  in  diplomacy  is 
to  be  the  interest  of  the  majority,  knowledge  of 
such  interest  must  exist  among  the  officials  :  the 
diplomatic  caste  is,  however,  economically  divided 
from  the  mass,  from  the  trading  class  and  even 
from  the  intellectuals  in  almost  every  nation.1 
Or,  if  the  interests  of  these  classes  are  admitted, 
they  are  known  only  from  blue  books  or  treatises 
and  not  by  personal  contact.  The  result  is  neglect 
of  the  consideration  of  the  interest  of  the  vast 
majority  in  every  nation. 

Finally,  in  no  department  of  government  is  the 
practice  of  despotism  more  prominent  than  in 
diplomacy.  By  despotism  we  mean  the  govern- 
ment of  others,  even,  in  the  case  of  beneficent 
despotism,  for  the  good  of  others,  in  spite  of  their 
wishes  or  without  reference  to  their  wishes.  And 
the  objection  against  such  a  method  is  not  made 
on   the  ground  that  Foreign   Ministers  are  evil- 

1  The  professors  and  editors  used  by  the  United  States  are, 
I  suppose,  less  divided  ;  but  elsewhere  the  diplomatists  are 
allied  to  the  military  and  land-owning  classes  only  and  neither 
"  trade "  nor  "  labour "  are  closely  present  to  their  minds. 
The  proof  of  this  is  to  be  found  in  the  establishment  of  the 
Consular  system  to  correct  the  deficiencies  of  Renaissance 
"aristocracy"  in  Embassies.  And  even  in  the  case  of  the 
United  States,  personal  wealth  being  often  necessary,  the  choice 
of  ambassadors  is  restricted. 
I 


1 14     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

minded  or  intend  to  do  wrong,  but  on  the  ground 
that  they  do  not  know  as  much  as  "  the  people  " 
do  what  the  people  need.  "  Les  hommes  droits 
et  simples  sont  difficiles  a  tromper  "  : 1  and  again, 
"  the  many,  of  whom  each  is  but  an  ordinary 
person,  when  they  meet  together  are  likely  to  be 
better  than  the  few  good."  2  Thus  the  objection 
against  despotism  is  an  objection  not  against 
clever  tyranny  but  against  benevolent  incom- 
petence. 

In  a  monarchical  State  the  interest  of  the  monarch 
is  chiefly  considered,  even  if  it  is  believed  that 
that  interest  involves  as  a  result  the  interests  of 
"  the  people."  And  in  such  a  State  the  person 
whose  interest  is  primarily  considered  is  definitely 
consulted.  Queen  Victoria  apparently  conceived 
Foreign  Policy  altogether  in  terms  of  Kings  and 
Queens  :  but  already  the  world  had  moved  away 
from  that  Renaissance  situation.  With  us  "  the 
people,"  whose  interest  is  supposed  to  be  fore- 
most, are  not  consulted.  This  is  really  due  to  the 
historic  origin  of  Secretariats,  but  a  modern  excuse 
is  given  for  it  by  saying  that  to  consult  the  people 
involves  publicity.  This  puts  our  Secretary  at  a 
disadvantage  of  showing  his  hand^  which  he  cannot 
do  without  losing  in  the  contest  between  national 
interests.  But  this  again  implies  an  interesting 
moral  problem.      Are   you   justified   in   cheating 

1  Rousseau,  Contrat  Social.  2  Arist.,  Pol.,  1281b. 


FOREIGN  POLICY  115 

your  grocer  if  you  think  he  is  likely  to  cheat 
you  ?  Or  why  should  there  be  any  secrecy  if 
there  is  nothing  being  done  of  which  the  nation 
might  be  ashamed  or  to  which  foreign  nations 
might  reasonably  object  ? 

A  clear  example  of  the  disadvantages  of  the 
present  system  is  to  be  found  in  the  Reminiscences 
of  Prince  Bismarck.  It  is  at  first  difficult  to 
discover  what  he  imagined  the  principles  of  foreign 
policy  to  be  :  but  it  appears  that  he  accepted  the 
idea  that  it  should  be  the  development  of  Prussia's 
interests  and,  through  this,  a  development  of 
German  interests.  He  did  not  go  further.  The 
interests  of  those  not  German  in  blood  or  language 
were  no  business  of  his  ;  and  he  implies  that  they 
must  be  opposed  to  the  interests  for  which  he  was 
to  act.1  Prussian-German  interests,  however,  he 
conceived  in  the  most  obsolete  way.  "  Real- 
politik "  is  generally  the  politics  of  our  great- 
grandfathers, and  what  are  called  "  facts "  are 
generally  the  illusions  of  a  still  earlier  age.  Prince 
Bismarck  modelled  his  policy  on  that  of  Frederick 
the  Great.2  He  would  use  modern  guns  but  not 
modern  ideas.     He  accepts  the  description  of  State- 

1  Bismarck,  the  Man  and  the  Statesman,  English  trans.,  Vol. 
II,  ch.  xxi,  p.  56.  "I  took  it  as  assured  that  war  with 
France  would  necessarily  have  to  be  waged  on  the  road  to  our 
further  national  development."  The  purpose  of  the  war  (id., 
p.  291)  was  "autonomous  political  life." 

2  Ibid.,  Vol.  II,  ch.  xii. 


n6     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

relationship  given  in  Hobbes  -,1  and  as  for  "national 
interest,"  it  seems  to  be  chiefly  keeping  things  as 
they  are,  which  is  naturally  the  view  of  the  well- 
fed  and  well-clothed  who  have  also  the  social 
"  position  "  they  want.  He  treats  all  expression 
of  dissatisfaction  with  the  established  system  as 
a  pernicious  tendency  which  must  be  condoned 
only  in  order  to  fit  the  whole  group  for  foreign 
war.  He  mistakes  his  idiosyncrasy  for  a  permanent 
feature  of  German  character.2 

But  Bismarck  is  not  the  only  specimen  of  the 
blind  guide,  or  of  the  specialist  whose  knowledge 
is  that  of  his  grandfathers.  The  system  which 
perpetuates  such  guidance  in  so  many  civilised 
States  must  certainly  be  somewhat  deficient. 

We  have  so  far  discussed  the  advantages  and 
disadvantages  of  the  system  ;  but  a  word  must  be 
said  concerning  the  principles  on  which  the  system 
seems  to  have  been  managed.  It  is  impossible  to 
make  accusations  against  contemporaries,  for  we 
have  not  all  the  evidence  ;  but  it  is  abundantly 
clear  that  in  the  past  the  principles  of  diplomacy 
have    not    been    moral.     The    very    ancient    and 

1  "  Upon  foreign  politics  .  .  .  my  views  .  .  .  were  taken 
from  the  standpoint  of  a  Prussian  officer"  {id.,  p.  3). 

2  Ibid.,  Ch.  XIII,  p.  314.  "  Never,  not  even  at  Frankfort, 
did  I  doubt  that  the  key  to  German  politics  was  to  be  found 
in  princes  and  dynasties,  not  in  publicists,  whether  in  parlia- 
ment and  the  press  or  on  the  barricades."  "  German  patriotism 
needs  to  hang  on  the  peg  of  dependence  upon  a  dynasty " 
(p.  316). 


FOREIGN   POLICY  117 

Machiavellian  method  we  may  omit,  although  it 
has  undoubtedly  vitiated  the  tradition  even  until 
our  own  day.  But  in  comparatively  recent  times 
and  as  between  modern  States,  diplomacy  has 
been  often  based  upon  lying,  studied  deceit  and 
unblushing  theft. 

The  point  is  that  the  relationship  of  the  citizens 
of  one  State  to  those  of  another  cannot  possibly 
be  moral  so  long  as  their  representatives  are  either 
strong  enough  or  are  allowed  to  use  immoral 
means  for  the  attainment  of  what  is  conceived  to 
be  a  national  purpose.  Yet  we  know  that  Lord 
Beaconsfield  in  1878  obtained  Cyprus  by  under- 
hand means  ;  that  a  Prussian  King  and  his 
statesmen  betrayed  a  trust  to  obtain  their  share 
of  Poland.  And  of  all  the  hopelessly  immoral 
methods  those  of  Austrian  diplomacy  seem  to  be 
crudest,  for  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  was  excused 
by  the  deliberate  forgery  of  documents  in  the 
Austrian  legation  at  Belgrade.1 

We  are  not  throwing  stones  at  diplomatists. 
What  seems  to  us  more  important  is  that  the 
majority  of  citizens  in  the   several   States  which 

1  As  an  instance  of  "  diplomacy  "  this  deserves  a  fuller  record. 
It  was  proved  in  the  Friedjung  Trial  (Dec.  1909)  that  the 
historian  Dr.  Friedjung  had  been  supplied  with  documents 
forged  in  the  Austrian  Legation  under  Count  Forgach  and  the 
Foreign  Minister  Count  Aehrenthal.  Forgach  was  promoted 
to  Vienna.  The  forged  documents  were  the  only  grounds  for 
Austrian  action.  (Cf.  Dr.  Seton-Watson  in  The  War  and 
Democracy,  Ch.  IV,  p.  150,) 


n8     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

benefited  financially  by  immoral  practice  did  not 
protest  or  even  refuse  to  receive  the  property 
stolen  in  their  behalf.  Morality  remains  at  a  low 
stage  of  development  so  long  as  men,  who  might 
avoid  lying  or  stealing  for  themselves,  are  perfectly 
willing  to  benefit  by  such  deeds  done  by  others. 
And  this  is  not  merely  a  political  but  also  an 
economic  issue.  The  State  is  not  a  trading  com- 
pany ;  but  even  if  it  were,  the  position  would  be 
no  better.  It  makes  no  difference  that  business 
is  often  conducted  on  the  same  Machiavellian 
principles  as  diplomacy.  The  principles  are  im- 
moral. And  our  much-abused  diplomatists  are 
very  often  angels  of  light  by  comparison  with 
some  peace-loving  business  men  who  continue  to 
raise  private  fortunes  by  acting  upon  principles 
which  they  affect  to  disapprove  of  when  they  read 
Machiavelli  or  diplomatic  despatches. 

Further,  as  we  shall  argue  later,  the  principle 
that  foreign  policy  should  be  a  maintenance  and 
development  of  the  interest  of  the  State  must  be 
subservient  to  the  general  principle  of  morality 
that  such  development  should  not  injure  any 
other.1     The  principle  is  implied  in  what  we  have 

1  Sedgwick,  Elements,  Ch.  XVIII.  "  For  a  State,  as  for  an 
individual,  the  ultimate  end  and  standard  of  conduct  is  the 
happiness  of  all  who  are  affected  by  its  actions.  ...  In  excep- 
tional cases  where  the  interest  of  the  part  conflicts  with  the 
interests  of  the  whole,  the  interest  of  the  part — be  it  individual 


FOREIGN   POLICY  119 

already  said  as  to  the  moral  character  of  the  State  ; 
but  how  it  can  be  applied  will  be  seen  when  we 
consider  the  latest  tendencies  towards  the  Comity 
of  Nations. 

There  is  a  general  principle  which  seems  to 
arise  from  such  consideration  of  the  system  by 
which  Foreign  Policy  is  managed.  It  is  the 
expression  of  a  need  in  the  developing  morality 
of  nations.  The  increase  of  popular  power  over 
law  and  government  should  be  accompanied  by  an 
increase  of  knowledge  among  all  citizens  of  the 
foreign  interests  of  their  group  and  of  the  method 
by  which  such  interests  are  developed.  We  must 
rid  ourselves  of  the  barbaric  ignorance  of  foreign 
peoples  which  is  our  inheritance  from  the  time 
when  peoples  were  separated  by  geographical 
features  or  economic  structure.  The  man  of  the 
Middle  Ages,  by  comparison  with  ourselves,  could 
well  afford  to  neglect  the  habits  and  customs  of 
foreigners  ;  he  could  with  difficulty  communicate 
with  them,  and  he  traded  with  them  hardly  at  all  ; 
but  if  the  minds  of  our  diplomatists  seem  to 
belong  to  the  Renaissance,  those  of  "  the  people  " 
seem  to  be  mediaeval,  and  the  next  step  forward  in 
making  diplomacy  more  moral  must  be  an  increase 
in  the  political  knowledge  of  citizens. 

or  State — must  necessarily  give  way.  On  this  point  of  principle 
no  compromise  is  possible,  no  hesitation  admissible,  no  appeal 
to  experience  relevant." 


CHAPTER   VII 

ALLIANCE 

The  results  of  Foreign  Policy,  so  far  as  they 
are  permanent  in  the  progress  of  International 
Morality,  are  generally  of  two  opposite  kinds. 
There  is,  first,  the  promotion  of  alliance  between 
States,  and  secondly,  the  continuance  of  inter- 
state rivalry.  This  second  result  may  seem  to 
be  not  moral  ;  but  it  is  clearly  a  part  of  morality 
to  develop  distinctions  of  group-character,  as  of 
individuality,  and  not  only  to  work  upon  the 
principle  of  common  interest.  We  shall,  how- 
ever, leave  this  issue  for  the  present,  and  speak 
of  alliance.  It  must  be  understood  that  the  dis- 
cussion does  not  involve  any  plan  for  a  Concert 
of  the  whole  civilised  world.  We  must  begin  at 
the  beginning.  There  are,  in  fact,  a  few  States 
which  are  acting  together  for  common  purposes, 
however  transitory  and  limited  :  and  this  fact  is 
important  for  a  judgment  upon  the  international 
situation.  For  alliance  has  sometimes  moral 
causes  or  moral  purposes,  and  nearly  always 
moral  results.     We  should  not   be   deceived  by 

120 


ALLIANCE  121 

the  purely  economic  theory,  whatever  its  basis 
in  fact.  It  is  true,  of  course,  that  a  new  distinc- 
tion has  come  into  prominence  in  recent  times, 
that  of  debtor  and  creditor  States.1  We  cannot  any 
longer  be  content  with  the  old  theory  of  equality 
of  sovereign  States  or  even  with  the  newer  dis- 
tinction between  the  "  Great  Powers  "  and  other 
States.2  There  is  the  new  fact  of  an  economic 
relationship  between  citizens  or  companies  of 
citizens  in  one  State  with  citizens  of  another, 
due  to  the  lending  of  money. 

We  have  seen  that  investment  tends  to 
disregard  State  frontiers  :  but  there  is  a  further 
important  fact — that  it  tends  to  follow  lines 
partly  laid  down  by  foreign  policy  in  the  interest 
of  military  or  non-material  security  ;  and  follow- 
ing these  lines  it  tends  to  secure  a  friendship 
which  military  reasons  alone  might  be  insufficient 
to  make  permanent.  The  standard  example  is 
the  relationship  of  Russia  and  France.  French 
citizens  lend  money  to  Russian  business  ;  and 
foreign  policy  assists  this,  at  first  perhaps  with  an 
anti-German  intention.  But  the  money  once  lent 
is  a  sufficient  reason  for  the  desire  of  France  that 
Russia  should  develop  successfully. 

In  the  same  way  our  financiers  played  their 
part,  in  the  beginning  of  the  war,  by  the  attention 

1  Brailsford,  War  of  Steel  and  Gold,  p.  221. 

2  Cf.  Lawrence,  Part  II,  ch.  iv,  p.  268. 


122     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

which  was  directed  to  the  possibilities  of  lucrative 
investment  in  Russia.1  But  if  such  investment 
takes  place,  it  will  bind  us  to  Russia  far  more 
effectively  than  any  common  action  in  war. 

The  creditor-debtor  relationship  in  foreign 
policy,  however,  may  not  always  result  in  alliance, 
when  the  debtor  State  is  very  much  inferior  in 
military  or  economic  power.  For  example,  the 
presence  of  British  capital  in  the  Transvaal  before 
the  Boer  War  put  the  Transvaal  Government  in 
a  difficult  political  position.  In  the  same  sense, 
Mexico  and  China  are  debtor-States  which  tend 
to  become  subordinated  politically  because  of  the 
superior  military  or  economic  power  of  their 
creditors. 

Thus  we  have  to  allow  not  merely  for  the 
interdependence  of  all  States,  but  for  the  closer 
interdependence  of  some  States  and  the  creation 
of  larger  economic  and  political  groups  out  of 
two  or  more  States.  The  cc  Balance  of  Power  " 
alliances  of  the  past,  transitory  and  often  for 
warlike  purposes  only,  are  being  transformed  or 
replaced  by  a  new  form  of  alliance  which,  what- 
ever it  excludes,  binds  more  effectively  and  for 
longer  periods  the  States  which  it  includes. 

1  The  best  example  of  this  is  to  be  found  in  the  Times 
Russian  Supplement  (published  January  191  5),  of  which  the 
whole  point  was  the  excellence  of  Russia  as  a  field  for  British 
capital. 


ALLIANCE  123 

The  whole  problem  is  new.  It  is  vital  to 
foreign  policy  :  but  it  has  no  solution  in  the 
language  and  thought  of  Renaissance  diplomacy 
or  our  antiquated  conceptions  of  the  State.  What 
is  the  relation  between  the  State  as  a  political 
institution  and  a  financial  company  of  its  citizens 
who  may  have  interests  in  foreign  countries  ? 
On  the  one  hand,  is  the  State  committed  to  act 
in  order  to  collect  debts  for  a  few  powerful 
citizens,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  should  not  the 
State  hesitate  to  act  if  action  would  imperil  such 
interests  in  foreign  lands  ?  These,  however,  are 
problems  for  the  practical  politicians  :  perhaps  no 
general  principles  are  established  ;  and  yet  from 
such  problems  arises  one  of  the  important  issues 
in  the  moral  relationship  between  States. 

At  one  time  the  State  was  regarded  as  a  kind 
of  Church,  and  wars  were  fought  for  religion  : 
now  the  State  tends  to  be  considered  as  a  sort  of 
financial  company.  But  even  if  the  relationship 
which  holds  together  modern  States  is  at  first 
economic,  the  result  is  often  of  importance  morally. 
The  merely  financial  common  interest  tends  to 
produce  a  moral  sentiment  of  sympathy  :  and 
such  also  is  the  general  effect  of  a  merely  military 
agreement.  The  important  point  for  our  present 
purpose  is  the  result  upon  the  minds  of  the 
average  citizens  in  the  allied  or  interdependent 
States.     It  makes  no  difference  that  the  majority 


i24     THE   MORALITY    OF    NATIONS 

are  quite  unaware  of  the  reason  for  their  senti- 
ment of  friendliness  :  nor  does  it  matter  that 
such  sentiment  is  often  created  by  newspapers  in 
the  pay  of  financiers.  In  a  sense,  a  sentiment  of 
friendliness  so  formed  may  be  easily  destroyed  ; 
and,  as  we  shall  see,  the  Italians  could  not  forget 
an  ancient  grudge  even  though  diplomacy  seemed 
to  commit  them  to  the  Triple  Alliance.  But 
sentiments  of  friendliness  are  interesting  because 
they  prove  that  there  is  no  insuperable  obstacle 
to  intimacy  between  any  nations  whatever.  And, 
at  least  for  the  few  years  during  which  they  are 
active,  they  give  promise  of  common  action 
between  diverse  peoples  on  general  principles. 

Now,  therefore,  we  may  examine  the  alliances 
of  recent  history  and,  in  tracing  their  growth, 
enquire  if  any  general  principles  can  be  found 
which  govern  the  friendship  of  States. 

The  situation  in  international  politics  was  until 
recently  governed  by  the  groupings  of — 

i.  The  Triple  Alliance, 

2.  The  Triple  Entente. 

The  first  may  be  held  to  have  disappeared, 
since  Italy  stood  out  of  the  war  at  the  begin- 
ning. Nevertheless,  it  may  be  worth  while  to 
say  how  the  situation  just  preceding  the  war  came 
into  existence. 

It  seems  reasonable  that  Germany  and  Austria 
should  be  allied  against  France,  or,  at  least,  for 


ALLIANCE  125 

the  defence  of  common  interests.  The  ruling 
peoples  in  both  empires  are  Teutonic,  and  the 
history  of  their  ancestors  binds  them  to  a  sort  of 
affection. 

Also  they  may  both  be  held  to  have  a  common 
cause  against   Pan-Slavism    in    Russia  or  in    the 

o 

Balkans.  In  fact,  it  was  the  Balkan  War,  and 
the  fear  of  a  Slav  preponderance  of  power  in 
Eastern  Europe,  which  probably  moved  the 
Berlin  diplomats  to  force  on  a  war  between 
Austria  and  Serbia.1 

But  even  the  Teutonic  peoples  have  not  for 
very  long  been  allied  officially.  Prussia  main- 
tained a  traditional  friendship  for  Russia  during 
the  greater  part  of  Bismarck's  power.  But  the 
current  of  affairs  bringing  Russia  and  France 
together  after  the  Prussian  success  of  1866, 
Bismarck  began  to  secure  his  position  by  friend- 
ship with  Austria.  In  1879  a  treaty  was  signed 
between  the  new  German  Empire  and  the  Aus- 
trian Empire  which  was  the  beginning  of  the 
Triple  Alliance.2 

The  third  party  of  the  alliance  was  Italy,  in 
spite  of  the  fact  that  Italian  opposition  to  Austria 
had  by  no  means  ceased.  But  in  1881  France 
declared  Tunis  her  protectorate,  and  the  Italian 
people  were  much  incensed  by  it.  Old  passions 
flamed  up,  and  the  memory  of  Italian  provinces 
1  Correspondence,  etc.  2  Bismarck,  II,  257. 


126     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

(Savoy  and  Nice)  which  had  been  given  over  to 
France,  served  to  make  the  Italian  Government 
able  to  enter  into  special  arrangements  with 
Austria  and  Germany.  The  Triple  Alliance  was 
probably  in  existence  as  early  as  October  1881. 
The  terms  were  like  those  agreed  upon  between 
Austria  and  Germany  :  that  each  Government 
should  aid  in  the  event  of  the  other  being 
attacked.  It  was  a  purely  defensive  alliance  ; 
and  Italy  was,  to  all  appearance,  in  exactly  the 
same  position  as  Austria  with  respect  to  Germany. 
If  the  present  war  is  not  purely  "  defensive," 
there  is  no  more  "  treaty  reason  "  for  Austria's  aid 
being  given  to  Germany  than  there  is  for  Italy's. 
On  paper,  it  would  seem  that  what  Italy  views 
as  not  defensive  is  viewed  by  the  other  two 
parties  to  the  alliance  as  defensive  ;  but  in  fact 
it  is  not  a  treaty  which  keeps  Vienna  and  Berlin 
so  closely  together.  The  terms  of  the  treaty 
may  have  been  exactly  the  same  for  all  three 
parties  :  but  two  of  the  three  are  united  by  blood 
and  tradition.  The  real  reason  for  Italy's  neu- 
trality is  not  because  the  war  of  her  late  allies  is 
regarded  as  aggressive,  but  because  the  treaty 
obligations  entered  into  in  188  1,  in  a  fit  of  anti- 
French  policy,  have  not  been  sufficient  to  destroy 
the  long  tradition  of  Italian  sentiment  directed 
against  the  Austrian  Government. 

The  Triple  Alliance  was  formed  by  a  defensive 


ALLIANCE  127 

policy  against  France,  and  has  gradually  been 
turned,  owing  to  events  in  the  Balkans,  against 
Russia.  As  an  expression  in  diplomatic  form  of 
the  real  interests  of  two  groups  or  Governments 
it  is  a  reasonable  and,  in  part,  a  beneficent  in- 
fluence in  so  far  as  it  has  cemented  the  friend- 
ship of  Berlin  and  Vienna,  and  closed,  perhaps 
finally,  the  disputes  as  to  predominance  among 
the  German  States  ;  but  as  to  the  interests  of 
the  third  group  or  Government  (Italy),  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  see  how  the  alliance  subserved  any  real 
good  except  as  providing  a  transitory  pause  to 
the  anti-Austrian  feeling  in  Italy. 

The  history  of  the  Franco-Russian  alliance 
is  even  stranger  than  that  of  the  Triple  Alliance. 
We  need  not  go  back  to  Napoleonic  times  to 
find  out  how  completely  the  tradition  of  France 
differs  from  that  of  Russia.  Politically  France 
has  been  the  great  experimenter  in  methods  of 
government,  while  Russia  has  been  continuously 
opposed  to  all  such  changes. 

In  March  1854  France  declared  war  against 
Russia,  since  at  that  time  it  was  conceived  to  be 
necessary  to  restrict  the  growth  of  Russian  power 
at  the  expense  of  Turkey.  The  war  ended  with 
no  very  great  feeling  on  either  side. 

There  had  been  a  faint  sympathy  between 
Russia  and  the  French  Empire  in  the  promotion 
of   nationality   in   the  Balkans,   following   on    the 


128     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

Treaty  of  Paris  (March  1856).  Russia  desired 
to  see  the  Balkan  people  free  of  Turkish  rule 
because  of  their  blood,  and  Napoleon  III  had  a 
sentimental  regard  for  the  principle  of  nationality. 
This  tendency  for  two  Empires  to  come  together 
almost  produced  an  entente  in  1861  and  1862  ;  but 
in  1863  the  Poles  rose  against  Russia.  French 
sympathy,  even  that  of  the  Emperor,  was  on  the 
side  of  the  national  movement,  and  the  Russian 
Government  only  wanted  to  remain  as  it  was. 

In  1866  Russia  was  friendly  with  Prussia 
rather  than  with  the  French  Empire,  and  in  1871 
Bismarck  was  able  to  buy  off  any  possible  Russian 
interference  with  the  success  of  Prussian  arms  by 
acting  in  the  interest  of  the  Russian  repudiation 
of  the  Treaty  of  Paris.  Republican  France  of 
1872  and  the  following  years  was  opposed  by 
Russian  autocracy  in  the  League  of  the  three 
Emperors,  and  it  was  not  until  the  reopening  of 
the  whole  Eastern  question  and  after  the  anti-Slav 
policy  of  the  Teutonic  powers  was  revealed  at 
Berlin  in  1878,  that  Russia  was  drawn  again 
towards  France.  The  common  interest  was  un- 
doubtedly opposition  to  the  growth  of  Teutonic 
influence  in  Europe,  and  the  result  was  an 
alliance  which  was  begun  in  July  1891.  France 
gave  Russia  a  large  loan  and  freedom  of  action 
in  the  East,  and  Russia  gave  France  some  security 
against  a  renewal  of  1870. 


ALLIANCE  129 

The  entry  of  England  into  full  alliance  with 
France  and  Russia  cannot  yet  be  fully  explained, 
since  the  necessary  documents  are  not  yet  public. 
Officially  we  were  not  allied  until  August  19 14, 
on  the  outbreak  of  war  ;  but  the  Entente 
Cordiale,  whatever  that  means,  had  been  followed 
by  a  rapprochement  with  Russia.  We  acted  in 
concert  with  Russia  in  the  suppression  of  some 
Persian  developments,  and  the  future  will  reveal 
whether  we  stood  in  this  case  for  an  order  which 
did  not  suppress  national  liberties.  We  are, 
however,  now  committed  to  a  full  alliance,  and 
the  most  prominent  moral  result  is  the  general 
sentiment  of  friendliness  and  admiration  of  the 
allies,  each  for  the  other. 

Alliance  is  of  immense  importance  in  interna- 
tional morality.  Indeed,  nothing  in  recent  years  has 
been  so  directly  a  force  in  the  direction  of  peace  as 
the  present  war  in  so  far  as  it  is  waged  by  Allies. 
We  have  seen  that  German  States  may  be  reason- 
ably supposed  to  have  common  interests,  not 
only  in  the  economic  sense  but  also  in  the  main- 
tenance of  a  special  type  of  government.  Thus 
two  great  nations,  the  German  and  Austrian,  are 
agreed  not  to  fight  each  other.  They  are  not 
likely  to  forget  the  common  experiences  of  danger 
or  of  success. 

But  far  more  important  is  the  situation  on  the 
side  of  those  whom  we  call  pre-eminently  **  the 

K 


130    THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

Allies."  The  popular  voice  in  newspapers  has 
rightly  given  prominence  to  the  important  fact 
that  such  different  races  as  the  English,  French, 
Russian,  Belgian  and  Japanese  are  all  fighting  on 
the  same  side.  For  to  fight  together  means  at 
least  not  to  fight  one  another,  and  that  fact  is 
important. 

Nations  of  very  different  government  and 
tradition  can  then  be  induced  to  act  together  at 
least  for  a  short  time  :  and  if  they  act  together 
in  war,  why  should  they  not  in  peace  ?  But  this 
means  that  the  crude  conception  of  nations  as 
necessarily  individualistic  competitors  is  obsolete, 
for  co-operation  is  possible  among  very  many. 
And  even  if  this  co-operation  is  transient  and 
only  for  the  primitive  need  of  military  effective- 
ness, even  if  in  a  few  years  we  were  at  war  with 
any  of  our  present  allies,  the  months  or  years 
of  alliance  will  have  done  something  towards 
breaking  down  the  wall  of  ignorance  and  barbaric 
hostility  to  foreigners  which  are  the  fruitful 
sources  of  all  war. 

For,  let  us  consider  the  result  of  our  alliance 
in  other  ways  than  its  military  effectiveness.  We 
have  learnt  for  years,  from  the  "  Entente  Cordiale," 
to  appreciate  the  French  character  and  the  French 
point  of  view.  A  French  invasion  of  England 
is  to  the  present  generation  absolutely  unthink- 
able.     Our  soldiers   may  learn   to   admire  their 


ALLIANCE  131 

French  comrades,  and  already  there  is  some  effort 
among  them  to  understand  the  French  language. 
They  are  proud  to  receive  French  medals  as  a 
reward  for  gallantry,  and  they  and  all  England 
feel  desperately  concerned  in  the  security  of 
North-eastern  France.  Such  a  sympathetic  under- 
standing between  two  such  different  nations, 
even  if  it  were  only  forcible  in  the  moment  of 
danger,  is  nevertheless  more  valuable  than  any 
treaty  or  covenant  between  Governments.  For 
it  is  national  sympathy  and  not  merely  a  soldier's 
emotion. 

Next,  as  to  Russia,  it  seems  already  unkind 
to  refer  to  our  hostility  in  the  Crimean  War, 
and  we  desire  nothing  better  now  than  the 
Russian  occupation  of  Constantinople,  which  our 
forefathers  fought  to  prevent.  This  is  not  mere 
inconsistency,  for  the  situation  has  changed.  And 
already  we  are  learning  as  a  people  to  appreciate 
Russian  opera,  Russian  dancing  and  Russian 
literature.  The  Russian  character  has  become 
more  known  to  us,  even  the  geography  of  Russia 
has  its  interests,  and  we  no  longer  neglect  the 
virtues  of  a  people  which  has  done  and  may  yet 
do  so  much  for  civilisation  at  large. 

Doubtless  a  great  part  of  this  popular  senti- 
ment for  "our  allies"  is  the  superficial  friend- 
liness of  mariners  adrift  in  the  same  boat  ;  but 
however  superficial,  it    is    a    promise   of    a    time 


132     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

when  very  different  races  will  learn  to  appreciate 
the  standpoint  of  other  races,  and  when  the 
popular  voice  will  not  condemn  every  foreign 
habit  as  barbarous  and  every  foreign  government 
as  tyranny.  It  is  interesting  to  notice  that  those 
who  speak  of  a  "  natural "  distaste  for  foreigners 
also  make  a  distinction  between  foreigners  ;  so 
that  some  foreigners  are  now  regarded  as  bar- 
barous, false  and  aggressive,  and  others  as  amiably 
different  from  ourselves.  But  apparently  a  few 
years  suffice  to  transform  this  natural  distaste, 
so  that  those  who  were  aggressive  fifty  years 
ago  are  now  believed  to  be  kindly,  and  those  who 
were  peaceful  then  are  now  ambitious  of  conquest. 
It  is  obvious  that  this  "  natural  "  distaste  is  simply 
another  instance  of  how  we  are  governed  by 
illusions  in  political  thinking.  Thus  with  any 
historical  perspective  we  learn  much  from  the 
present  alliance  of  England,  Russia,  France, 
Belgium,  Serbia  and  Japan. 

More  important  still  for  international  morality 
is  the  fact  that  the  present  Alliance  shows  how 
force  may  be  exerted  in  the  maintenance  of  law 
and  order  without  the  existence  of  any  one 
"  World-dominion."  Rome  in  old  days  dictated 
peace  to  the  world  ;  England  dictates  peace  to 
India  ;  and  in  these  cases  law  and  order  depend 
upon  the  predominance  of  one  State.  But  if  the 
Allies  win  the  present  war,  peace  will  be  dictated 


ALLIANCE  133 

not  by  any  one,  but  by  a  large  group  of  very 
different  States  :  it  follows  that  it  will  be  a  peace 
in  which  a  great  number  of  different  interests  will 
be  preserved.  And,  still  further,  it  follows  that 
International  Law  will  be  maintained  not  by 
the  will  of  one  World-power,  but  by  agreement 
between  many  equals. 

The  principle  of  independent  development 
contained  in  the  legal  conception  of  sovereignty 
has  so  far  been  effective  in  securing  the  right  of 
each  separate  state-group.  The  Renaissance  con- 
ception had  its  value.  But  States  have  not,  in 
fact,  kept  a  splendid  isolation  ;  it  has  been  found 
ever  since  there  were  any  sovereign  States  that 
alliance  was  necessary  and  valuable.  And  we 
look  forward  to  a  further  extension  of  the 
principle  of  alliance,  although  at  first  sight  it 
might  seem  to  hamper  the  full  independence  of  a 
sovereign  State  to  avoid  any  "  individual  "  action. 
Thus  the  mutual  pledge  of  the  three  Govern- 
ments of  Russia,  France,  and  England  not  to 
enter  into  a  separate  peace  may  be  extended 
to  cover  common  action  for  many  years  after 
the  War. 

If  States  are  not  isolated,  it  is  because  of  real 
or  supposed  interests  which  they  have  in  common, 
whether  those  interests  are  purely  economic  or 
military  or  non-material.  The  new  commerce 
and  the  new  finance  destroyed  the  more  personal 


134     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

and  accidental  alliances  of  the  Middle  Ages  and 
the  Renaissance.  For  modern  alliance  is  of  a 
different  and  more  enduring  kind.  It  carries 
with  it  economic  bonds  and  the  growth  of 
popular  sentiment. 

But  the  interests  of  the  group  are  the  ultimate 
interests  of  all  the  individuals  :  and,  again,  the 
national  group  is  subdivided  into  smaller  groups. 
Clearly,  alliance  should  not  be  for  the  benefit  of 
one  small  group  among  many  ;  unless  in  helping 
that  group  it  also  helps  the  others.  The  tendency, 
however,  to  refuse  to  begin  with  small  gains  in 
order  to  wait  until  every  one  can  be  directly 
helped,  is  like  a  vague  cosmopolitanism  which  will 
not  begin  with  the  actual  friendliness  of  two  or 
more  nations. 

Alliance,  nevertheless,  may  not  be  altogether 
good  in  its  moral  results.  We  may  pay  too 
highly  for  success  in  war  or  in  investment,  if  we 
allow  the  restriction  of  liberty  even  among  other 
peoples.  It  is  sometimes  implied  that  other 
peoples  must  look  after  themselves  :  political 
and  national  laissez-faire  is  advocated  even  by 
those  who  see  that  as  between  fellow-citizens 
laissez-faire  is  obsolete.  But  lest  it  may  seem  as 
if  the  interest  in  the  liberty  of  other  peoples  is 
mere  sentimentalism,  we  must  repeat  what  should 
by  now  be  obvious,  that  the  State  which  aids  or 


ALLIANCE  135 

allows  the  extinction  of  liberty  in  other  States  has 
become  tyrannical  ;  and  the  direct  effect  is  tyranny 
within  the  tyrannical  State.  The  taste  for  tyranny 
cannot  be  satisfied  with  practice  upon  foreigners 
or  "  natives." 

We  may  then  pass  to  definite  instances  either 
of  the  moral  ineffectiveness  of  alliance,  or  of  its 
pernicious  moral  effects. 

Alliances  are  made  by  established  Governments, 
not  by  peoples.  Sometimes  the  Governments 
consider  the  interest  of  the  governed  ;  but  some- 
times only  the  interest  of  the  established  system 
is  considered,  or  even  if  the  interest  of  the  people 
is  considered  by  the  officials,  it  is  misunderstood. 
Thus  alliance  may  be  made  for  the  suppression  of 
popular  liberty  by  combining  the  force  of  two  or 
more  bodies  of  officials  ;  and  it  matters  nothing 
that  the  officials  conscientiously  believe  the  sup- 
pression of  popular  liberty  to  be  good  for  the 
people.  The  maintenance  of  a  system  which 
the  majority  wish  to  change  may  be  good  for  that 
majority  :  but  the  majority  are  less  likely  to  be 
wrong  about  that  than  are  the  officials  who  are 
the  system. 

In  1854  we  assisted  Turkey  against  Russia. 
The  alliance  was  strange,  since  many  in  England 
held  that  nothing  could  be  worse  than  Turkish 
rule  :   but  the  English  people,  incurably  optimistic 


136     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

as  to  the  character  of  their  friends  of  the  moment, 
apparently  hoped  great  things  from  the  influence 
of  England's  friendship  over  Turkish  rulers.  In 
1867  the  Sultan  of  Turkey  visited  England,  and 
was  received  not  only  with  official  greetings,  but 
with  popular  enthusiasm.  It  was  supposed  by 
many  that  the  effect  of  such  a  welcome  would  be 
to  make  the  Sultan  reform  his  manner  of  rule  ; 
and,  of  course,  no  such  result  followed.1  But, 
whatever  sane  statesmen  may  have  thought,  a 
great  number  of  Englishmen  really  seem  to  hope 
that  English  friendship  for  foreign  Governments 
will  affect  these  Governments  in  a  manner  of 
which  we  should  approve. 

It  is  said  by  Germany  that  England's  alliance 
with  Russia  is  in  the  interest  of  barbarism,  and 
we  regard  that  as  a  charge  to  be  refuted.  For 
even  if  it  were  to  our  interest  to  ally  ourselves 
with  a  barbaric  power,  we  could  hardly  believe  it 
moral  to  assist  in  the  suppression  of  civilised  life  : 
and,  in  fact,  it  could  hardly  be  to  the  higher 
interest  of  any  civilised  nation  to  increase  the 
power  of  barbarism  in  the  world.  But,  clearly, 
it  is  not  simply  because  of  our  interest  that  we 
regard  it  as  just  to  ally  ourselves  with  Russia  : 

1  The  best  record  of  work  done  upon  the  principle  of 
friendly  influence  as  a  ground  for  reform  in  foreign  States  is 
to  be  found  in  the  life  of  Lord  Stratford  de  RedclifFe  {Life, 
by  S.  Lane-Poole). 


ALLIANCE  137 

not  any  means  is  justified  in  the  attempt  to 
maintain  the  interests  of  England.  So  that  it  is 
usually  urged  that  the  alliance  may  have  a  good 
effect  in  assisting  the  forces  within  Russia  itself 
of  which  we  approve  ;  and  this  means  that  we 
regard  the  alliance  as  useful  for  the  promotion 
not  merely  of  England's  financial  or  military 
interests,  but  also  for  those  non-material  interests 
which  every  self-respecting  nation  must  consider — 
local  independence,  popular  happiness,  and  the 
rest.  The  alliance  would  be  morally  justified 
if  it  secured  the  independence  of  Serbia  without 
imperilling  the  liberties  of  the  Russian,  Finnish, 
Polish,  or  Jewish  people. 

The  argument,  therefore,  runs  in  this  way. 
Alliance  may  have  many  different  causes  or 
purposes  :  but  it  invariably  has  important  and 
good  moral  effects,  at  least  as  between  the  allies. 
Such  effects  are  greater  in  modern  times  than 
they  have  been  hitherto,  because  of  the  greater 
consciousness  of  the  mass  of  men  and  the  closer 
contact  due  to  swift  and  frequent  communication. 
Upon  alliance,  then,  we  may  rely  not  merely  for 
securing  a  new  moral  attitude  in  any  one  nation 
towards  foreigners,  but  also  for  the  common 
action  of  diverse  States  in  matters  of  principle. 
Alliance  may  have  evil  effects  upon  certain 
sections  of  the  States  allied,  or  upon  small  or 
weak  States   not   in  the  alliance.     These    effects 


138     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

must  be  considered  and  prevented :  not  only 
because  they  injure  others,  but  also  because  even 
the  good  effects  upon  the  allied  States  will  be 
insecure  or  absolutely  destroyed  by  the  common 
support  of  evil. 


CHAPTER   VIII 

INTERNATIONAL    RIVALRY 

The  relation  of  States  to  one  another,  even  if 
it  be  considered  with  a  view  to  morality  rather 
than  for  the  purpose  of  merely  recording  facts, 
must  be  acknowledged  to  depend  very  much 
upon  the  opposition  of  interests.  With  the  best 
will  in  the  world,  the  average  man  feels  that  the 
ideals  of  cosmopolitanism  do  not  sufficiently  allow 
for  divergent  claims  of  different  groups.  Ab- 
stractly it  may  be  certain  that  what  is  for  the 
good  of  the  whole  of  humanity  must  be  for  the 
good  of  each  and  every  group  of  men  and  women  ; 
but  if  it  is  difficult  to  find  the  true  interest  even 
of  a  small  group  on  any  wide  issue,  it  must  be 
almost  impossible,  especially  by  abstract  consider- 
ation, to  discover  what  is  really  for  the  good  of 
all  human  beings.  And  in  any  case  it  is  more 
likely  that  we  shall  promote  the  general  interest 
by  developing  the  interest  of  separate  groups  than 
that  we  shall  help  the  smaller  group  by  attempt- 
ing to  act  upon  some  vague  general  principle. 
For   the  intelligent  pursuit   by  each    State   of  its 

i39 


i4o     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

own  interest  will  be  the  most  practical  method  of 
attaining  the  true  interest  of  each  ;  and  yet  such 
pursuit  seems  to  lead  inevitably  to  the  attack 
upon  the  interest  of  other  States.  At  all  costs, 
however,  we  feel  that  the  character  of  each  State 
should  be  preserved  by  that  State. 

It  is  our  purpose,  then,  to  discover  how  far  the 
rivalry  and  opposition  between  States  is  valuable 
and  how  far  it  is  not.  The  ultimate  criterion 
must  be  again  the  amount  of  civilised  life  which 
is  derived  by  individuals  from  such  rivalry  ;  since 
it  is  misleading  here  as  elsewhere  to  speak  of 
States  as  large  persons,  or  to  speak  of  the  contact 
between  States  as  a  sort  of  Individualism.  It  is 
the  interest  of  a  definite  group  of  men  and  women 
which  seems  opposed  to  that  of  another  group. 
And  first  we  must  refer  to  the  astonishing  psycho- 
logical variety  in  the  attitude  of  nations  to  one 
another.  For  the  general  attitude  of  a  people 
reflects  at  least  a  vague  feeling  as  to  who  their 
rivals  really  are  ;  and  the  result  has  generally  been 
rapprochement  with  some  other  group. 

There  always  have  been  transferences  of  national 
affection,  based  not  upon  common  blood  or  tradi- 
tion but  upon  supposed  common  interests  ;  but 
never  yet  has  any  affection  or  national  sympathy 
been  without  some  suggestion  of  a  common 
enemy.  The  most  primitive  form  of  union  is 
based   upon  common  hostility,  and  the  emotional 


INTERNATIONAL   RIVALRY      141 

adventures  of  every  people  appear  in  history  as  a 
record  of  changing  rivalries.1 

The  differences  of  national  feeling  in  Prussia, 
for  example,  have  been  remarkable  in  recent 
years.  In  1853,  just  before  the  Crimean  War, 
Prussia  was  supposed  to  be  in  agreement  with 
England  and  France  against  Russia  ;  and  during 
that  year  Prussia  was  a  signatory  to  notes  which 
Russia  rejected.  But  the  general  tendency  of 
feeling  in  Prussia  was  by  no  means  anti-Russian. 
Both  the  King  and  Bismarck  were  more  than 
inclined  to  support  Russia.  The  rising  of  the 
Poles  in  1863  gave  Bismarck  the  opportunity  of 
going  further  than  abstract  amity,  and  a  Conven- 
tion was  signed  which  practically  amounted  to 
armed  alliance  between  Prussia  and  Russia  against 
the  subject  race.  Whether  one  can  speak  of 
national  sentiments  in  this  matter  is  doubtful, 
since  the  agreement  of  the  new  German  power 
with  the  Slav  autocracy  was  largely  managed  by 
Bismarck  in  accordance  with  his  own  conception 
of  national  interest.  In  any  case  the  friendship 
of  Prussia  for  Russia  alarmed  both  the  Austrians 
and  the  French  so  far  that  an  attempt  was  made 
in     1867    to    establish    an    alliance    against    their 

1  Thus  in  individual  morality  "  scandal  "  is  useful  in  con- 
versation because  the  primitive  basis  for  friendship  is  a 
common  hostility  to  some  third.  So  the  cementing  of  amity 
between  groups,  by  war  against  a  common  enemy,  provides  only 
primitive  friendship. 


1 42     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

union.  In  1870  the  Russian  friendship  still 
continued  to  make  Prussians  think  kindly  of 
their  Eastern  neighbour.  As  late  as  1884  Bis- 
marck was  able  to  procure  a  secret  treaty  of  the 
new  Germany  with  Russia,  and  this  remained  in 
force  until  1890  ;  although  national  sentiment  in 
Prussia  had  by  that  time  completely  transferred 
affection  to  Austria. 

In  much  the  same  way  we  can  watch  the 
Prussian  sentiment  changing  with  respect  to 
Austria.  In  1849  tne  German  peoples  were 
much  agitated  by  their  attempts  to  consolidate 
their  union  in  spite  of  an  obsolete  dynastic  system. 
Prussia  was  regarded  by  many  as  the  friend  of 
democracy,  or  at  least  of  progress,  as  opposed  to 
the  absolutism  of  Austria.  The  Governments  of 
Germany  were  in  difficulties  owing  to  popular 
excitement  ;  but  a  rivalry  appeared  none  the  less, 
and  in  1850  the  small  German  States  were  with 
Prussia  against  Austria,  Hanover,  Saxony,  Bavaria, 
and  Wiirtemberg.  In  July  of  that  year  the 
Prussians,  under  vague  threats  from  Russia  and 
Austria,  were  made  to  feel  that  their  predominance 
among  Germans  was  definitely  opposed  by  Austria. 
A  league  was  actually  formed  by  Austria,  Bavaria 
and  Wiirtemberg  against  Prussia  (Oct.  11,  1850)  ; 
but  by  1 861  the  Prussians  had  become  deliberal- 
ised  and  the  Austrians  were  playing  with  the 
principles    of    popular     government.        In     1862 


INTERNATIONAL   RIVALRY       143 

Bismarck  was  called  upon  by  King  William  of 
Prussia  to  give  force  to  the  new  anti-liberal 
regime.  At  once  he  took  up  the  solving  of  the 
German  problem  by  "  blood  and  iron  "  ;  but  first 
German  sentiment  was  stirred  by  the  affair  of  the 
Danish  Duchies.  The  diplomatic  subtleties  of 
Bismarck  do  not  concern  us  here.  It  is  sufficient 
to  say  that  Austria  and  Prussia  found  themselves 
at  one  in  1864.  It  was  an  accidental  difficulty 
for  Austria,  the  Magyar  disturbances  and  Italian 
sentiment  in  Venetia,  which  led  to  her  alliance 
with  her  German  rival  ;  and  Prussians  seem  all 
along  to  have  suspected  the  ultimate  designs  of 
their  ally.  Feeling  against  Bismarck  and  Prussia 
ran  high  in  Germany,  and  in  Prussia  there  was 
still  a  certain  suspicion  of  the  high-handed 
absolutism  of  the  Chancellor.  He  continued, 
however,  to  take  advantage  of  Austrian  difficulties 
at  home  and  of  German  disunion  to  take  over  the 
Duchy  of  Schleswig.1 

In  1866  Prussian  hostility  to  Austria  resulted 
in  open  war.  But  Bismarck,  and  perhaps  the 
Prussian  Conservatives,  did  not  want  the  ruin  of 
a  kindred  nation.  It  was  sufficient,  as  it  seemed, 
for  Prussian  interests  if  predominance  in  Northern 
Germany  was  secured.  So  that  the  hostility  to 
Austria  was  transformed  into  an  affection,  which 
grew  steadily  after  the  peace  of  July  1866. 

1  Convention  of  Gastein,  August  1865. 


i44     THE    MORALITY   OF    NATIONS 

Prussian  hostility  to  France  is  an  old  inheritance 
since  Napoleon  I  roused  the  national  spirit  by  his 
success;  but  by  the  war  of  1870  the  Prussians 
seem  to  have  convinced  themselves  that  France 
was  decadent  in  military  power.  The  enmity 
involved  in  their  conception  of  "  interest "  was 
therefore  transferred  to  England.  Since  the 
success  of  the  naval  scheme  in  1900  their  sense 
of  rivalry  has  implied  an  opposition  to  English 
naval  power,  which  they  felt  as  an  unwarrantable 
world-domination  hostile  to  German  development. 
As  the  militarism  of  Prussia  seems  to  us  a  danger 
to  European  independence,  although  to  the  Prus- 
sians it  seems  a  bare  necessity  of  their  position, 
so  the  naval  power  of  England  seems  to  them  a 
menace  to  the  weaker  nations,  although  to  us  it 
seems  a  bare  necessity  of  our  life  on  an  island. 

The  hostilities  of  emotion  through  v/hich 
England  has  passed  in  recent  years  provide  the 
same  kind  of  evidence.  It  is  not  a  matter  of 
open  war.  The  sense  of  national  rivalry  may 
not  break  out  into  war,  and  may  be  all  the  more 
obstructive  when  it  does  not.  Thus  France  was 
our  "  natural  enemy  "  for  most  of  the  Renaissance 
and  until  the  downfall  of  Napoleon.1      In    1852 

1  It  is  impossible  to  begin  national  hostility  before  that. 
The  mediaeval  wars  were  not  "  national,"  and  our  kings  were 
kings  of"  France."  But  Stubbs  {vide  supra,  p.  109)  preserves 
the  Napoleonic- Wars  attitude  in  his  misinterpretation  of 
mediaeval  "  foreign  "  policy. 


INTERNATIONAL   RIVALRY       145 

our  first  Volunteer  Movement  originated  in  fear 
of  invasion  by  the  French.  Two  years  after  we 
were  allied  with  the  French  in  the  Crimean  War 
against  Russia.  For  many  years  about  this  period 
Russia  was  our  "  natural  enemy "  ;  and  it  was 
"  proved  "  that  the  two  Imperial  powers  in  Asia 
could  not  fail  to  be  hostile.  France  meantime 
had  come  into  the  Russian  orbit,  and  in  1898  our 
"  natural "  hostility  to  France  showed  itself  in 
connection  with  the  Fashoda  episode.  A  very 
few  years  after,  the  Entente  Cordiale  bound  us  to 
France,  and  we  then  began  friendly  arrangements 
with  Russia.  Thus  in  1 900  our  "  natural  "  enemy 
was  Germany  ;  and  it  was  proved  not  merely 
that  it  was  for  the  moment  a  convenience  to  be 
friendly  to  France,  but  that  the  advanced  demo- 
cratic peoples  of  France  and  England  were 
"naturally"  to  be  allied.1 

All  this  shows  that  there  is  a  sense  of  rivalry 
between  organised  nations  which,  whether  it  leads 
to  war  or  not,  is  of  immense  political  importance. 
For  on  it  are  based  the  vast  expenditure  on  arma- 
ment,2 the  panics  which  disturb  industry  and  the 

1  I  need  not  refer  to  the  popular  expression  of  political 
rivalry,  although  it  is  effective  in  the  formation  of  general 
sentiment.  German  table-manners  and  domestic  life  are 
abhorrent  to  us  now  as  were  French  manners  and  "frivolity" 
in  Nelson's  time. 

2  How  impossible  it  is  to  consider  the  nature  of  the  State 
with  only  a  passing  reference  to  "  external  "  relations  is  seen 

L 


146     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

transference,  especially  where  there  is  compulsory 
military  service,  of  countless  energies  to  the  mere 
waiting  for  war. 

What,  then,  is  the  real  basis  of  international 
rivalry  ?  It  is  unlikely  that  rivalry  is  based  only 
on  illusions,  although  the  particular  forms  which 
it  takes  at  certain  times  are  supported  by  illusion. 
Let  us  therefore  examine,  first,  the  current  "  ex- 
planations "  of  rivalry  in  which  the  change  of 
rivals  is  admitted,  for  we  cannot  count  as  reason- 
able the  idea  that  any  rivalry  is  eternal  or  funda- 
mental or  natural.  It  is  only  a  rivalry  based  upon 
a  definite  situation  which  can  be  worth  explaining. 

The  "  inevitable  causes "  of  rivalry  usually 
referred  to  are  (i)  natural  expansion  and  (2) 
Evolution.  But  what  is  natural  expansion  ? 
We  connect  it  with  colonies  and  "  a  place  in  the 
sun."  It  is  held  to  be  "natural"  that  a  country 
with  a  high  birth-rate  should  expand :  and  ex- 
panding generally  is  allowed  to  mean  the  extension 
of    a   state-system.1      This    must    be    dealt    with 

from  the  fact  that  taxation  based  on  rivalry  (for  "  defence  ") 
in  every  civilised  country  exceeds  taxation  for  "  all  internal 
functions  taken  together"  (Sidgwick,  Elements  of  Poliths,Ch..  XV. 
par.  1,  note). 

1  It  is  interesting  that  this  "  reason  "  for  expansion  is  new. 
The  same  idea  was  supported  originally  by  quite  a  different 
"reason,"  which  still  affected  Neitzsche.  The  original  "reason" 
is  to  be  found  in  Machiavelli,  that  it  is  the  nature  of  the  State 
to  expand  (Disc.  I.  6,  la  necessita  la  conducesse  ad  ampliare)  ;  and 
the  evidence  for  that  is  Livy's  rendering  of  Roman  history  ! 


INTERNATIONAL   RIVALRY        147 

abruptly.  It  cannot  follow  that,  because  within 
the  frontiers  of  a  modern  State  there  are  now 
more  inhabitants  than  there  were,  the  frontiers 
should  be  enlarged.  For,  in  the  first  place,  no 
State  has  developed  fully  the  land  or  resources 
within  its  frontiers,  and  until  this  is  done  there 
is  no  valid  reason  for  demanding  more.  If 
there  is  distress  within  the  frontiers,  it  is  not 
due  to  the  compression  of  the  inhabitants.  The 
implied  metaphor  is  childish  and  futile.  One 
would  imagine  inhabitants  to  be  so  thick  that  they 
jostled  one  another.  Distress  is  due  to  neglect 
of  resources  and  maldistribution  of  wealth,  not 
to  lack  of  land.  And,  secondly,  if  there  are  too 
many  inhabitants  within  the  frontiers  they  can 
easily  cross  any  frontier  without  the  extension  of 
their  own  state-system.  Against  this  it  is  urged 
that  they  are  "lost  to  the  State  "  :  by  which  it  is 
meant  that  they  cannot  be  taxed  or  made  to  serve 
in  the  army  ;  and  that  is  no  reason  for  expanding 
the  State  to  the  detriment  of  other  States.  It 
may,  however,  be  urged  that  the  "  surplus  popu- 
lation "  does  not  wish  to  part  with  its  own  insti- 
tutions ;  and  that  would  be  a  reasonable  ground 
for  their  retaining  their  own  law  and  government.1 

1  Either  by  not  naturalising  themselves  in  the  new  country 
or  by  transforming  the  institutions  of  the  new  country  in  the 
direction  they  desire.  But  the  whole  idea  implied  in  the 
word  "  surplus "  is  absolute  nonsense. 


i48     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

But  even  that  would  not  excuse  the  conquest  of 
new  lands  ;  for  it  is  quite  reasonable  to  say  that 
the  surplus  population  must  sacrifice  either  its 
prospects  of  wealth  or  its  continuance  with  the 
same  law  and  government.  The  man  who  is  not 
willing  to  sacrifice  prospects  of  greater  wealth  for 
active  citizenship  in  his  old  State  does  not  value 
his  citizenship  as  much  as  his  income  ;  and  the 
man  who  values  his  citizenship  so  highly  as  to 
want  his  State  to  expand  over  him  wherever  he 
goes,  might  reasonably  sacrifice  a  large  income  to 
what  he  values  so  highly. 

The  whole  idea  of  expanding  by  conquest  of 
colonies  is  based  upon  bad  history  and  obsolete 
politics.1  England  did  not  conquer  colonies  in 
order  to  find  room  for  surplus  population,  and 
the  period  is  long  since  gone  when  vast  open 
spaces  could  be  "  possessed  "  by  conquerors.  The 
surface  of  the  earth  is  now  politically  a  whole  with 
no  edges  or  fringes.2 

1  As  a  fruitful  source  of  war  the  acquisition  of  seaports  in 
the  East  for  trading  purposes  is  one  of  the  most  important  (cf. 
C.  W.  Eliot,  Some  Roads  Tozvards  Peace,  p.  18). 

2  Prussian  policy  still  bears  the  mark  of  a  rather  primitive 
stage  of  thought.  I  do  not  think  that  it  is  simply  the  state 
of  war  which  makes  us  suspect  the  Prussian  diplomatists  of 
ambitions  in  the  direction  of  foreign  conquest.  They  have 
learnt,  indeed,  that  such  conquest  is  impossible  or  in  some  way 
undesirable  on  the  continent  of  Europe  :  the  difficulty  of 
treating  a  group  of  men  and  women  in  Alsace-Lorraine  as 
conquered  property  has  become  evident.     But  they  still  seem 


INTERNATIONAL   RIVALRY       149 

But,  undoubtedly,  if  expansion  means  the  taking 
over  of  "  spheres  of  influence  "  or  the  superseding 


to  imagine  that  colonies  should  be  captured  by  the  strongest 
power.  Thus  they  confessed  aggressive  intentions  with  respect 
to  the  French  colonies. 

They  appear  to  imagine  that  nations  inhabiting  or  govern- 
ing much  land  should  be  regarded  as  natural  enemies  of  nations 
with  less.  They  seem  to  think  that  England  "  owns  "  Canada 
or  Australia  and  that  the  ownership  can  be  changed  by  a 
successful  war.  But  Canada  and  Australia  are  not  patches 
of  land,  they  are  groups  of  men  and  women  who  are  in  no 
sense  owned  by  the  inhabitants  of  England.  Even  if  they 
were  under  the  direct  government  of  London  officials,  they 
could  not  be  counted  as  property  any  more  than  Yorkshiremen, 
who  are  not  owned  by  the  offices  in  Whitehall  which  collect 
taxes  or  take  measures  for  the  military  defence  of  Yorkshire. 
I  do  not  know  whether  Bavaria  seems  to  be  a  Prussian 
possession. 

As  to  colonies  which  are  really  inhabited  by  what  we  may 
call  subject  races,  there  may  seem  to  be  more  ground  for  the 
Prussian  idea,  since  even  in  England  there  is  much  careless 
language  about  "  our  possessions."  But  in  practice,  even  in 
such  cases,  we  do  not  treat  native  races  as  property. 

Such  races  are  ruled  by  English  system  of  law  and  govern- 
ment for  their  good  and  often  with  the  acquiescence  of  the 
majority  of  the  governed.  They  are  not  held  down  by  military 
force,  nor  are  they  in  any  sense  "  possessed  "  by  the  English 
State,  even  though  there  may  be  many  evil  deeds  of  dispossession 
and  tyranny  on  the  part  of  individual  Englishmen. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  the  surplus  population  of  Germany  has 
gone  largely  to  South  America  and  to  the  United  States.  It 
has  not  gone  to  the  German  "  possessions "  in  Africa  or  in  the 
East  Indies.  And  has  Germany  lost  anything  by  this  move- 
ment ?  She  gained  the  immense  development  of  her  Atlantic 
trade,  which  grew  quite  independently  of  the  strength  of  the 
German  Navy  or  the  extent  of  the  German  state-system. 
Even  the  diplomatists  have  never  said  that  the  growth  of  juch 


i$o    THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

of  a  more  primitive  by  a  more  developed  state- 
system,  then,  whether  it  should  occur  or  not,  it  is 
occurring  and  is  a  real  basis  for  rivalry  and  a 
fruitful  cause  of  war.1  In  Africa  and  farther  Asia 
there  is  a  contact  of  European  States  as  rivals  over 
the  decrepit  bodies  of  native  Governments  ;  and 
we  may  see  a  like  situation  later  in  some  parts  of 
South  America.  Why,  then,  it  may  be  asked, 
does  one  State  feel  that  this  sort  of  expansion  on 
the  part  of  another  is  to  be  opposed  ?  First, 
because  States  tend  to  restrict  trade  in  their  own 
interest  in  countries  over  which  they  expand. 
The  conception  of  restricting  trade  is  based  upon 
the  false  economics  which  aims  at  impoverishing  a 
prospective  buyer.2  When  that  is  no  longer  used, 
expansion  will  not  involve  rivalry.  And,  secondly, 
the  State  "  expanding  "  does  undoubtedly  aim  at 
military  advantage  ;  but  when  the  test  of  value 
among  States  is  no  longer  savage  this  kind  of 
expansion  will  cease.     The  conclusion  is  not,  of 

wealth  was  due  to  the  Navy  :  the  existence  of  the  wealth  was 
made  an  excuse  for  the  Navy,  and  it  has  never  been  shown  that 
the  power  of  the  Navy  increased  the  wealth  of  Hamburg. 

Germany  has  also  gained  a  solid  body  of  friends  in  America 
in  the  company  of  her  sons  who  have  lived  there  for  many  years. 

1  See  Eliot's  report  to  the  Carnegie  Endowment  on  the 
influence  of  Western  ports  in  China,  etc.  Also  P.  S.  Reinsch, 
World  Politics  at  the  end  of  the  Nineteenth  Century  as  Influenced  by 
the  Oriental  Situation,  1900. 

2  Cf.  the  French  "  expansion  "  into  Morocco  and  the  secret 
Conventions  of  1904. 


INTERNATIONAL   RIVALRY       151 

course,  that  there  is  no  reasonable  rivalry  of  the 
physical  kind,  but  only  that  such  rivalry  is  not 
natural  or  inevitable,  being  simply  due  to  the 
undeveloped  state  of  international  feeling,  which 
again  is  due  to  the  primitive  ideas  of  government 
and  political  institutions.1 

As  for  "  Evolution,"  the  word  is  a  sort  of 
political  "  black  magic."  It  means  nothing  and 
excuses  everything.  Even  if  races  were  in  conflict 
for  survival,  as  individuals  were  once  imagined  to 
be,  there  is  another  and  a  better  conflict  than  the 
conflict  of  brute  force.  In  defiance  of  Nature,  we 
men  apply  to  individuals  the  test  of  character  and 
not  that  of  physical  force  or  low  cunning.  And 
if  we  applied  the  same  sort  of  test  to  groups,  it 
would  not  follow  that  a  State  should  be  hostile  to 
another  either  because  of  having  more  or  because 
of  having  fewer  citizens.  Quality,  not  quantity, 
is  what  we  hold  best.  A  small  State  of  fine 
citizens  is  "better"  than  a  large  State  of  fools. 
But  "  Evolution "  in  such  a  case  is  nonsense. 
"Survival  of  the  fittest"  is  an  obsolete  charm. 
When  we  ask  "  who  are  the  fittest  ?  "  we  are  told 
"  those  who  survive  "  ;  and  when  we  ask  "  who 
survive  ?  "  we  are  told  "  the  fittest "  !     Obviously, 

1  I  disagree  with  Sidgwick  here.  His  conception  that  the 
guiding  policy  of  States  with  respect  to  each  other  should  be 
non-interference  is  undeveloped  Individualism  wrongly  applied. 
No  one  now  believes  that  non-interference  is  the  basic  principle 
in  realising  even  the  individuality  of  persons. 


152     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

then,  evolution  is  neither  a  justification  nor  a 
decent  excuse  for  national  rivalries  :  for  even 
if  "  Nature  "  tries  races  in  this  way,  a  proposition 
by  no  means  proved,  we  must  confess  that  the 
process  leaves  us  without  any  enthusiasm  ;  and  a 
moral  politics  cannot  be  based  on  mere  adoration 
of  natural  processes. 

Such  are  the  alleged  causes  of  national  rivalry. 
What  are  the  real  causes  ?  First,  there  are  the 
sinister  and  unmentioned  causes.  States  are  often 
persuaded  into  mutual  hostility  by  financiers  for 
increase  in  armament  trade  or  for  exploiting 
natives,1  or  by  newspapers  for  copy  or  sensation  ;2 
or  peoples  are  engineered  into  hostility  by  a 
Government  which  feels  insecure.3  All  these  are 
causes  of  dangerous  rivalries,  and  they  must  be 
dragged  out  into  the  open  if  we  are  to  distinguish 
the  reasonable  and  the  natural  from  the  artificial 
contrivances  of  private  greed  or  personal  ambition. 

There  is,  however,  a  reasonable  ground  for 
rivalry.       If    States    are    to    remain    distinct    and 

1  Cf.  The  War  Traders,  by  E.  H.  Porris,  where  the  details 
are  given  of  faked  information  being  used  by  armament  firms 
to  induce  Governments  to  spend  more  on  arms. 

2  The  Hearst  papers  are  known  to  have  engineered  the 
Spanish-American  War. 

3  Napoleon  III  was  eager  to  maintain  military  prestige  when 
his  administration  was  causing  discontent.  Bismarck,  in  his 
Reminiscences,  seems  to  imply  that  hostility  to  France  was 
useful  to  him  for  the  same  purpose — avoiding  internal  reform, 
Russia  has  often  played  the  same  game. 


INTERNATIONAL    RIVALRY        153 

systems  of  law  and  government  may  continue 
to  differ,  for  the  advantage  of  all  humanity,  the 
independence  of  state-development  must  be 
secured.  We  have  spoken  of  this  above  as  one 
of  the  guiding  conceptions  of  foreign  policy.  It 
is  the  reasonable  basis  underlying  the  obsolete 
methods  of  a  Balance  of  Power.  It  is  true  that 
no  one  State  can  be  allowed  to  predominate  over 
all  others  :  it  is  true  that  each  State  must  take 
measures  to  secure  independent  development ;  and 
it  is  true  that  possible  danger  to  such  development 
comes  now  from  one  State,  now  from  another. 
The  changes  in  rivalry  which  we  have  noticed 
above  are  not  unreasonable  :  it  was  not  foolish 
for  England  to  be  afraid  of  Napoleon  III  in 
December  1851,  or  of  Prussian  militarism  in 
1914. 

There  is  rivalry,  and  so  long  as  States  are 
conceived  as  "armed  bands,"  the  rivalry  will 
take  a  military  form.  Politically  it  is  not 
possible  to  disarm.  That  is  obvious.  But  we 
do  not  here  depend  only  upon  the  wrinkled 
and  dotard  past,  which  hobbles  upon  the  political 
stage.  We  bow  to  it  and  pass  on.  For  there 
is  a  new  form  of  rivalry  gradually  being  sub- 
stituted in  the  minds  of  citizens  for  the  primitive 
rivalry  of  physical  force. 

Individuals  do  not  now  think  it  necessary  to 
preserve  their  individuality  by  strengthening  their 


154     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

muscles.  Indeed,  individuality  is  more  prominent 
when  physical  rivalry  is  set  aside  :  the  primitive, 
who  are  able  to  defend  themselves  from  each 
other,  are  more  like  one  another  than  the  civilised 
who  have  not  learnt  "  self-defence."  l  It  is  true 
that  the  new  kind  of  rivalry  is  only  possible  be- 
cause force  is  exerted  by  the  State  to  prevent  the 
old  kind  from  being  used.  But  the  point  is  that 
the  abolition  of  the  use  of  private  force  has  not 
resulted  in  less  but  in  more  individuality.  One 
savage  is  more  like  another  savage  in  thought  and 
action  than  is  one  civilised  man  like  another. 

In  the  same  way  military  rivalry,  so  far  from 
securing  distinct,  independent  and  characteristic 
development  of  each  State,  tends  to  make  all 
States  more  similar.  If  we  wish,  therefore,  to 
secure  a  complete  individuality  for  our  State  we 
must  contrive  to  use  some  other  than  the 
military-economic  rivalry.2  The  argument  is 
that  the  physical  form  of  rivalry  does  not  effect 
the  purpose  for  which  alone  it  could  be  justified. 

1  The  psychological  law  would  be  that  attention  to  defence 
inhibits  characteristic  development,  by  concentrating  all  force 
upon  one  purpose.  That  purpose  being  the  same  for  all  who  want 
to  defend  themselves,  they  tend  to  become  all  like  one  another. 

2  Hegel's  argument  for  war  thus  falls  to  the  ground.  He 
says  "  individuality  must  create  opposition  and  so  beget  an 
enemy"  {Phil,  of  Right,  §  324)  ;  but  if  that  were  so  we 
should  still  need  personal  enmity  for  development  of  character. 
His  history  is  simply  out  of  date  :  but  he  wrote,  of  course,  in 
1820. 


INTERNATIONAL   RIVALRY       155 

We  put  aside  war,  then,  not  because  we  disap- 
prove of  war,  but  because  warfare  and  the  prepara- 
tion for  warfare  do  not  result  in  independent 
development. 

What  other  form  of  rivalry  is  possible  ?  The 
future  will  indicate  that  more  fully  ;  but  we  can 
at  present  see  that  it  is  on  the  lines  of  specialisa- 
tion of  function.  Individuality  of  persons  has  been 
secured  by  specialisation  of  knowledge  and  special- 
isation of  business.  So  also  "  individuality  "  of 
groups  will  be  secured  by  developing  the  special 
function  of  each  group  in  the  world  polity. 
This  specialisation  began  with  the  world-situation 
reviewed  above.  England  before  the  war  was 
supplying  some  needs  to  the  whole  world,  and 
Germany  others.  Russia  was  supplying  some, 
and  France  others.  This  situation  in  times  of 
peace  would  tend  to  develop.  And  not  only  in 
industry  but  also  in  ideas  is  there  specialisation  of 
function.1     The  result  upon  the  political  institu- 

1  The  war  has  set  back  the  development  of  this  tendency. 
Every  State  has  had  to  become  suddenly  more  self-sufficing,  i.e. 
more  isolated,  i.  e.  more  primitive.  In  England  we  have  had 
to  begin  the  manufacture  of  articles  which  before  the  war  we 
could  obtain  more  economically  from  Germany.  The  war- 
party  in  Germany  foresaw  this  situation  and,  by  way  of 
preparing  for  war,  set  themselves  to  resist  the  civilising 
tendency  to  specialisation  of  function.  Cf.  von  Billow's 
Imperial  Germany.  The  author  (p.  209)  actually  prides  himself 
on  resisting  the  development  of  German  industry  because  it 
would  make  Germany  dependent  on  other  States. 


156     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

tions  of  the  different  groups  would  be  inevitable, 
and  they  would  come  more  closely  into  contact 
and  organise  themselves  more  adequately  in  in- 
dependence of  one  another.  They  would  be 
rivals,  but  not  in  warfare. 

It  may  not  be  correct  to  use  the  word  rivalry  in 
this  sense.  If  that  is  so  and  the  older  meaning  is 
the  only  one  possible,  then  perhaps  we  shall  do 
without  any  rivalry.  But  we  continue  to  use  the 
word  State  and  nation  in  senses  unknown  to  our 
grandfathers,  and  so  perhaps  we  may  use  rivalry 
to  indicate  the  independent  development  of  groups 
organised  for  different  purposes. 

Again,  it  might  be  argued  that  the  new  and 
civilised  rivalry  cannot  replace  the  older  rivalry 
of  force  until  some  superior  force  above  all  the 
States  is  established  ;  on  the  ground  that  the 
individual  does  not  use  force  to  protect  his  in- 
dividuality only  because  another  force,  the  State's, 
is  used  instead.  But  such  an  argument  overlooks 
the  fact  that  force  used  by  the  State  is  really  based 
upon  the  changed  attitude  of  individuals. 

The  new  idea  of  individuality  comes  first, 
although  vaguely,  and  then  the  use  of  physical 
force  is  given  up  by  individuals.  The  conception 
of  the  relation  between  men  changed  and  was  no 
longer  that  of  purely  physical  conflict  :  then  only 
could  the  new  political  situation  come  about. 
And  the  same  is  true  of  group  character  or  of 


INTERNATIONAL   RIVALRY       157 

national  independence.  A  new  conception  of  what 
these  are  must  come  first ;  and  then  we  may  con- 
sider the  formation  of  an  international  police 
force.  New  standards  of  value  in  the  rivalry 
of  States,  not  those  of  purely  economic-military 
kind,  must  take  hold  of  the  minds  of  the  average 
citizens,  and  then  we  may  begin  to  speak  of  laying 
down  arms.  For  if  an  international  force  were 
now  established  it  would  probably  be  used  only 
to  perpetuate  the  brute  conflict  of  power  which  is 
the  greatest  obstacle  to  the  progress  of  civilised 
life.  We  must  begin,  then,  from  some  such  idea 
as  this:  there  is  no  "danger"  to  national  de- 
velopment in  the  increase  of  interdependence 
between  States,  as  there  is  no  danger  to  personal 
individuality  in  the  doctor's  depending  on  the 
shoemaker  for  his  shoes.  And  the  sudden 
refusal  of  the  shoemaker  to  supply  the  doctor 
probably  hurts  the  individuality  of  the  shoe- 
maker just  as  much  as  that  of  the  doctor.1     It 

1  Independence  is  a  means  to  individuality  of  the  person  or 
the  group.  If  characteristic  development  is  secured,  "  in- 
dependence "  may  be  disregarded.  The  old  individualism 
obscured  the  issue  by  the  emphasis  on  non-interference — a 
purely  negative  concept.  Difference  is  promoted  by  differentia- 
tion of  function  ;  but  even  independence,  in  a  new  sense  of 
the  word,  may  be  said  to  be  also  promoted  by  the  same 
differentiation. 

A  person  is  independent  in  two  senses  :  (i)  when  he  does 
everything  for  himself  and  also  (2)  when  he  does  what  he  is 
capable  of  doing.  The  former  (primitive)  is  the  independence 
of  the  stone,  the  latter  (organic)  the  independence  of  the  eye. 


158     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

is  the  purpose  of  foreign  policy,  then,  to  promote 
the  specialisation  of  function  between  States  as  a 
means  to  real  individuality  of  character.  For 
isolation  is  not  true  independence  ;  or,  at  least, 
the  most  valuable  form  of  independence  cannot 
be  arrived  at  by  isolation,  since  isolation  preserves 
only  material  independence,  whereas  co-operation 
secures  independence  of  thought  and  character. 
One  of  the  chief  purposes  of  foreign  policy  must 
be  the  preservation  and  development  of  this  in- 
dependence ;  but  it  cannot  be  conceived  any 
longer  in  terms  of  the  Renaissance  philosophy 
or  the  individualistic  enlightenment.  It  will  be 
seen  to  be  in  its  finest  and  most  human  form 
when  it  is  understood  to  be  simply  the  complement 
or  corollary  of  interdependence. 

We  are  at  present  working  in  this  matter  with 
two  irreconcilable  hypotheses.  Foreign  Policy, 
in  all  States,  is  based  at  once  on  the  old  idea  of 
rivalry  and  on  the  new.  It  promotes  military 
spying  and  commerce  ;  but  one  or  the  other 
must  cease,  if  we  are  not  to  continue  our  vicious 
circle  of  war  after  war. 

But  the  eye  does  not  lose  independence  because  it  cannot 
hear  ;  for  in  fact  the  attending  to  many  functions  causes  a 
lessened  ability  to  do  what  is  most  suitable  and  therefore  most 
pleasant.  The  man  who  might  be  an  artist  is  not  more 
independent  in  life  on  a  desert  island  where  he  has  to  spend 
most  of  his  time  killing  and  cooking  :  he  has  less  real  freedom 
to  develop  what  is  characteristic  of  him. 


CHAPTER   IX 

THE    MORALITY    OF    NATIONS    AT    WAR 

At  certain  crises  the  conflicting  interests  of 
States  lead  to  war  :  and  war  is  not  an  appeal  to 
any  moral  criterion.1  Either  the  conflicting  in- 
terests cannot  be  arranged  according  to  the 
accepted  view  of  moral  values,  or  there  is  no' 
accepted  view  according  to  which  it  may  be  plain 
to  all  which  interest  ought  to  give  place  to  the 
other.  The  interests  which  are  in  conflict  may 
be  either  material  (economic)  or  non-material 
(independence,  reputation,  development,  etc.)  ; 
but  even  non-material  interests  leading  to  war 
do  not  make  war  in  itself  a  moral  relationship. 
For  war,  being  conflict  between  groups,  is  essen- 

1  I  take  it  for  granted  that  no  one  seriously  believes  that 
in  a  contest  of  physical  force  the  man  or  men  who  are  better 
morally  are  necessarily  victorious.  Such  a  belief  would  be 
a  survival  of  the  mediaeval  Trial  by  battle,  etc.  All  that 
is  decided  in  war  is  strength  (military  or  economic)  ;  and  the 
world  is  not  necessarily  better  morally  because  the  stronger 
survive,  except  according  to  the  confused  Evolutionism  of  the 
nineteenth  century,  which  does  not  distinguish  a  moral  value 
from  a  physical,  or  seeks  to  "transcend"  both  in  an  imaginary 
Absolute. 

'59 


160    THE   MORALITY   OF    NATIONS 

tially  a  setting  aside,  for  the  moment  and  so  far 
as  the  conflict  is  concerned,  of  moral  criteria  as 
to  which  interest  should  prevail.  But  the  state 
of  belligerency  is  complex,  and  many  things  occur 
which  are  not  warlike  acts  :  therefore,  even  when 
the  interests  of  States  are  in  conflict  to  such  an 
extent  that  war  becomes  possible,  the  relationship 
of  States  does  not  cease  to  be  moral.  If  war 
were  mere  conflict  of  brute  force,  then  it  would 
be  the  end  of  moral  relations,  at  least  between 
the  belligerents  ;  but,  in  fact,  it  is  unusual  in 
modern  times  to  find  States  in  conflict  of  an 
unrestricted  kind,  and  so  long  as  groups  of  men 
are  related  otherwise  than  in  physical  conflict, 
their  relations  are  in  that  degree  moral.  And 
not  only  are  some  moral  relationships  preserved 
between  belligerent  States,1  but  even  in  the  actual 
exercise  of  force  a  most  important  moral  element 
is  to  be  found. 

The  first  and  most  important  fact  is  that  even 
the  use  of  force  does  not  generally  compel  or 
induce  a  civilised  group  to  the  use  of  unlimited 
force.  We  must,  therefore,  discover  what  the 
limits  imposed  are,  and  then  endeavour  to  explain 
the  grounds  on  which  such  limits  rest.  For  to 
say  that  the  contending  parties  are,  at  least,  not 
supposed  to  go  to  any  lengths,  implies  that  we 
do   not  imagine  that  even  in  actual  conflict  the 

1  In  truces,  exchange  of  prisoners,  etc. 


MORALITY  OF  NATIONS  AT  WAR     161 

opponents  are  without  some  moral  regard  for  one 
another  :  they  have  not  become  purely  animals 
or  purely  machines.  In  some  ways  they  may 
be  purely  opponents  in  force  or  cunning  ;  but 
in  some  ways  they  remain  still  obedient  to  a 
moral  criterion  :  so  long,  that  is,  as  "  there  are 
some  things  which  no  fellow  can  do." 

Of  the  ameliorations  of  war,  as  they  are  called 
in  International  Law,  there  are  two  main  classes.1 
Some  relate  to  the  use  of  force  or  guile  as 
between  combatants,  and  others  relate  to  a 
distinction  made  in  comparatively  recent  years 
between  combatants  and  non-combatants.  This 
is  not  the  place  to  describe  in  detail  the  con- 
ventions of  war,  for  our  purpose  is  to  discover 
what  moral  relationship  is  implied  in  the  existence 
of  any  such  conventions,  and  not  merely  to  classify 
or  to  prove  that  such-and-such  conventions  exist. 

It  will  be  sufficient  to  give  some  examples  of 
the  restrictions  usually  supposed  to  be  made 
even  in  the  exercise  of  physical  force.  Poisoned 
weapons  are  not  supposed  to  be  used  ;  explosive 
bullets  are  not  to  be  used,  nor  those  which 
expand  on  entering  the  body.  There  are  certain 
buildings,  conveyances  and  persons  marked  with 
the  Red  Cross  :  these  must  not  directly  be 
attacked    or   destroyed.      When    a   combatant   is 

1  See  Lecture  VII  in   Maine's  International  Law,  and  J.  E. 
Holland,  A  Lecture  on  the  Brussels  Conference  of  18J4,  publ.  1876. 
M 


1 62     THE    MORALITY    OF   NATIONS 

wounded  he  must  be  given  e<  quarter,"  and  may 
even  be  cared  for  by  those  of  the  opposite  side. 
Prisoners  of  war  are  not  supposed  to  be  killed. 
As  for  the  distinction  of  combatants  and  non- 
combatants,  it  is  a  strange  development  in  the 
history  of  warfare  :  at  present  it  is  usually  sup- 
posed that  only  those  in  a  recognised  uniform 
may  be  directly  attacked  ;  and  these  alone,  on 
the  other  hand,  are  allowed  to  attack  in  depend- 
ence on  the  conventions  covering  wounded  or 
prisoners,  for  if  a  non-uniformed  assailant  be 
captured  he  may  be  executed  as  a  criminal. 

The  greater  number  in  any  civilised  group — 
chiefly,  of  course,  women  and  children — are  sup- 
posed not  to  be  directly  attacked.  They  are  not 
to  be  killed  or  enslaved.  War  is,  therefore,  now 
defined  in  International  Law,  not  as  the  conflict 
between  States  but  as  the  conflict  between  the 
armed  representatives  of  States. 

Property  also  is  protected  by  certain  conventions 
in  time  of  war.  As  between  belligerent  States, 
private  property  on  land  is  not  to  be  directly 
destroyed  or  taken.  Private  property  on  the  sea 
is  not  quite  so  well  protected  in  the  mind  of  the 
time  ;  and  the  point  is,  not  that  there  are  not 
established  "  conventions,"  but  that  the  restriction 
of  physical  force  in  this  matter  is  not  supposed  to 
be  so  great. 

The    existence    of    war   changes   the   relations 


MORALITY  OF  NATIONS  AT  WAR     163 

even  between  States  which  are  not  at  war  and 
those  which  are  at  war.  Neutrality  has  become 
a  very  elaborate  section  in  International  Law. 
The  belligerents  are  not  supposed  to  interfere 
with  certain  Neutral  rights  even  in  the  exercise 
of  physical  force  against  their  opponents.  In  all 
this  we  have  not  merely  much  legal  interest  but 
the  delicate  moral  issue  as  to  the  reason  for  re- 
strictions of  force.  We  do  not  mean  the  power 
of  conventions  :  that  is  no  reason.  The  question 
is,  Why  were  such  conventions  ever  made  ?  Why 
do  we  suppose  that  even  the  omnipotent  State 
should  not  use  every  force  ?  And  if  not  every 
force,  why  even  such  force  as  is  now  used  ?  For 
nearly  every  argument  against  poisoned  weapons 
or  explosive  bullets  is  equally  valid  against 
modern  shell-fire  or  torpedoes.  And  if  non- 
combatants  are  to  be  recognised,  why  would  not 
ten  combatants  on  either  side  be  sufficient  ?  The 
idea  is  ludicrous  ;  but  that  is  only  because  the 
whole  conception  of  restricting  the  use  of  force 
in  one  way  and  not  in  another  is  ludicrous. 

Even  the  limitation  of  force  in  war  now 
admitted,  however,  is  comparatively  recent.  The 
greater  part  of  the  limitations  in  the  matter  of 
weapons,  so  far  as  convention  goes,  is  not  older 
than  the    nineteenth  century.1     One    can    hardly 

1  Poisoned  weapons  only  forbidden  in  1868  by  the 
Declaration  ot  St.  Petersburg.     Treatment  of  wounded  agreed 


1 64     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

imagine  what  happened  to  the  wounded  in 
Napoleonic  and  earlier  wars.  There  was  no 
Geneva  convention,  no  Red  Cross,  no  elaborate 
ambulances.  The  surgery  was  primitive,  and  the 
care  of  the  diseases  incidental  to  a  campaign 
practically  non-existent.  On  warships  the  situa- 
tion was  even  more  terrible  than  on  land  ;  but 
here,  of  course,  we  have  made  less  change. 

Non-combatants  were  not  likely  to  fare  well 
when  a  town  was  taken  by  storm,  as  we  may 
judge  from  Wellington's  remark  that  he  had  for- 
bidden his  soldiers  to  sack  and  murder  in  Spain.1 
The  ancient  privilege  of  conquest  was  revived  at 
the  taking  of  Pekin  by  the  European  nations  : 
but  this  was  generally  supposed  to  be  retaliation,2 

to  only  in  1864,  by  the  Geneva  Convention.  This  was 
directly  due  to  private  energy  in  publishing  descriptions  of 
the  battlefields  of  Solferino,  etc.  (1861).  Holland,  loc.  cit., 
and  Maine,  loc.  cit.,  p.  199. 

To  go  further  back,  our  Black  Prince  caused  innumerable 
murders  at  Limoges.  Henry  V  executed  prisoners.  The 
sack  of  Magdeburg  is  famous,  in  which  of  25,000  only  2,000 
were  left  when  the  house-to-house  murdering  was  over. 
Before  the  "  Red  Cross "  a  black  flag  was  used  to  cover  the 
work  of  surgeons,  etc.,  but  it  was  an  inadequate  protection. 
The  new  Geneva  convention  (Red  Cross)  was  vigorously 
opposed  by  military  men  as  tending  to  lessen  the  effectiveness 
of  their  action  (for  details  and  proof,  see  Holland,  loc.  cit.). 

1  He  announced  to  the  people,  however,  that  if  there  was 
any  armed  resistance  among  those  not  soldiers  he  would 
"  totally  destroy  their  towns  and  hang  up  all  the  people 
belonging  to  them." 

2  Retaliation    or    retorsion    is    morally   interesting,  as    the 


MORALITY  OF  NATIONS  AT  WAR     165 

and  most  modern  armies  would  not  sack  or 
murder  in  a  city  taken  by  storm.1  Something 
has  been  achieved  in  recent  years,  after  the  long- 
lasting  brutalities  of  human  history.  Indeed,  the 
farther  we  go  back  in  history,  the  more  unlimited 
is  the  use  of  available  force  in  war :  until  we 
come  to  a  time  when  the  only  limitation  was 
made  in  the  interest  of  the  conquerors,  who 
would  not  slay  if  they  could  enslave,  and  would 
not  burn  what  they  could  use.  But,  whatever 
the  reason,  as  soon  as  the  limitation  of  force  sets 
in,  it  becomes  a  habit. 

We  should  have  to  go  very  far  back  indeed  to 
find  absolutely  unlimited  exercise  of  force,  and  in 
those  days  States  could  not  be  held  to  exist  ; 
so  that  we  may  say  that  war  as  an  official  conflict 
has  always  implied  some  restriction  in  the  use  of 
force.  Long  before  conventions  existed  there 
were  limits  imposed  by  general  sentiment  which 
could  not  be  over-ridden  even  by  conquerors 
except  in  the  supremest  crises.  It  is  not  usual  to 
poison  food  or  water,  to  assassinate  generals,  or 

pain  never  falls  on  the  actual  culprits.  In  it  the  citizen  is 
treated  as  identical  with  the  State  :  what  any  agent  of  his 
State  does,  any  citizen  is  supposed  to  have  done.  A  modifica- 
tion of  this  primitive  morality  is  necessary  (Westlake,  Coll. 
Papers,  p.  259  seql). 

1  Murder  and  outrage  were  common  incidents  in  the 
Balkan  Wars  of  191 2,  191 3.  See  Report  on  Balkan  Wars 
(Carnegie   Endowment). 


1 66     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

to  do  certain  quite  possible  but  nameless  things 
which  would  bring  a  war  to  speedy  termination. 
It  is  quite  possible  to  think  of  innumerable  acts 
which  even  primitive  States  could  have  done  to 
be  successful  in  their  wars,  and  they  have  not 
done  them.  It  is  possible  still  more  nowadays 
to  imagine  engines  of  destruction  or  modern 
subtleties  which  could  quite  easily  give  us  the 
victory — but  we  dare  not  use  them.1 

A  gradual  amelioration  of  war  has  excluded  the 
possibility  of  certain  weapons  or  the  prevalence 
of  certain  actions.2  We  are  in  advance  of  our 
forefathers,  at  least  in  sentiment  :  since  we  gener- 
ally feel  that  there  are  some  things  which  should 
not  be  done  even  when  we  are  at  war,  although 
this  feeling  is  always  in  danger  of  being  sub- 
merged by  a  sudden  access  of  fear.  But  although 
we  may  congratulate  ourselves  on  the  moral 
progress  implied  in  the  Red  Cross  and  the 
abolition  of  poisoned  weapons,  we  must  also 
recognise  that  the  present  conventions  are   only 

1  When  war  has  destroyed  the  normal  inhibitions  upon 
which  civilisation  depends,  there  is  no  telling  how  far  men 
may  go.  Poison  is  already  used  ;  there  are  some  few,  not  less 
effective,  brutalities  which  have  not  yet  been  used  in  this  most 
"  civilised  "  war.  One  cannot  well  describe  them  ;  but  it  is 
perfectly  possible  to  prevent  the  return  of  the  wounded  to 
the  firing  line.  Will  calculating  barbarism,  using  modern 
science,  break  down  that  inhibition  too  ? 

2  The  number  of  these  actually  excluded  lessens  as  the 
present  war  goes  on  ;  but  there  are  still  a  few  left. 


MORALITY  OF  NATIONS  AT  WAR     167 

a  few  successful  attempts  surviving  from  the 
innumerable  desires  of  idealists  to  keep  physical 
force  in  control  of  moral  sentiment.  The  record 
is  long  of  the  attempts  to  ameliorate  war  which 
have  failed. 

The  crossbow  was  once  forbidden,  but  it  came 
into  use  :  *  the  musket  seemed  barbarous  to  men 
who  used  only  bows  and  arrows  ;  but  it  was  soon 
common  in  every  army.  Shells  were  supposed 
to  be  too  barbarous  in  1789,  but  all  armies  now 
use  them.  The  rifle,  which  replaced  the  old 
smooth-bore  gun,  was  regarded  as  hardly  to  be 
used  in  civilised  warfare,  but  it  now  is  everywhere. 
Men  tried  to  forbid  the  use  of  the  bayonet  ;  but 
that  too  was  introduced,  and  first  made  common 
by  Frederick  the  Great  of  Prussia.  Torpedoes 
were  at  first  thought  barbarous,  but  were  soon 
adopted  by  all  nations.  So  that,  clearly,  two 
forces  have  been  at  work  in  the  making  of  the 
present  situation — an  ever-increasing  power  of 
destruction  and  a  sentiment  which  has  only  been 
partly  successful  in  limiting  the  use  of  that  power. 
If  the  sentiment  had  been  stronger  we  should  not 
now  be  using  the  bayonet  or  the  torpedo,  and 
who  can  tell  what  other  mechanical  devices  ?  If 
the  sentiment  had  not  been  so  strong  we  should 

1  Pope  Innocent  III  forbade  the  use  of  instruments  to  cast 
stones,  etc.  (artem  illam  mortiferam  et  odibilem  ballistariorum), 
at  least  against  Christians. 


1 68     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

now  be  assassinating  generals,  poisoning  weapons, 
and  slaughtering  the  wounded. 

He  would  indeed  be  a  subtle  historian  who 
could  explain  why  the  civilised  State  is  willing  to 
use  certain  methods  and  not  certain  others  in 
destroying  its  "  enemies "  :  but  whatever  the 
explanation,  the  distinction  exists,  and  not  all  the 
violation  of  this  or  that  convention  can  quite  put 
us  back  to  the  unlimited  use  of  force.  This, 
however,  has  not  made  much  real  difference  to 
the  destructiveness  of  war.  On  sea,  when  Nelson 
lay  alongside  his  opponent  and  both  pounded 
away  at  point-blank  range  there  was  less  destruc- 
tion of  life  than  when,  as  in  the  Falkland  Islands 
battle,  ships  travelling  at  about  twenty-five  miles 
an  hour  sank  German  ships  also  travelling  at  that 
rate  at  a  range  of  over  eight  miles,  by  firing 
shell  in  arcs  so  high  that  they  could  have  passed 
over  Mont  Blanc.  In  an  action  between  evenly 
matched  fleets  there  is  no  reason  why  any  one  at 
all  should  survive. 

On  land,  between  dawn  and  sunset  on  March 
10,  1 91 5,  at  Neuve  Chapelle  2,337  men  and 
1 90  officers  were  killed  : 1  and  we  were  victorious. 

1  Details  in  Sir  John  French's  despatch,  published  April 
15  th — 

Officers.  Men. 

Killed  ....  190  2,3  37 

Wounded     ....  359  8,174 

Missing        ....  23  i>728 

Total    .  .  .  572  12,239 


MORALITY  OF  NATIONS  AT  WAR     169 

What  the  enemy  lost  we  do  not  know.  This  is 
only  a  trivial  episode  in  a  really  civilised  war. 
In  conflict  with  slightly  less  effective  weapons, 
however,  Bulgaria  suffered  the  deaths  of  44,313 
men  and  579  officers  killed,  in  the  two  wars  of 
19 1 2  and  1913.1  It  is  clear  that  they  are  not  so 
civilised  in  the  Balkans,  although  they  assisted  the 
civilised  methods  of  destruction  by  the  killing  of 
sick  and  wounded.2 

In  destroying  more  than  lives  we  are  also 
very  much  advanced.  When  men  built  Rheims 
Cathedral  or  Ypres  Town  Hall  they  had  not 
the  power  to  destroy  them  except  with  much 
hard  labour  :  now  a  few  well-planted  shells  lay 
flat  the  careful  work  of  many  years. 

The  power  of  destruction  is  greater  now  than 
it  ever  has  been,  in  spite  of  all  conventions  and 

1  The  whole  population  of  Bulgaria  before  the  wars  was 
4,337,516,  of  whom  perhaps  one-quarter  (1,084,376)  were 
capable  of  bearing  arms.     The  losses  were — 


Killed. 

Wounded. 

Missing 

War  against  Turkey — 

Officers 

3*3 

9*5 

2 

Men 

•     29>7" 

52,55° 

3>i93 

War  against  the  "  Allies  "- 

Officers 

266 

816 

69 

Men      . 

14,602 

5°,3°3 

4,560 

Totals  (Officers) 

579 

I.731 

71 

„       (Men)    . 

44,3 1 3 

102,853 

7,753 

44,892 

104,584 

7,824 

2  For  all  details   see  Report  on  Balkan  Wars  (published  by 
the  Carnegie  Endowment,  Washington,  D.C.). 


170     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

sentiments.  And  there  is  no  reason  whatever 
why  our  power  should  not  increase  even  more 
rapidly  in  the  near  future.  The  probability  is 
that  we  shall  in  the  next  few  years  be  able  to 
destroy  much  more  effectively  and  at  a  still 
greater  distance.  We  may  be  able  to  prevent 
the  return  of  wounded  to  the  firing  line.  It 
would  shorten  wars.  We  may  even  be  able  to 
destroy  whole  towns  at  one  blow.  It  would 
make  victory  more  certain.  One  hardly  likes 
to  mention  what  may  easily  become  possible  in 
the  near  future  if  States  really  give  their  minds 
to  the  continuance  of  war. 

Again,  the  calculus  of  pain  is  difficult  to  make ; 
but,  allowing  for  the  numbers  engaged  and  the 
effectiveness  of  the  instruments  employed,  it  is 
clear  that  in  recent  wars  the  pain  has  been  much 
increased,  in  spite  of  all  our  conventions  and  all 
our  kindness  to  the  wounded.  That  pain,  more 
even  than  the  deaths  of  many,  is  a  legacy  of 
warfare  such  that  it  is  infinitely  multiplied  among 
our  more  sensitive  populations.  The  numberless 
and  subtle  terrors  which  may  attend  on  all — not 
merely  on  soldiers — from  the  air,  from  bombard- 
ment at  fantastic  distances,  from  chemical  poisons, 
from  skilfully  manipulated  disease — all  this  the 
future  holds  in  store  for  us,  unless  perhaps  the 
restricting  sentiment  which  has  so  ineffectively 
limped  behind  our  intellectual  ability  gains  some 


MORALITY  OF  NATIONS  AT  WAR    171 

new  strength.  That  only  can  keep  us  from  the 
use  of  nameless  deeds  :  but  it  is  a  delicate  growth, 
and  can  easily  become  callous  to  the  death  and 
maiming  of  millions.  That  sentiment,  however, 
has  already  done  something  ;  and  it  is  difficult  to 
explain  why  it  has  not  done  more.1 

1  f}  €/\.7m  fxeyaXrj.  It  was  when  war  was  at  its  worst  that 
Hugo  de  Groot  made  the  world  listen  to  his  idea  of  limiting 
force  ;  so  now,  bad  as  things  seem,  the  new  sentiment  may 
rise. 

Compare  "  The  Evolution  of  Peace "  (Essay  VI  in  T.  J. 
Lawrence's  Essays  on  some  disputed  Questions  of  Internationa/  Law, 
2nd  ed.  1883).  From  i  880-1 885  in  wars  between  civilised 
nations  2,000,000  men  were  killed.  Russell  is  quoted,  from 
the  Times,  on  the  battlefield  of  Sedan  :  "  Masses  of  coloured 
rags  glued  together  with  blood  and  brains  and  pinned  into 
strange  shapes  by  fragments  of  bones.  Men's  bodies  without 
heads,  legs  without  bodies,  heaps  of  human  entrails  attached 
to  red  and  blue  cloth  and  disembowelled  corpses  in  uniform." 
Vice  of  all  kinds  arises  in  the  heat  of  war — lust,  private 
murder,  theft,  hate  and  brutishness.  Insanity  is  more  frequent 
in  our  more  civilised  noises  of  war.  No  one  has  yet  put  on 
record  the  nature  of  the  stench  arising  from  decaying  corpses  in 
Poland  and  France  owing  to  the  rapidity  with  which  civilised 
nations  can  destroy  life. 

Compare  also  Ch.  XI  in  the  Collected  Papers  of  J.  West- 
lake  (Camb.  1 9 14),  on  War:  the  rules  of  war,  considered  as 
Laws,  where  it  is  argued  that  the  sentiment  for  restricting 
force  is  less  in  modern  popular  States.  There  is  "  a  public 
impatience  of  any  restrictions."  The  important  German  theory 
of  necessity  is  stated  in  full.  Professor  Lueder  is  quoted  (from 
Holtzendorf's  Handbuch  des  Volkerrechi)  as  saying  that  "  ravage, 
burning  and  devastation,  even  on  a  large  scale,  or  of  a  whole 
neighbourhood  and  tract  of  country  .  .  .  may  be  practised"; 
— when  the  "  necessity "  demands  it  or  even  when  the 
resistance  is  "  frivol."     This  is  called  Kriegsraison  (as  opposed 


172     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

Even  if  war  may  be  supposed  to  be  necessary 
or  inevitable — a  proposition  we  do  not  even  con- 
descend to  argue  about — still,  it  would  not  follow 
that  this  or  that  instrument  of  destruction  was 
necessary  or  inevitable.  If  a  shell  is  an  inevitable 
exercise  of  force,  why  is  not  a  poisoned  weapon 
inevitable  or  the  murder  of  wounded  ?  We 
"  draw  the  line "  somewhere.  Why  draw  it 
where  we  now  do  ?  Indeed,  when  cavalry 
generals  assert  that  war  must  be  the  ultimate 
test  of  the  conflicting  interests  of  States,  they  do 
not  commonly  define  what  they  mean  by  war. 
War  might  mean  very  much  more  than  it  does 
in  the  exercise  of  the  "  arbitrament  of  the 
sword  "  ;  but  it  might  also  mean  very  much  less 
than  it  does.  In  which  sense  is  it  "  inevitable  "  ? 
Is  it  inevitable  that  millions  of  men  should  fight  ? 
Why  not  that  women  and  children  also  should  ? 

The  answer  to  all  these  problems  is  a  simple 
one.     It   is   not   direct  :    it   implies   much   which 

to  Kriegsmariier  (law  of  war).  It  is  clear  that  the  judgment 
as  to  when  it  is  necessary  and  when  the  resistance  of  the 
opposite  side  is  "  frivol  "  must  be  that  of  the  commander. 
Besides  that,  Westlake  shows  that  as  no  State  goes  to  war 
except  by  necessity,  necessity  is  always  present  to  excuse  any 
violence  as  soon  as  there  is  war.  "  But,"  says  Westlake,  "  it 
need  not  be  greatly  feared  that  Professor  Lueder's  own 
Government  will  ever  give  effect  to  his  doctrine  by  ordering 
the  devastation  of  a  whole  region  as  an  act  of  terrorism." 
This  was  published  in  July  19 14.  See  the  Bryce  Report 
(published  May  191  5)  on  what  was  done  in  August  19 14. 


MORALITY  OF  NATIONS  AT  WAR    173 

cannot  be  put  into  words  ;  but  it  shows  at  least 
why  the  sentiment  which  has  excluded  poison 
has  not  excluded  cordite. 

The  truth  is  that  our  intellectual  progress  is 
immense,  and  our  moral  progress  ludicrously 
small.  Our  concepts  governing  Nature  are 
immensely  advanced  since  the  days  of  Greek  and 
Roman  ;  but  in  governing  human  action  we  are 
using  obsolete  and  inadequate  theories.  Moral 
progress,  however,  does  not  consist  of  an  increase 
in  good  intentions.  The  attention  given  to  cul- 
tivating goodwill  has  indeed  been  one  of  the 
direct  causes  of  our  moral  incompetence  ;  for  it 
has  involved  a  neglect  of  knowledge.  And  it  is 
our  moral  knowledge  which  is  deficient.  We  do 
not  know  what  actions  are  right  and  what  are 
wrong,  and  why  :  or  at  least  we  have  made  no 
noticeable  advance  upon  our  great-grandfather's 
conceptions  in  this  matter.  The  old  issues  have 
not  been  reconsidered  and  new  issues  have  not 
been  faced.  But  it  is  moral  progress  only  which 
will  master  and  subdue  our  increasing  ability  to 
destroy. 

So  obsessed  are  we  with  Kantian  Pietism  in 
philosophy,  or  Hegelian  confusion  of  everything 
in  an  Absolute,  that  it  is  even  misleading  to 
speak  of  moral  progress.  We  do  not  mean  that  men 
should  feel  more  virtuous  or  should  become  more 
saintly  than  their  grandfathers  ;  we  mean  that  men 


i74     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

must  leave  good  intentions  to  take  care  of  them- 
selves and  acquire  a  knowledge  of  moral  facts  by 
the  same  methods  which  have  been  successful  in 
physical  science — by  direct  inquiry  into  evidence 
and  the  making  of  certain  and  universally  valid 
conclusions.  We  shall  at  least  have  to  avoid 
taking  it  for  granted  that  conflicting  interest  be- 
tween groups  makes  it  inevitable  that  men  should 
use  every  power  in  overcoming.  We  shall  at  least 
discuss,  what  many  appear  to  take  for  granted, 
whether  the  State  has  not  a  higher  purpose  than 
even  its  own  self-preservation  :  and  perhaps  it 
may  be  whispered  that  in  the  case  of  divided 
allegiance,  when  a  man  finds  his  duty  to  his  State 
in  conflict  with  other  duties,  it  need  not  necessarily 
follow  that  his  duty  to  his  State  should  take 
precedence.  All  kinds  of  accepted  moral  plati- 
tude will  have  to  be  dragged  out  into  the  open  : 
and  we  shall  stand  up  at  last  in  our  own  right  to 
give  judgment  upon  the  State.  But  what  solution 
we  find  for  these  problems  will  depend  upon  a 
judgment  of  evidence  :  and  until  we  begin  to 
understand  what  the  evidence  is,  we  cannot  even 
approach  a  conclusion.  The  empty  aspirations  of 
sentimentalists  are  of  no  more  moral  worth  than  the 
submissions  of  the  economists  to  "  natural  law." 

The  present  situation,  then,  in  the  morality  of 
nations  or  States  has  not  abolished  the  use  of 
physical  force.     Normally  the  citizens  of  different 


MORALITY  OF  NATIONS  AT  WAR     175 

States  trade  with  each  other  or  interchange  ideas, 
in  dependence  on  a  moral  attitude  not  essentially 
different  from  that  of  fellow-citizens  in  the  same 
State.  But  at  certain  times  it  seems  impossible 
to  maintain  that  attitude.  Perhaps  the  interests 
of  the  organised  groups  are  in  conflict,  perhaps 
one  group  is  aggressive,  perhaps  all  groups  are 
hypnotised  by  fear — whatever  the  reasons,  real  or 
imaginary,  for  the  declaration  of  war — war  is 
declared.  Even  that,  however,  does  not  altogether 
destroy  the  moral  relationship  of  the  combatants, 
since  it  is  felt,  however  vaguely,  that  "  there  are 
some  things  that  no  fellow  can  do."  l  That  is  to 
say,  we  treat  our  enemies  as  something  more 
than  beasts  or  machines  ;  which  implies  that  we 
continue  to  treat  them  as  moral  beings.  This 
restricting  sentiment  is  a  comparatively  recent 
growth,  and  its  effectiveness  is  endangered  not 
only  by  the  tides  of  passion  or  fear  which  arise 
in  war,  but  also  by  the  unparalleled  increase  in 
intellectual  power  over  natural  forces.  It  is  of 
little  value  that  we  deny  ourselves  the  use  of  the 
crossbow  if  we  can  use  the  rifle  ;  and  it  will  be 
of  little  value   that  in   the  future  we  may  deny 

1  It  would  be  an  interesting  moral  investigation  to  discover 
how  far  the  average  soldier  thinks  it  possible  to  go,  or  how 
far  the  average  citizen  thinks  the  State  can  command  him  to 
go,  or  how  far  the  women  of  a  State  are  willing  that  their 
defenders  should  go.  Defence  would  clearly  be  more  adequate 
if  it  were  more  deadly. 


176     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

ourselves  the  use  of  dumdum  bullets  if  we  can 
use  modern  chemicals. 

The  morality  of  nations  can  only  survive  if  we 
are  able  to  subordinate  our  power  over  Nature  to 
our  knowledge  of  man.  For  the  power  over 
Nature  is  morally  colourless.  The  same  ability 
which  gives  us  an  exquisite  shell  might  give 
us  greater  comforts  in  peace.  Which  way  the 
ability  is  used  depends  entirely  on  our  conceptions 
of  the  nature  of  man  in  society  and  of  what  is 
worth  while  in  life.  And  such  conceptions  are 
not  inspired  or  intuitive.  They  are  the  results  of 
intellectual  labour.  The  prime  need,  then,  of  the 
present  is  a  continued  and  universal  investigation 
into  our  moral  conceptions,  into  the  nature  of 
citizenship,  of  the  State  and  the  relationship 
between  States.  We  have  been  so  obsessed  with 
physical  science  that  we  have  neglected  to  develop 
the  other  realms  of  knowledge.  In  material 
power  we  are  immeasurably  superior  to  our 
grandfathers,  in  political  and  moral  thought 
we  stumble  through  primaeval  darkness. 

In  the  morality  of  warfare,  however,  it  is  not 
simply  a  question  of  searching  in  the  dark.  One 
principle  at  least  stands  out  from  the  facts  we 
have  considered.  It  is  not  very  definite,  perhaps, 
and  appears  rather  as  a  vast  figure  in  the  darkness 
of  our  international  morality,  whose  nature  is 
rather   guessed    at    than   understood.     But    it    is 


MORALITY  OF  NATIONS  AT  WAR    177 

there  clearly  enough  for  all  practical  purposes. 
That  principle  is  the  basis  of  all  convention  and 
of  all  restriction  of  physical  force. 

The  moral  relationship  of  nations  cannot  begin 
with  agreed  conventions  nor  even  with  the  en- 
forcement of  such  conventions.  It  must  begin 
with  a  firm  establishment  among  the  citizens,  at 
least  of  civilised  nations,  of  the  attitude  of  mind 
and  the  habit  of  action  which  alone  make  any 
conventions  possible.  If  there  is  anything  which 
stands  out  from  the  facts  we  have  recited  it  is 
that  there  are  innumerable  acts  which  no  civilised 
nation  could  do  which  are  not  covered  by  any 
convention.  Destroy  every  vestige  of  the  Hague 
Conferences  and  we  should  still  find  that  warfare 
was  not  the  unlimited  exercise  of  force.  There 
is  something  stronger  than  the  sentiment  of 
respect  for  wounded  or  for  non-combatants, 
something  which  survives  even  when  a  calculat- 
ing brutality  throws  these  to  the  winds,  something 
which  gives  pause  even  to  the  conventional 
modern  barbarian,  who  is  barbarian  by  vicious 
argument  and  not  by  accidental  impulse.  It  is 
the  acquired  habit  of  generations.  Upon  that 
alone  we  may  rely  for  the  security  of  many 
limitations  of  force  which  were  not  mentioned  at 
the  Hague  ;  and  upon  that  really  depends  the 
security  even  of  such  conventions  as  are  con- 
scious.    For  many  generations,  unconsciously,  we 

N 


178     THE   MORALITY  OF   NATIONS 

have  simply  put  aside  as  utterly  impossible  certain 
actions  which  were  quite  common  in  primitive 
times  ;  and  some  actions  at  least  no  nation  would 
dare  to  do.  How  secure  the  acquired  habit  is, 
one  cannot  tell.  A  great  war,  great  passion  and 
great  fear,  endanger  old  inhibitions.  The  strain 
may  set  us  back  to  utter  barbarism.  But  so  far 
we  are  safe  :  and  we  are  safe  only  so  long  as 
acquired  habit  makes  it  impossible  to  use  certain 
forces.  The  line  of  progress,  therefore,  is  the 
securing  of  this  habit  of  mind  and  action,  in  spite 
of  all  temptations  to  retaliate,  and  the  deliberate 
increasing  of  the  number  of  those  acts  which 
habit  makes  it  impossible  to  do. 


CHAPTER  X 

PEACE     RELATIONS 

We  may  presume  that,  in  spite  of  occasional 
wars,  peace  is  now  the  normal  situation  between 
most  States.  That  it  is  still  an  armed  peace  is 
true,  but  it  is  peace.  The  situation,  however, 
needs  some  examination,  both  because  (i)  its 
nature  is  entirely  different  from  any  peace  which 
preceded  1850,  and  because  (2)  ordinarily  the 
word  "  peace "  is  supposed  to  mean  only  the 
negative  of  war.  But,  conceived  as  a  Renaissance 
or  a  mediaeval  cessation  of  hostilities,  modern 
peace  cannot  be  understood  ;  and  so  long  as  we 
continue  to  imagine  war  to  be  a  time  for  positive 
action  and  peace  only  a  time  for  doing  nothing, 
so  long  will  the  old  attractiveness  of  war  continue. 
For  men  and  women,  though  incurably  lazy  during 
most  of  life,  delight  in  occasional  fits  of  energy  ; 
and  peace,  being  conceived  to  deny  energy,  is 
regarded  as  something  unworthy  of  the  higher 
aspirations  of  man. 

Sentimentalists,  indeed,  have  made  too  much 
of  peace.     We    are    speaking    here    not    of    the 

179 


180     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

supposed  beauties  or  delights  of  peace,  but  of 
its  commonplace  nature.  And  first  it  is  necessary 
to  recognise  that  the  contrast  between  peace  and 
war,  as  it  appears  to  the  popular  imagination,  is  a 
result  of  false  history.  Not  only  is  it  false  to 
say  that  war  is  a  period  of  activity  ;  it  is  a  direct 
reverse  of  the  truth.  In  periods  of  war  less, 
not  more,  is  done  ;  and  preparation  for  war  is  a 
well-known  cause  of  the  inertia  and  idleness 
during  years  of  peace.1  In  peace  much  more  is 
achieved  in  producing  and  using  all  the  higher 
resources  of  the  civilised  life.  And  again,  not 
merely  is  less  done  in  war,  but  less  need  be  done. 
The  activities  essential  to  the  prosecution  of  war 
are  comparatively  simple  ;  but  in  peace  there  is 
very  much  to  be  done.  How,  then,  it  may  be 
asked,  does  the  morality  of  a  nation  seem  to  receive 
new  impetus  from  war,  in  the  devotion  to  unselfish 
ends  and  the  self-sacrifice  incidental  to  bearing 
arms  ?  2  For  in  peace  it  seems  that  men  seek 
only  their  own  private  interests  and  do  nothing 
for  the  State  :  or  parties  pursue  their  programmes 
without  subordination  to  a  higher  loyalty.     But  in 

1  Thus  Bacon  says,  "  warlike  nations  are  lazy."  Essay  en 
Empire. 

2  The  misrepresentation  of  war  is  largely  due  to  the  ignor- 
ance of  professed  philosophers.  Hegel  makes  the  army  the 
highest  essence  of  the  State,  and  he  says,  "  The  military  class 
is  the  class  of  universality,"  which,  besides  being  an  obscure 
compliment,  is  also  false  {Phil,  of  Right,  §  327). 


PEACE   RELATIONS 


I8l 


war  all  this  is  changed.  Therefore  war  is  some- 
times said  to  be  a  moral  tonic,  in  so  far  as  it  rouses 
men  to  unselfishness  or  the  facing  of  danger  : 
peace  seems  to  mean  inertia  or  egoistic  activity. 
We  cannot  deny  the  truth  of  this,  but  the 
reason  for  it  is  instructive.  That  reason  is  the 
undeveloped  political  imagination.  The  needs  of 
peace  are  more  pressing,  more  various  and  more 
exalting  than  those  of  war  ;  but  few  are  able  even 
to  see  them.  The  moral  perception  is  obscured 
by  conventional  ideas  ;  and  indeed  the  senti- 
mentalism  of  the  advocates  of  peace  is  as  nothing 
by  comparison  with  the  sentimentalism  of  those 
who  accept  the  ancient  idea  that  the  finest  service 
of  the  community  is  the  bearing  of  arms.  There 
are  opportunities  enough  for  unselfishness,  public 
service,  and  even  danger  or  death,  in  the  service 
of  the  State  in  times  of  peace  ;  but  few  see  them : 
and  this  because  we  do  not  really  consider  what 
we  mean  by  peace,  but  leave  it  to  mean  only 
"  not  war."  We  do  not  see  that  modern  peace  is 
not  anything  specially  virtuous  or  sanctimonious, 
but  only  an  opportunity  for  a  life  of  full  and 
varied  activity.  That  the  opportunity  has  not 
been  used  by  very  many  may  be  true  :  it 
may  even  be  true  that  such  opportunity  will 
never  be  used.  We  cannot  tell.  But  it  is 
nothing  against  an  opportunity  of  this  kind  that 
men  are  too  undeveloped  to  use  it  :  just  as  it  is 


1 82     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

nothing  against  wealth  that  those  who  possess  it 
seem  to  find  time  hanging  on  their  hands.  A 
subtler  imaginative  development  uses  great 
opportunities  more  fully  and  makes  much  even 
of  very  limited  means.  So  it  is  with  the  vast 
majority  of  the  so-called  civilised  :  their  con- 
ceptions of  what  is  enjoyable  are  indications  of 
the  undeveloped  imagination.  Men  do  not  lack 
leisure  so  much  as  they  lack  knowledge  of  what 
to  do  with  it  if  they  have  it.  Put  a  savage 
in  a  theatre  or  a  library  and  he  will  be  "  bored  " 
until  he  can  scalp  some  one  :  give  the  semi- 
civilised  peace  and  they  will  long  for  war.  The 
reason  is  that  they  cannot  see  what  may  be  done 
unless  what  is  to  be  done  is  very  simple  and 
obvious.  It  is  their  understanding  of  peace  itself 
which  is  at  fault.1 

What,  then,  is  modern  peace  ?  The  answer 
is  to  be  found  partly,  as  we  have  already  said, 
in  the  complex  interchange  of  goods  and  ideas 
under  the  influence  of  the  various  institutions 
other  than  States,  which  in  modern  times  have 
become  international.  This  has  affected  the 
political  situation  so  as  to  make  it  more  difficult 

1  "  Till  all  the  methods  have  been  exhausted  by  which 
Nature  can  be  brought  into  the  services  of  man,  till  society  is 
so  organised  that  every  one's  capacities  have  free  scope  for  their 
development,  there  is  no  need  to  resort  to  war  for  a  field  in 
which  patriotism  may  display  itself"  (Green,  Principles  of  Pol. 
Obl.,%171). 


PEACE   RELATIONS  183 

for  the  State  to  pass  either  from  peace  to  war 
or  from  war  to  peace.  It  is  said  of  organisms 
that  the  higher  or  more  complex  they  become, 
the  more  difficult  is  any  structural  rearrangement 
to  meet  a  new  environment.  And  however  that 
may  be,  the  complex  institution  is  certainly  less 
adaptable.  It  is  easier  for  Serbia  to  pass  either 
from  peace  to  war  or  from  war  to  peace  than 
it  is  for  England.  There  is  less  dislocation  in 
an  agricultural  than  in  an  industrial  country,  and 
in  proportion  as  the  occupations  of  peace  become 
more  diverse  and  more  specialised,  in  that  pro- 
portion the  State  suffers  by  declaring  war.  For 
modern  peace  is  the  condition  or  opportunity 
for  the  exercise  of  very  complex  interdependent 
functions,  political,  industrial  and  cultural  ;  and 
the  peace  which  preceded  the  Napoleonic  wars 
was,  therefore,  quite  different  from  the  peace 
which  preceded  the  present  war,  at  least  as  re- 
gards the  more  developed  States.  It  must  be 
recognised,  therefore,  that  the  very  necessities 
of  modern  life  make  peace  so  full  of  diverse 
activities  that  war  becomes  more  and  more 
dangerous  to  civilised  life  as  civilised  life  becomes 
more  complex. 

But  not  only  industrial  complexity  separates 
modern  from  ancient  peace.  It  was,  or  will  be, 
a  new  intellectual  period. 

The    peace    preceding    this    war,    at    least    as 


i84     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

between  States  which  we  have  called  "  modern," 
had  lasted  from  i  87 1  to  19 14.  That  alone  would 
be  sufficient  to  prove  it  a  unique  phenomenon 
in  European  history  ;  and  during  those  years  the 
mental  and  bodily  activities  of  European  men 
and  women  were  habituated  to  the  situation.  So 
consolidated  had  the  peace  become  that  even 
modern  war  could  not  set  back  belligerents  to 
the  state  of  complete  severance  which  supervened 
in  wars  of  the  non-modern  period.  For  example, 
in  1904,  in  the  midst  of  the  Russo-Japanese 
war,  Russians  and  Japanese  met  at  the  Scientific 
Congress  at  St.  Louis,  U.S.A.1  It  would  not  be 
difficult  to  quote  examples  of  the  same  sort  even 
in  the  present  embittered  hostility.2 

During  the  period  1 871-19 14  populations  in- 
creased, wealth  not  only  increased  but  was  more 
subtly  and  effectively  organised  according  to  the 
principles  of  the  joint-stock  company,  the  mastery 
over  Nature  and  the  supply  of  human  needs 
developed  immensely  ;  and  in  the  purely  political 
sphere  every  nation    became    more   conscious   of 

1  Reinsch,  Intern.  Unions,  p.  185.  The  same  sort  of 
meeting  occurred  in  the  wars  of  the  eighteenth  century,  but 
those  were  dynastic  non-popular  wars,  when  feeling  did  not 
run  very  high. 

2  Through  the  bureaux  for  communicating  with  prisoners 
of  war,  and  contacts  of  persons  in  neutral  countries,  communi- 
cation is  not  stopped  as  it  used  to  be.  We  even  hear  what  is 
officially  announced  to  the  citizens  of  the  opposing  States. 


PEACE   RELATIONS  185 

its  special  character  and  every  State  moved  towards 
democratic  forms  of  government. 

The  conclusion  as  regards  morality  is  some- 
what subtle.  All  the  various  functionings  of 
modern  peace  are  really  services  of  the  com- 
munity as  valuable  at  least  as  military  service 
in  time  of  war.  In  a  sense  they  are  not  "  serving 
the  State  "  ;  for,  as  we  have  seen,  "  the  State  " 
is  not  the  only  organisation  for  the  civilised  life  ; 
but  they  are  not  therefore  selfish  or  egoistic 
occupations.  The  idea  that  what  is  not  done  "  for 
the  State "  is  done  for  yourself  is  due  to  the 
old  universalism  of  "  the  State,"  and  the  lack  of 
any  theory  as  to  other  social  bonds  besides  that 
of  citizenship.  Even  the  Socialists  have  been 
misled  by  obsolete  ideas.  They  have  tried  to 
redeem  peace  by  making  all  occupations  state- 
services  ;  but  in  that  they  have  accepted  the 
antiquated  conception  of  the  State.  Their  pur- 
pose, however,  was  reasonable.  They  saw  that 
we  suffer  from  lack  of  social  perceptiveness,  and 
they  emphasised  the  social  causes  and  the  social 
results  of  all  action. 

It  is  obvious,  however,  that  the  business  man, 
or  the  engineer,  or  the  writer,  has  generally  no 
conception  of  "  service  "  ;  and  a  higher  moral  per- 
ception is,  perhaps,  needed  in  the  carrying  out 
of  the  various  social  functions  during  modern 
peace.     But  the  point  now  is  that,  whether  they 


1 86     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

know  it  or  not,  those  who  perform  such  functions 
are  really  "  serving  the  community,"  and  it  makes 
no  difference  whatever  that  they  make  their 
own  living  by  it.  Nor  would  making  livings 
by  such  service  destroy  the  moral  quality  of 
it,  if  it  were  consciously  service.  As  a  mere 
economic  necessity  it  is  not  moral  ;  but  as  a 
conscious  fulfilling  of  social  function  the  special- 
isation of  modern  peace  is  moral.  And  perhaps 
this  is  more  commonly  recognised  than  is  be- 
lieved. Nothing  is  more  remarkable  in  the 
period  preceding  19 14  than  the  growth  of  the 
social  conscience,  the  emotional  perception  of 
disease  and  poverty,  not  as  mere  opportunities 
for  benevolence,  but  as  the  result  of  social  forces 
and  as  causes  of  social  decay.  And  this  conscience 
is  not  confined  within  the  boundaries  of  States. 
Those  who  feel  any  social  evils  are  likely  to 
sympathise  with  the  citizens  of  other  States  who 
feel  the  same  evils.  A  common  suffering  sub- 
ordinates to  sympathy  distinctions  of  law  and 
government,  and  with  this  fact  the  statesman  of 
the  future  will  have  to  reckon. 

The  true  nature  of  modern  peace,  however, 
can  best  be  seen  in  the  direct  influence  of  States 
upon  one  another.  The  agreement  between 
States  on  certain  methods  of  arranging  life  within 
their  own  borders  is  one  of  the  most  interesting 
features  of  the  late  nineteenth  and  early  twentieth 


PEACE   RELATIONS  187 

centuries.  Fortunately  this  has  been  worked  out 
in  detail,  and  we  need  not  repeat  here  the  results 
of  the  investigations  of  Professor  Reinsch.1 

He  counts  and  gives  details  of  twenty-eight 
different  agreements  between  States,  no  one  of 
which  was  in  existence  before  the  middle  of  the 
nineteenth  century.  These  comprise  agreements 
on  methods  of  communication,  regulation  of 
trade,  of  prisons,  of  sanitation,  of  police  (fisheries 
police  and  suppression  of  slavery)  besides  scientific 
common  work.  The  point  is  that  this  has  been 
done  besides  whatever  is  due  to  private  enterprise 
or  voluntary  associations.  The  States  themselves 
have  assimilated  their  institutions  or  have  intro- 
duced new  methods  in  common  ;  and  this,  not 
because  of  any  sentimental  regard  for  co-opera- 
tion,  but   simply  because   in  practical    politics   it 

1  Public  International  Unions,  by  P.  S.  Reinsch,  191 1.  The 
list  includes  the  International  Unions  for  (1)  Telegraphs, 
(2)  Wireless,  (3)  Postage,  (4)  Railway  Freight,  (5)  Auto- 
mobiles, (6)  Navigation  ;  the  Agreements  on  (7)  the  Metric 
System,  (8)  Industrial  and  Literary  Property,  (9)  the  Publica- 
tion of  Customs  Tariffs,  (10)  Protection  of  Labourers,  (11) 
Sugar,  (12)  Agriculture,  (13)  Insurance,  (14)  Prisons,  (15) 
Sanitation,  (16)  Pan-American  Sanitation,  (17)  Opium, 
(18)  Geneva  Convention,  (19)  Fisheries  Police,  (20)  Pro- 
tection of  Submarine  Cables,  (21)  African  Slave  Trade  and 
Liquor  Traffic,  (22)  White  Slave  Traffic,  (23)  South  American 
Police.  And  there  are  the  following  scientific  Unions  :  (24) 
Geodetic  Association,  (25)  Electro-technical  Commission,  (26) 
Seismological  Union,  (27)  Union  for  the  Exploration  of  the 
Sea,  (28)  Pan-American  Scientific  Union. 


1 88     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

saves  time  and  money.  Thus,  the  very  institutions 
which  according  to  the  ancient  hypothesis  were 
self-sufficing  and  complete  in  themselves,  have  not 
only  been  influenced  by  the  other  interests  of 
civilised  life  outside  the  region  of  politics,  but 
in  a  strictly  political  sense  and  in  direct  depend- 
ence upon  other  States,  have  adopted  governmental 
action  together.  No  more  glaring  contradiction 
could  be  given  to  the  whole  of  the  ancient  idea  of 
the  State.  It  is  to  be  noticed  that  this  is  direct 
peace  policy,  and  not  any  mere  alliance  for  war 
or  for  avoiding  war.1  The  States  have  preserved 
their  independence  and  have  acted  together.  They 
have  even  accepted  common  institutional  arrange- 
ments (postage,  telegraph,  etc.),  and  their  char- 
acteristics have  not  been  obliterated.  And  all 
that  has  been  done  while  the  theorists  of  expansion 
and  prestige  and  "  vital  interests  "  slept  or  kept 
their  one  eye  upon  possible  war. 

But  we  can  only  calculate  prospects  of  the 
future  by  reference  to  actual  achievement.  A 
peace  policy  in  terms  perhaps  of  the  mere  avoid- 
ance of  war  but  really  with  a  new  spirit,  is 
embodied  in  the  Treaty  between  the  United 
Kingdom  and  the  United  States  of  America 
signed  on  September  15,  19 14.      It  provides  that 

1  Nearly  all  these  Unions  or  Agreements  were  originally 
suggested  or  contrived  by  private  citizens  who  used  their 
influence  upon   officials. 


PEACE   RELATIONS  189 

"  all  disputes  between  them,  of  any  nature  what- 
soever, other  than  disputes  the  settlement  of 
which  is  provided  for  and,  in  fact,  achieved  under 
existing  agreements  between  the  High  Contracting 
Parties,  shall,  when  diplomatic  methods  of  adjust- 
ment have  failed,  be  referred  for  investigation  and 
report  to  a  permanent  International  Commission 
.  .  .  and  they  agree  not  to  declare  war  or  begin 
hostilities  during  such  investigation  and  before 
the  report  is  submitted."1  The  security  for  such 
a  policy  is  not  in  the  signatures,  but  in  the  new 
attitude  which  such  an  agreement  indicates.  And 
such  an  attitude  is  the  result  of  the  years  of  peace. 
Since  the  nineteenth  century  about  one  hundred 
disputes  have  been  decided  by  arbitration.  Arbi- 
tration agreements  of  a  limited  kind  have  been 
entered  into  by  the  United  Kingdom  with  twelve 
other  States  ;2  and  in  the  two  years  1913,  191 4, 
the  United  States  of  America  entered  into  Peace 
Commission  Treaties  with  eighteen  different 
States,  chiefly  on  the  American  continent.3 

These  are  only  a  few  indications  of  the  new 
relationship  between  States  ;  and  from  them  alone 
it  would  be  obvious  that  the  word  State  refers  to 

1  Treaty,  Art.  I. 

2  Pari.  Papers,  Misc.  No.  9  (1909),  Cd.  4870. 

3  Salvador,  Guatemala,  Panama,  Honduras,  Nicaragua, 
Netherlands,  Bolivia,  Portugal,  Persia,  Denmark,  Switzerland, 
Costa  Rica,  Dominican  Republic,  Venezuela,  Great  Britain, 
France,  Spain,  China. 


1 9o     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

something  very  different  from  the  partly  isolated 
and  mutually  suspicious  governments  of  the  early 
nineteenth  century.  The  institutions  themselves 
are  transformed.  From  such  a  transformation 
one  may  judge  of  the  intangible  but  more  im- 
portant change  which  has  taken  place  in  the 
sentiments  of  civilised  men  and  women  ;  and 
although  the  change  in  actual  politics  seems  to  be 
small,  that  change  is  already  having  its  effect  on 
the  sentiments  even  of  the  unthinking. 

We  may  turn  now  to  the  problem  which  is 
more  fundamental  in  the  study  of  morality. 
What  course  of  action  is  to  be  adopted  on  the 
part  of  institutions  so  variously  related  ?  It  is 
generally  agreed  that  a  peace  policy  is  the  only 
one  reasonable  ;  and  we  need  not  trouble  to 
argue  with  those  who  advocate,  if  any  do,  a 
policy  of  war  or  of  aggression.  But  while 
diplomatists  and  statesmen  proclaim  their  ad- 
hesion to  a  peace  policy,  no  one  seems  to  inquire 
what  such  a  policy  would  be.  And  we  may  be 
bold  enough  to  say  that,  whatever  may  be  true 
in  future,  there  certainly  has  never  yet  been  a 
peace  policy.  For  the  avoidance  of  war  is  not 
a  peace  policy. 

In  private  as  well  as  in  public  morality  we  are 
hampered  by  an  obsolete  conception  of  what 
morality  is.  We  have  inherited,  among  other 
mistakes,  the  idea  that  there  is  some  "  command  " 


PEACE    RELATIONS  19  r 

implied  in  the  moral  "  ought  " — but  that  is  a 
general  issue  in  Ethics  which  it  would  be  out  of 
place  to  discuss  here.  Along  with  the  idea  of 
command,  however,  has  gone  the  use  of  negatives. 
We  have  been  supposed  to  know  from  "  the 
moral  law  "  what  we  should  not  do.  The  Mosaic 
code  reasonably,  considering  its  date,  was  chiefly 
insistent  on  the  avoidance  of  certain  actions — 
swearing,  coveting,  killing,  adultery.  Morality 
consisted,  as  it  then  seemed,  in  not  doing  these  ; 
and  although  there  was  a  half-hearted  command 
to  do  something  in  loving  your  parents,  this 
seemed  an  exception  in  a  rule  of  life  which  was 
an  inculcation  of  avoidances.  Such,  of  course, 
morality  is,  in  a  primitive  state  of  society.  Taboo 
is  the  first  law  ;  and  society  depends  upon  inhibi- 
tions. But  by  an  accident  of  history  this  ancient 
type  of  law  became  the  embodiment  of  morality, 
even  when  the  whole  structure  of  society  had 
changed.  Life,  therefore,  became  an  obstacle 
race.  The  moral  man  was  he  who  did  not  do 
things.  The  good  life  was  a  successful  avoidance. 
It  is  clear  that  this  is  a  conception  of  morality 
belonging  to  a  primitive  time.  Civilised  morality, 
as  Plato  and  Aristotle  knew,  is  a  doing  of  actions, 
not  an  avoiding.  It  is  positive  and  not  negative. 
And  moral  knowledge  consists  in  knowing  what 
to  do,  not  what  to  avoid  ;  for  life  is  not  an 
obstacle  race,  but  a  fine  art.     The  moral  man   is 


192     THE    MORALITY    OF   NATIONS 

he  who  acts,  not  he  who  avoids  action.  The 
moral  life  is  varied  and  complex  activity,  not  the 
successful  escape  from  temptation. 

The  most  pernicious  effect,  then,  of  the  older 
conception  of  morality  was  that  "  moral  instruc- 
tion "  definitely  became  an  instruction  in  immorality. 
The  knowledge  of  what  not  to  do  involved  explain- 
ing to  children  the  meaning  of  vice  ;  for  if  your 
commands  contain  words  like  "  adultery,"  "  theft  " 
and  the  rest,  unless  you  are  to  leave  them  mere 
sounds,  you  must  explain  to  your  pupils  their  full 
meaning.  But  this  involves  impressing  ideas  of 
vice  upon  the  mind. 

This  is  all  criticism  of  morality  in  general,  and 
its  importance  will  depend  upon  the  development 
of  the  same  theme  in  elaborating  an  art  of  life  for 
individuals.  That  is  another  issue.  The  same 
obsolete  system,  however,  has  been  in  vogue  in 
group-morality.  We  have  been  made  to  feel, 
feebly  enough,  what  we  must  not  do,  and  no  one 
has  considered  what  we  should  do.  The  State  in 
contact  with  other  States  should  avoid  this  and 
that  ;  but  no  one  has  said  how  the  State  should 
act  positively  in  the  relation  to  other  States. 

Thus  there  never  has  been  a  peace  policy 
because  there  has  been  no  conscious  official  activity 
in  the  complexities  of  peace.  The  policy  of  avoid- 
ing war  has  been  the  highest  imagined  ;  and  it 
has    had    the    same    effect    as   the   inculcation   of 


PEACE   RELATIONS  193 

avoidances  in  private  morality.  For  the  idea  of 
avoiding  an  action  tends  to  concentrate  the  mind 
upon  that  very  action.  The  real  thought  is  given 
to  the  obstacle,  and  successful  policy  seems  to  be 
a  mere  avoidance  of  it.  Hence  every  one  under- 
stands how  great  a  benefit  the  State  may  derive 
from  war,  in  the  knitting  together  of  its  citizens  ; 
and  no  one  has  ever  considered  that  citizens  miofht 
be  more  closely  knit  in  times  of  peace.  For  war 
has  been  considered  at  least  to  be  action  ;  but 
peace  only  a  time  in  which  not  to  do  what  you  do 
in  war.  Hence  also  the  peace  of  1871  to  1914 
has  been  an  armed  peace  ;  and  the  ancient  lie  has 
survived  that  one  may  secure  peace  by  preparing 
for  war.  While  the  current  of  events  has  steadily 
transformed  society  and,  with  it,  its  political  insti- 
tutions, the  official  mind  was  still  obsessed  with 
the  primitive  idea  of  group- morality.  Policy  was 
negative  ;  and  the  danger  of  war  filled  the  minds 
of  statesmen  who  might  have  turned  attention  to 
new  and  positive  action.  With  a  new  conception 
of  group-morality,  however,  we  should  regard  it 
as  our  first  task  to  discover  what  the  State  should 
do  in  times  of  peace  with  respect  to  other  States. 
Something  is,  as  we  have  seen,  already  done  ;  but 
it  is  unconscious  and  hardly  part  of  a  settled  policy. 
A  real  peace  policy  would  involve  the  increase  of 
official  activity  in  the  name  of  the  State  and  for 
the  benefit  of  all  the  citizens,  in  the  direction  of 
o 


194     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

benefiting  other  States  and  gaining  their  trust.  It 
is  perfectly  well  known  that  some  States  tend  at 
certain  times  to  hostile  feeling.  A  peace  policy- 
would  involve  action  in  order  to  correct  that,  on 
the  part  of  the  State  which  is  regarded  as  hostile. 
And  also  perhaps,  even  if  the  hostility  is  between 
two  neighbouring  States,  a  peace  policy  would 
suggest  conciliatory  action  on  the  part  of  some 
third.  This  is  not  Utopian,  nor  is  it  some  heroic 
morality  to  which  the  average  citizens  could  not 
rise.  It  could  probably  be  shown,  if  we  had  all 
the  documents,  that  such  a  policy  has  at  least 
fitfully  been  pursued  by  some  statesmen. 

In  any  case,  the  present  situation,  even  in  spite 
of  a  great  war,  is  so  different  from  that  of  our 
grandfathers  that  we  must  conceive  the  moral 
relationship  of  States  differently  and,  with  a  new 
view  of  what  is  done  and  what  can  be  done  in 
peace,  the  policy  of  every  State  will  change.  Our 
conclusion  must  certainly  be  that  one  of  the 
changes  of  recent  years  is  the  change  in  the 
meaning   of   peace.1     War   also   has   changed,  as 

1  Lest  the  idea  of  a  peace  policy  should  seem  new,  it  is  well 
to  be  reminded  that  ever  since  the  early  years  of  Christianity 
there  have  been  some  who  stood  out  against  the  preparation  for 
war  (cf.  E.  Nys,  Les  Origines  du  droit  internationel.  Bruxelles, 
Paris,  1894,  Ch.  Ill,  "Christianity  and  War,"  and  Ch.  XVII, 
"Les  Irenistes").  The  Friars  attempted  to  preach  in  this 
sense ;  and  a  society,  the  Fratres  Pacis,  spread  through  France 
in  the  twelfth  century  to  protest  against  the  continual  mediaeval 
wars.     At    the    Renaissance    Colet    preached    directly  against 


PEACE   RELATIONS  195 

we  have  seen,  and  to  write  history  or  to  give 
ethical  judgments  which  confounded,  because  of 
a  mere  similarity  of  name,  the  events  of  the 
Hundred  Years  War  with  the  events  of  the  last 
few  months  would  be  like  confusing  the  Mill 
on  the  Floss  with  Mill  on  Liberty.  The  word 
"  war  "  has  absolutely  changed  its  meaning.1  And 
so  has  "peace."  The  new  situation  has  given  to 
the  complex  relationship  between  States  which  we 
call  peace  a  colour  which  was  impossible  in  our 
grandfathers'  time.  It  is  as  different  from  their 
peace  as  our  finance  is  different  from  theirs. 

Henry  VIIPs  war  policy.  More,  in  the  Utopia,  Erasmus  and 
the  other  humanists,  all  protested  in  the  same  sense.  In  later 
times  the  protests  were  even  more  frequent,  but  the  historians 
have  commonly  neglected  them. 

1  For  the  change  in  the  meaning  of  war,  see  Hobhouse, 
Morals  in  Evolution,  Pt.  I.  ch.  vi.      New  Edition,  191  5. 


CHAPTER   XI 

NEEDS    OF    THE    STATE 

States  are  organised  groups,  and  such  groups 
are  related  morally  one  to  another.  Such  state- 
ments do  not  go  beyond  the  actual  facts  admitted 
by  every  one  nowadays.  But  the  relations  have 
affected  the  modern  State  so  that  even  with  respect 
to  one's  fellow-citizens  the  attitude  of  many  is 
somewhat  different  from  what  it  was  in  the  past. 
There  is  a  modern  tendency,  due  in  part  to  the 
new  situation,  which  is  of  extreme  importance  for 
the  future.  It  concerns,  first,  the  bond  by  which 
the  modern  citizen  feels  himself  held  within  his 
own  State  ;  and,  next,  the  relationship  in  which 
the  few  at  least  in  every  State  feel  themselves  to 
be  with  respect  to  the  citizens  of  other  States. 

This  is  not  the  place  to  discuss  the  appearance 
of  what  has  been  called  the  social  conscience  in 
matters  of  social  reform.  But  it  is  recognised  on 
every  hand  that,  whatever  the  distresses  of  the 
present,  the  emotional  atmosphere  with  regard  to 
this  has  been  transformed  within  the  last  hundred 
years.      It    has    always    been    recognised    that    a 

196 


NEEDS   OF   THE   STATE  197 

complex  social  organisation  is  accompanied  by- 
much  poverty  and  disease.  Attempts  have  often 
been  made  to  deal  with  these,  and  generally  on 
the  ground  of  benevolence  or  charity.  But  the 
modern  social  conscience  is  the  indefinite  feeling 
of  discontent  even  with  the  partial  success  of 
charity.  It  is  now  felt  that  social  distress  exists 
because  of  forces  which  can  and  must  be  controlled. 
Prevention,  not  cure,  is  our  purpose.  Charity 
implies  that  the  recipient  has  no  right  to  what  he 
gets  ;  but  now  we  believe  that  poverty  and  disease 
imply  disregarded  rights.  We  now  feel  that  the 
social  organism  is  real  and  that  individuals  are 
not  atomic.  We  seek  the  re-establishment  of 
human  association  in  place  of  or  beside  the  merely 
economic  and  legal.  Contract  took  the  place  of 
Status.  Now  Co-operation  takes  the  place  of 
Contract.  The  whole  community  suffers  from  the 
disease  and  poverty  of  some  ;  and  the  State  must 
conquer  such  evils  or  decay.  Social  reform, 
development  of  national  resources,  education, 
protection  of  the  weak — all  these  are  matters  of 
pressing  importance. 

All  these,  then,  may  be  "  needs  of  the  State." 
But  here  our  subject  must  be  allowed  to  limit 
the  discussion  of  these  needs  to  such  as  regard 
immediately  the  foreign  relations  of  the  State. 
Since  the  State  is  not  isolated,  it  has  needs  other 
than  those  of  domestic  or  internal  reform.     The 


198     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

other  needs  arise  from  the  situation  created  by 
contact  with  foreign  States  ;  and  they  are  supposed 
to  be  represented  and  supplied  in  our  foreign 
policy.  And  further,  such  needs  are  oar  needs — 
not  the  needs  of  a  government.  Our  honour, 
our  interests  and  our  obligations  are  supposed  to 
govern  foreign  policy  :  and  the  same  might  be 
said  of  the  citizens  of  every  civilised  State.  Their 
needs  also  are  recognised  by  their  representatives 
in  contact  with  foreigners.     But  this  is  new. 

It  would  not  require  much  reference  to  ancient 
texts  to  show  that  foreign  policy  was  once  sup- 
posed to  represent  not  the  needs  of  the  governed 
but  rather  those  of  the  government.  Napoleon  III 
is  believed  to  have  been  at  least  not  unwilling 
to  undertake  war  in  order  to  secure  his  rule  in 
France.  But  now  in  every  country  war  or  peace 
is  supposed  to  be  contrived  in  the  interests  of  the 
whole  group  of  the  citizens.  For  their  sake  what 
is  done  had  to  be  done. 

And  when  the  result  of  our  foreign  policy  is 
war,  the  cry  is  "  Your  king  and  country  need  you." 
It  may  be  supposed  that  the  need  has  existed 
before  :  or  shall  we  say  that  king  and  country 
can  get  on  very  well  without  us  until  there  is 
a  war  ?  And  if  king  and  country  need  us  in  time 
of  peace,  why  has  it  never  been  said  ?  Are  the 
citizens  not  needed  by  the  Government  for  any 
common  action  in  times  of  peace  ?     Or  are  they 


NEEDS   OF   THE  STATE  199 

only  sources  of  income  to  the  Services  ?  However 
that  may  be,  the  need  is  at  last  acknowledged — 
that  the  State  cannot  exist  without  entire  depend- 
ence on  its  citizens.  And  what  is  needed  ? 
Military  service  and  whatever  in  engineering  or 
manufacture  is  subservient  to  this  :  in  a  time  of 
crisis  such  is  really  the  need.  But  even  the  non- 
warlike  employment  of  citizens  is  now  recognised 
as  a  need  of  the  State.  Education  must  go  on 
and  the  provision  of  food  and  clothing  :  and  all 
this  not  for  supplying  individuals  who  pay  or  for 
maintaining  individuals  who  work,  but  "  for  the 
State."  This  surely  involves  a  change  of  attitude 
at  least  for  the  moment  :  and  even  if  it  cannot 
last,  its  effects  will  endure. 

But  to  say  that  the  king  and  the  country  need 
us  will  obscure  the  issue,  if  we  do  not  understand 
that  the  need  is  reciprocal.  King  and  country 
need  us  as  we  need  king  and  country.  What  is 
endangered  is  the  institution  under  which  we  live, 
which  we  fight  for  because  we  need  it.  We  need 
it  to  make  life  endurable  or  pleasant,  or  because 
we  think  that  there  is  more  hope  for  our  future 
in  our  institution  than  in  others.  It  is  quite  clear 
that  in  every  civilised  nation  the  conscious  citizen 
values  his  political  institutions  and  is  willing  to  do 
anything  which  may  be  necessary  for  preserving 
them.  And  the  danger  from  foreign  aggression 
only  makes  the  value  of  our  own  system  more 


200     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

obvious.  The  special  need  being  admitted  and 
acted  upon,  we  are  driven  to  consider  the  more 
general  issue.  If  these  are  the  needs  of  the  State 
at  present,  what  are  its  needs  in  normal  times  with 
respect  to  foreign  nations  ?  And  as  soon  as  we 
ask,  the  usual  host  of  antiquated  and  obsolete 
conceptions  appear  to  answer.  The  felt  needs  are 
not  all  the  real  needs ;  and  the  real  needs  are  often 
misrepresented  by  the  same  limited  conception  of 
the  State  with  which  we  have  dealt  above.  We 
must,  therefore,  first  examine  the  relationship  of 
the  citizen  to  his  State,  in  so  far  as  he  may  feel  his 
need  supplied  by  the  State  for  his  contact  with 
foreigners.  We  must  discover  what  governing 
conception  makes  him  support  his  State  in  this  or 
that  action  with  respect  to  foreign  States. 

The  need  with  respect  to  foreign  States  has 
always  been  conceived  in  terms  of  opposition. 
The  chief  need  felt  normally  by  the  mass  of 
citizens  is  the  need  of  independence  :  this  has 
been  consciously  accepted  even  when  other  needs 
have  really  been  supplied.  So  that  the  average 
citizen  feels  his  State  with  regard  to  foreign 
States  to  be  chiefly  a  defence  :  hence  in  action 
for  his  State,  in  contact  with  other  States,  he  feels 
that  the  chief  need  is  military.  But  other  needs 
have  existed,  and  have  actually  been  supplied, 
without  impressing  the  mind  so  as  to  correct  or 
modify  the  older  view  of   international  relation- 


NEEDS   OF   THE  STATE  201 

ship.  We  have  always  needed,  although  we  have 
not  always  wanted,  honesty  in  our  dealing  with 
foreigners,  suggestions  from  foreigners  in  ideas 
of  reform,  and  goods  of  foreigners  for  the  amen- 
ities of  life.  These  are,  however,  unnoticed  and 
unconscious  needs.  What  is  conscious  is  our 
need  of  independence,  leading  directly  through 
a  normal  attitude  of  pure  opposition,  to  such 
crises  as  produce  war  in  generation  after  gener- 
ation. For  these  wars  have  all  been  effects,  at 
least  in  part,  of  the  governing  conception  of  what 
our  State  needs  and  what  it  is.  The  situation 
is  not  very  different  in  the  various  civilised 
countries,  but  we  may  make  our  argument  more 
pointed  by  confining  attention  to  England.  What 
do  we  think  England  is  ?  What,  in  fact,  have  we 
been  taught  she  is  ?  The  answer  is  to  be  found 
in  the  established  conventions  of  history. 

History  is  supposed  to  be  the  source  of  patriot- 
ism, in  the  sense  that  from  it  one  may  derive 
some  rational  idea  of  what  is  meant  by  "  King 
and  Country."  From  history  we  are  supposed 
to  learn  what  has  made  England  what  she  is. 
The  theme  of  the  story  is  the  growth  of  the 
inheritance  into  which  we  have  been  born  ;  and 
if  there  is  any  moral  judgment  implied,  as  well 
as  mere  record  of  fact,  we  are  supposed  to  see  in 
history  the  good  and  the  bad  gradually  evolving 
into  a  better  state  of   things.     In  the  course  of 


202     THE    MORALITY    OF   NATIONS 

this  evolution  the  modern  State  has  appeared  ; 
and  we  are  supposed  to  find  in  history  an  explan- 
ation of  the  institutions  under  which  we  live, 
which  we  desire  to  maintain  and,  at  times  of 
crises,  are  called  upon  to  defend.  What  sort 
of  State,  then,  do  we  find  in  the  established 
history  ? 

History  has  been  for  generations  the  mere 
record  of  conflict — wars  and  rumours  of  wars,  and 
the  marriages  of  kings.  We  may  put  aside  for 
the  moment  the  fact  that  such  a  record  is  no 
explanation  of  how  we  come  to  be  as  we  now 
are,  and  we  may  acknowledge  that  history  in 
recent  times  has  been  by  no  means  altogether 
a  mere  list  of  exceptional  events.  It  is  true 
that  historians  have,  after  many  generations  of 
mediaeval  chronicling,  contrived  to  mention  how 
common  men  lived  and  how  most  men  thought 
in  the  past.  History  is  not  the  crude  journalism 
which  it  once  was  ;  but  the  crudities  of  the  old 
history  hang  about  the  meaning  we  give  to  the 
name  of  England.  For  the  "  history  "  of  Eng- 
land's foreign  relations  is  only  a  record  of  conflict, 
or  at  most  an  occasional  reference  to  a  dynastic 
alliance.  We  cannot  possibly  avoid  the  conclusion 
that  such  foreign  relations  are  in  the  essence  of 
things. 

Undoubtedly    the    current    conception    of    the 
State,  as  in  pure  opposition  to  foreign  States,  is 


NEEDS   OF    THE   STATE  203 

due  in  part  to  the  idea  that  the  history  of  Eng- 
land's foreign  relations  is  to  be  found  in  the 
records  of  war,  or  in  trivial  personal  alliances 
between  unintelligent  princelings  and  passive 
brides.  And  even  the  modern  historians,  while 
they  are  no  longer  date-and-fact  journalists, 
remain  provincial  in  the  restriction  of  their 
theme.  There  is  very  little,  if  any,  acknowledg- 
ment of  the  influence  of  the  relations  of  England 
with  foreign  countries  in  the  development  of 
even  English  thought  and  habits.  The  two 
causes — the  mistakes  of  the  old  history  and  the 
limitations  of  the  new — combine  to  prevent  us 
rising  to  a  new  conception  of  the  needs  of  the 
State.  For,  first,  "  England  "  is  supposed  to  be 
concerned  primarily  in  such  adventures  as  Crecy 
and  Agincourt.  Plans  of  battles,  not  plans  of 
towns,  are  the  illustrations  of  text-books  ;  armed 
men,  not  scholars  or  traders,  are  the  English  of 
the  past.  Now,  quite  apart  from  the  fact  that 
"  England,"  the  modern  State,  was  not  in  exist- 
ence and  that  "the  enemy"  in  mediaeval  times 
were  certainly  not  great  national  groups — apart 
from  the  fact  that  the  whole  conception  of  organ- 
ised groups  in  opposition  is  an  anachronism  when 
applied  to  the  Middle  Ages — clearly  England 
did  not  mainly  come  into  contact  with  the  non- 
English  in  the  adventures  of  war.  Crecy  and 
Agincourt  and  the  rest  are  merely  chance  episodes 


2o4     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

in  the  steady  current  of  international  growth.  So 
that  the  foreign  relations  of  England  must  be 
looked  for  in  the  cosmopolitanism  of  scholars, 
of  professional  classes,  of  traders  and  of  travellers. 
Men  went  from  England  to  learn  law  in  Bologna, 
or  medicine  at  Montpellier,  or  science  in  Paris. 
Germans,  French  and  Italians  came  to  learn  from 
us  at  Oxford.  There  was  the  cosmopolitanism 
of  trade  also.  New  methods  came  to  us  from 
the  Flemings  and  the  Lombards.  Fashions  came 
from  France  and  Italy.  So  that  while  the  official 
attitude  to  foreign  rulers  may  have  been  that  of 
mere  hostility,  the  real  growth  of  England  was 
dependent  on  continual  interdependence.  The 
history,  therefore,  which  relegates  all  this  to  an 
appendix  or  a  short  chapter,  and  dilates  upon 
campaigns  and  dynastic  marriages,  is  simply  false 
to  fact.  It  is  not  true  that  England  came  to  be 
what  she  is  through  battles,  or  that  English 
institutions  are  worth  defending  because  of  op- 
position to  foreigners.  Indeed,  this  very  State 
which  needs  us  has  owed  much  to  foreign  political 
thought  and  practice. 

But  the  misreading  of  historical  fact  is  not  due 
to  the  date-and-fact  historians  only,  who  remained 
mediaeval  in  their  attitude  because  their  sources 
were  mediaeval.  It  is  due  also  to  the  limita- 
tions of  the  new  historical  school.  Custom  and 
language    cannot    be    studied    provincially.      The 


NEEDS   OF   THE   STATE  205 

language  of  England  is  what  it  is  not  simply 
because  of  our  developed  method  of  expression 
from  "  Beowulf  "  to  Meredith,  but  also  because  of 
the  matter  with  which  English  has  been  concerned. 
Now  that  English  contains  new  subjects,  covers 
a  vaster  field,  and,  in  fact,  is  a  language  and  not 
merely  a  dialect,  is  due  to  the  intimacy  of  the  in- 
terdependence between  English  and  non-English 
thinkers. 

The  history  of  English  thought  and  custom 
cannot  be  rendered  with  merely  occasional  refer- 
ences to  "  the  Continent,"  any  more  than  the 
history  of  thought  and  custom  in  York  could  be 
rendered  without  reference  to  the  developments 
which  were  taking  place  outside  York.  English 
institutions,  then,  and  English  thought  are  worth 
defending  and  developing,  not  in  spite  of  foreign- 
ers but  because  of  what  we  owe  to  foreigners. 
The  battles  of  England  have  kept  back  the  English 
State  :  the  years  of  unnoticed  and  peaceful  con- 
tact have  helped  it  to  grow.  But  these  years 
and  these  influences  passing  from  State  to  State, 
are  either  unnoticed  or  are  subordinated  to  the 
exceptional.  The  result  is  that  we  still  think  of 
the  needs  of  the  State  in  regard  to  foreign  States, 
either  in  the  terms  of  pure  opposition  or  in  the 
terms  of  occasional  and  accidental  exchange. 
Hence  the  needs  of  the  State  in  foreign  affairs 
seem  to   be   military  organisation   or,  at  best,  an 


206     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

occasional  expedition  for  inquiry  into  the  habits 
of  interesting  strangers.  And  the  acquired  atti- 
tude of  the  average  citizen  regarding  his  State 
as  a  defence  against  such  strangers  is  due,  in 
great  part,  to  the  misrepresentation  of  fact  in 
journalistic  history  and  to  the  misinterpretation 
of  comparative  values  by  the  newer  school.1 

Our  present  attitude  is  embodied  in  our  institu- 
tions. For  our  recognised  needs  with  respect  to 
foreign  States  we  have  three  great  Government 
offices  :  the  War  Office,  the  Admiralty  and  the 
Foreign  Office.  The  guiding  conception  in  all 
three  is  that  of  pure  opposition.  Of  the  War 
Office  and  the  Admiralty  that  is  obvious. 
Defence  and,  because  "  the  best  defensive  is 
an  offensive,"  also  direct  hostility,  is  the  pur- 
pose of  these  two.  Of  course  they  do  not 
exist  for  aggression.  In  no  country  are  such 
offices  for  anything  but  pure  defence  ;  and  the 
elaborate  organisation  of  armaments  is  only 
for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  our  threatened 
independence.  So  the  citizens  of  any  civilised 
country  would  say  of  their  own  War  Offices. 
But  who  is  likely  to  interfere  with  independence  ? 

1  As  far  as  one  can  gather  from  Treitschke  the  influence  of 
obsolete  history  has  been  very  great  in  limiting  the  German 
conception  of  what  has  made  Germany  worth  defending.  Ger- 
many even  more  than  England  owes  much  to  "  foreigners  "  : 
all  her  culture  is  due  to  such  interdependence  and  has  been 
obstructed  by  war. 


NEEDS   OF   THE   STATE         207 

Foreign  States.  Why  should  they  r  That  no 
one  has  been  able  to  explain,  and  therefore  it  is 
said  to  be  inevitable.  That  is  to  say,  it  is  regarded 
as  the  nature  of  a  foreign  State  to  interfere  with 
the  independence  of  our  State.  States  are  in 
opposition  inevitably  because  they  "  expand  "  or 
because  of  spheres  of  influence  and  all  the  rest 
of  that  fantastic  mythology  which  grows  out  of 
an  obsolete  conception  of  what  the  State  is.  Upon 
all  that  is  based  the  importance  of  War  Offices. 
There  is  no  Peace  Office. 

But  if  the  real  foreign  interests  of  the  State  are 
such  as  we  have  outlined  in  an  earlier  chapter, 
and  if  the  needs  of  the  State  are  to  be  judged  by 
reference  to  them,  there  is  no  reason  why  there 
should  not  be  a  Peace  Office.  Only  tradition 
is  against  it,  and  only  obsolete  conceptions  prevent 
us  seeing  that  the  needs  of  a  modern  civilised 
State  in  foreign  affairs  are  such  that  deliberate 
and  official  maintenance  or  development  of  inter- 
change should  not  be  left  to  private  enterprise. 
At  present  war  is  officially  prepared  for  and 
carried  on  :  peace  is  not  public  business.1  It 
may  be  said  that  peace,  being  normal,  may  be 
left   to   take    care    of    itself,  or    at   least   without 

1  Another  sign  of  the  same  attitude  is  in  the  training  of 
princes.  Machiavelli  {Principe,  Ch.  XIV)  says  that  "  War  is 
the  only  profession  worthy  of  a  prince,"  and  even  in  the 
twentieth  century  who  ever  heard  of  a  prince  being  trained  as 
an  economist  or  engineer  ? 


208     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

official  maintenance  by  a  Government  Office. 
But,  in  the  first  place,  that  plan  has  been  tried  and 
has  failed  ;  and  secondly,  if  prevention  is  better 
than  cure,  and  it  is  better  worth  while  to  preserve 
health  than  to  cure  disease,  surely  the  official  and 
organised  development  of  the  interdependence  of 
States  should  begin. 

The  Foreign  Office,  however,  it  may  be  said, 
does  not  exist  merely  for  opposition.  It  is  in 
fact  the  source  of  our  official  alliances,  and  is 
continually  in  communication  with  other  Govern- 
ments. It  may  be  said  to  take  a  less  hostile 
view  of  foreign  States  than  is  usual  in  the  War 
Office  and  Admiralty.  But,  we  must  observe, 
even  the  War  Office  and  Admiralty  have  no 
objection  to  alliances.  In  fact,  apparently  without 
any  governmental  sanction,  our  War  Office  went 
so  far  a  few  years  ago  as  to  secure  our  entente 
with  France  by  military  agreements  ;  and,  indeed, 
the  War  Office  has  always  developed  alliances — 
with  a  view  to  possible  conflict. 

The  Admiralty  is  of  a  more  independent  turn 
of  mind  ;  but  the  Admiralty  also  counts  upon 
certain  friendliness  on  the  part  of  some  nations 
when  ships  are  being  counted  against  Germany. 
The  interest  in  alliances  is  not  peculiar  to  the 
Foreign  Office,  it  may  co-exist  with  the  obsolete 
view  of  foreign  relations.  And,  further,  the 
Foreign  Office  is  very  closely  in  contact  with  the 


NEEDS   OF   THE   STATE  209 

War  Office  and  Admiralty,  more  closely  in  fact 
than  it  is  even  with  the  Cabinet.  Whether  the 
Fleet  is  ready  has  often  made  a  difference  to  the 
manner  of  the  Foreign  Office  :  so  that  a  cynic 
might  be  inclined  to  say  that  the  Foreign  Offices 
in  every  civilised  State  are  mere  departments  of 
the  War  Offices. 

It  is  true,  nevertheless,  that  the  Foreign  Office 
and  the  Diplomatic  and  Consular  Service  do 
develop  the  interdependence  of  States  in  time 
of  peace.  In  so  far  as  this  is  so  the  Foreign 
Office  may  be  our  future  Peace  Office  ;  but,  as 
we  have  seen,  its  interests  are  certainly  not  yet 
confined  to  the  maintenance  of  peace,  and  much 
of  its  usefulness  in  this  direction  is  hampered  by 
the  tradition  of  diplomacy  which  it  represents. 
It  is  saturated  with  that  false  history  of  the  State 
of  which  we  have  already  spoken,  and  even  with 
the  best  will  in  the  world  its  present  organisation 
is  not  likely  to  embody  any  definite  peace  policy. 

The  conclusion  is  inevitable.  There  is  no 
official  organisation  for  the  maintenance  or  de- 
velopment of  those  interests  of  the  State  which 
are  not  based  upon  mere  opposition  to  other 
States.  The  reason  is  the  current  and  obsolete 
conception  of  the  State  and  its  needs. 

But  what,  in  positive  terms,  are  the  needs  of 
the  State  ?  We  may  learn  in  part  from  a  truer 
conception  of  the  past.  The  wealth  and  well- 
p 


210    THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

being,  the  moral  and  intellectual  life  of  the  Eng- 
lish have  grown  in  continuous  interchange  with 
foreigners  ;  and  if  such  are  the  needs  of  the 
State  with  respect  to  other  States,  the  first  neces- 
sity is  a  new  conception  of  foreign  policy.  And 
that  this  may  be  permanent,  a  new  institution  will 
have  to  be  established  or  an  old  one  absolutely 
transformed. 

But  the  more  fundamental  need  is,  of  course, 
a  change  of  attitude  among  the  citizens.  A  mere 
institution  will  be  valueless  unless  it  is  the  result 
of  a  new  sentiment  ;  and  the  sentiment  will  have 
to  be  very  much  more  widespread  and  powerful 
than  it  is  before  it  gives  birth  to  an  institution. 
Such  a  sentiment  must  first  transform  the  relation 
of  the  citizens  to  the  institutions  under  which 
they  live.  They  must  feel  in  some  new  way  the 
needs  of  the  State  or  their  own  need  of  a  State. 

We  can,  however,  be  more  precise  still  as  to 
the  change  of  attitude.  Sometimes  the  democratic 
control  of  foreign  policy  is  said  to  be  the  solution 
of  our  present  difficulties.  The  people  in  every 
group  are  said  to  be  likely  to  arrange  difficulties 
more  amicably  than  the  diplomatists  :  at  any  rate 
we  may  accept  completely  the  statements  that 
"  the  people  "  are  likely  to  recognise  the  incon- 
veniences of  war  more  than  the  diplomatists. 
For  these  few  may  have  to  do  without  their 
footmen,  but  the  people  do  without  bread  ;  and 


/ 


NEEDS   OF   THE    STATE  211 

one  is  more  likely  to  be  careful  about  a  possible 
lack  of  food  than  about  a  mere  deficiency  in 
domestic  service. 

But  the  democratic  control  of  foreign  policy 
will  be  as  futile  as  any  other  if  the  people  accept 
the  old  conception  of  the  State.  That  conception 
will  certainly  be  put  before  them  as  soon  as  they 
are  able  to  exercise  any  real  power,  as  soon  as 
they  show  any  interest  at  all,  in  foreign  policy. 
Wiseacres  are  always  ready  to  tell  the  people  the 
thoughts  of  their  grandfathers  ;  and,  as  to  being 
believed,  the  proportion  of  fools  among  "  the 
people "  is  probably  not  lower  than  among  the 
"  upper  "  classes.  But  changes  have  been  made 
before  in  the  accepted  beliefs,  and  perhaps  a 
change  may  yet  be  made  in  the  conception  which 
the  average  citizen  has  of  his  own  State. 

This  fundamental  change  of  attitude  is  occurring. 
Men  feel  themselves  bound  together  in  the  State 
by  other  than  economic  or  legal  bonds.  They 
rise  with  at  least  a  momentary  enthusiasm  in 
every  country  to  the  cry  "  Your  country  needs 
you."  Differences  are  for  the  moment  sunk  : 
private  or  clique  interests  are  for  the  moment 
subordinated  to  the  general  good,  and  that  not 
for  pay  or  what  any  one  may  make  out  of  it,  nor 
because  of  any  legal  contract  between  citizens. 

The  bond  is  clearly  emotional.  Our  fellow 
citizens  are  regarded  as  living  men  and  women, 


212     THE   MORALITY    OF  NATIONS 

not  as  machines  or  as  types.  Less  is  said  about 
"  the  working  man  "  of  drawing-room  fiction  or 
of  the  "wicked  capitalist"  of  popular  rhetoric; 
and  all  are  recognised  as  human.  The  State, 
then,  is  an  institution  which  lives  in  the  conscious 
emotion  of  its  citizens  :  it  is  not  an  economic  nor 
a  legal  union. 

But  this  means  that  we  are  recovering  from 
one  of  the  chief  deficiencies  in  the  representative 
system  of  government.  The  vast  size  of  modern 
States  has  had  the  effect,  first,  of  producing  an 
extreme  of  delegated  power,  and,  secondly,  an 
extreme  lack  of  interest  among  the  great  body  of 
citizens.  The  delegation  of  power  meant  the 
dehumanising  of  state-functions.  The  imagina- 
tion was  not  able  to  grasp  the  common  interests 
of  the  vaster  groups  as  it  could  when,  for  example, 
in  Athens  every  citizen  knew  every  other  and 
soon  heard  from  his  neighbour  of  the  effects  upon 
this  neighbour  of  any  new  law.1  Now  we  cry  to 
one  another  across  the  chasm  of  vastness  which 
is  not  at  all  bridged  by  the  institutions  which  are 
supposed  to  hold  us  together. 

The  situation,  however,  is  being  transformed. 
The   mechanical  inventions  which  have   made   it 

1  Aristotle  was  perfectly  right  in  the  purpose  for  which  he 
suggested  a  limitation  in  the  number  of  citizens,  although  we 
may  yet  attain  that  purpose  without  such  limiting.  He  knew 
that  citizens  must  be  persons  to  one  another,  not  mere  units 
or  machines. 


NEEDS    OF   THE   STATE  213 

possible  for  such  vast  States  to  exist  may  yet,  by 
giving  us  rapid  and  widespread  communication, 
enable  us  to  master  the  machine  of  government, 
and  to  humanise  the  relation  of  men  by  bringing 
them  more  closely  into  contact.  Even  in  normal 
times  there  is  really  a  closer  contact  between  the 
inhabitants  of  vast  Empires  now  than  there  was 
in  the  much  smaller  States  of  Renaissance  Europe. 
And,  next,  the  crisis  of  war  has  awakened  interest 
in  the  common  affairs  of  the  group  among  the 
mass  of  citizens.  The  vastness  of  the  issues,  or 
the  remoteness  of  their  connection  with  one's 
food  and  clothing  in  times  of  peace,  led  us  to 
give  more  and  more  the  judgment  and  the  action 
into  the  hands  of  a  few  specialists  who  would 
represent  and  look  after  our  interests.  But  the 
crisis  has  taught  many  that  a  mistake  in  diplomatic 
policy  may  directly  affect  one's  food.  The  result 
is  that  the  action  of  the  State,  its  interests,  honour 
and  obligations,  are  now  felt  to  be  a  subject 
for  every  citizen's  immediate  and  continuous  dis- 
cussion. We  put  out  our  hands  to  master  the 
machine  we  have  created  and  have  allowed  to  run 
its  course  until  it  came  near  to  the  precipice. 
Now  no  plea  of  inevitableness  or  necessity  will 
prevent  our  feeling  that  the  human  needs  are 
supreme  over  the  existence  of  the  mere  institution. 
The  immense  increase  in  intellectual  power  and 
the  mastery  over  Nature  has  often  been  referred 


2i4     THE    MORALITY   OF    NATIONS 

to,  as  it  is  to  be  seen  either  in  the  modern  loco- 
motive or  spinning-machine,  or  in  the  exquisitely 
constructed  shells  which  destroy  so  effectively. 
But  forces  of  another  kind  have  also  increased. 
The  banding  together  of  great  numbers  in  cities 
and  States  has  given  us  social  force  so  great  that 
the  group-force  of  Athens  or  Rome,  or  even 
Revolutionary  Paris,  becomes  trifling  by  com- 
parison. The  moving  together  of  the  vast  armies 
of  the  last  few  months  is  but  a  sign  of  the  amount 
of  social  force  which  can  now  be  directed  to  the 
supply  of  certain  needs.  It  is  true  that  one 
cannot  imagine  yet  the  raising  of  such  an  army 
for  any  purpose  but  conflict  :  and  yet  abstractly 
it  is  possible  that  we  could  now  mass  millions 
of  men  together  for  the  destruction  of  hideous 
slums,  for  the  building  of  cities,  or  the  conquest 
of  disease.  The  mastery  of  natural  forces  has  led 
to  the  possibility  of  immense  social  force  ;  and  so 
far  this  immense  force  has  been  used  either  for 
private  manufacture  or  for  public  slaughter.  But 
the  force  is  there,  and  that  is  something.  The 
human  bond  between  us  in  England  and  the  army 
in  France  is  stronger  than  that  which  existed 
between  the  army  at  Crecy  and  the  England  of 
their  day.  Communication  and  rapid  transit  keep 
the  more  numerous  group  closer  together  than 
the  less  numerous  could  manage  to  be.  But  it  is 
not  altogether  due  to  the  mechanical  contrivances. 


NEEDS   OF    THE   STATE  215 

The  emotional  crisis  is  at  least  one  cause  of  the 
common  interest  being  perceived  and  the  human 
relationship  therefore  being  established.  There 
has  been  no  such  human  relationship  between  the 
user  of  coal  and  the  coal-miner.  The  common 
needs  are  only  felt  in  their  crudest  form. 

But  felt  needs,  however  crude,  based  upon  a 
human  and  not  a  merely  mechanical  relationship, 
will  produce  naturally  a  new  sense  of  social 
responsibility.  First,  we  shall  have,  perhaps,  an 
end  of  the  nonsense  which  pretends  that  the 
morality  of  individuals  cannot  govern  the  rela- 
tionship of  States.  That  was  all  based  upon 
the  mythological  and  mechanical-legal  State  of 
philosophic  fiction.  When  the  relationships  are 
humanised  it  will  be  clear  that  morality  holds 
good  and  is  of  fundamentally  the  same  nature, 
whether  between  individuals  of  the  same  insti- 
tution or  of  different  institutions.  Savages  have 
been  said  by  travellers  to  be  immoral,  on  the 
ground  that  they  kill  or  steal  :  but  scholars  now 
maintain  that  the  lowest  savage  feels  the  incon- 
venience of  stealing  from  men  of  his  own  group. 
Outside  the  group,  of  course,  no  such  bond  is 
recognised.  The  old  philosophy  of  the  non- 
morality  of  the  State  was  a  learned  excuse  for 
the  savage  attitude.  In  place  of  this  we  begin 
to  feel  that  a  man  should  have  as  high  a  moral 
code  when  acting  in  behalf  of   his  group  as  he 


216     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

should "  have  in  acting  for  his  own  interests. 
We  do  not  excuse  a  man  for  lying,  cheating  or 
murdering  if  he  says  that  after  all  he  did  not  do 
it  for  himself  but  for  his  wife  and  family.  Why 
should  we  excuse  him  if  he  says  he  did  it  for 
his  second  cousins  twice  removed,  which  he  calls 
his  country  ? 

The  attitude  of  officials,  however,  can  only  be 
transformed  by  the  transformation  of  the  attitude 
of  the  greater  number  in  the  group.  The  change 
must  come  from  the  citizens  before  it  is  effective 
with  their  representatives.  The  majority  must 
be  able  to  feel,  however  dimly,  that  they  should 
not  benefit  by  the  actions  which  they  would  be 
ashamed  to  do  in  their  own  interests.  They 
must  object  to  lying,  cheating  or  murdering  by 
their  representatives,  even  if  they  get  something 
out  of  it.  And  before  this  comes  about,  the 
tendency  to  say  "  it  is  no  business  of  ours  " 
must  be  corrected.  State-morality  is  of  the  same 
kind  as  the  group-morality  of  trading-companies 
or  dividend-making.  But  there  are  very  few  who 
do  not  turn  their  eyes  away  from  the  sources  of 
their  wealth.  Not  merely  "  wicked  capitalists," 
but  great  numbers  who  do  not  get  dividends, 
maintain  a  system,  by  conscious  blindness, 
which  reduces  all  human  relationship  to  merely 
mechanical  arrangement,  which  depends  upon  the 
transformation  of  great  numbers  of  men  into  tools. 


NEEDS    OF   THE   STATE  217 

This  is  all  part  of  the  same  issue,  but  we 
must  restrict  our  reference  to  the  responsibility 
of  the  citizens  for  the  actions  done  by  others 
for  their  interests,  honour  or  obligations.  Not 
merely  should  the  ultimate  power  be  in  the 
hands  and  the  full  information  be  in  the  minds 
of  greater  numbers,  but  the  nature  of  the  things 
done  by  this  greater  number  or  in  their  name 
must  be  governed  by  the  ordinary  rules  of 
morality.  We  see  no  reason  why  the  citizens 
should  not  definitely  object  to  the  lying,  cheating 
and  spying  system,  which  is  normally  carried  on 
by  all  civilised  States  in  the  Secret  Service,  for 
the  purposes,  of  course,  of  self-defence.  We 
need  say  nothing  of  the  normal  purposes  of 
diplomacy  or  of  the  "  Statesmanship  "  which 
keeps  a  national  obligation  secret  from  the  people 
whom  it  is  destined  to  bind  until  an  emotional 
crisis  makes  it  certain  that  no  one  will  be  able 
to  object  to  bearing  the  obligation.  All  that 
has  yet  to  be  brought  to  reasonable  limits  :  but 
we  must  begin  with  the  crudest  examples  of  the 
immorality  which  is  practised  in  the  interest  of 
citizens.  Spying  is  an  example.  It  is  not 
accounted  honourable  for  a  man  to  go  in  dis- 
guise into  a  neighbour's  house  in  order  to 
discover  the  weak  points  in  his  family  affairs  : 
but  for  every  civilised  State  this  is  done.  And 
it   is  said  that  we  have   to  use  the  weapons  of 


218     THE    MORALITY    OF   NATIONS 

our  adversaries  to  secure  ourselves  from  their  pre- 
datory intentions.  It  is  not,  however,  regarded 
as  moral  to  cheat  your  grocer  because  you  suspect 
that  he  has  cheated  or  may  cheat  you.  And  in 
social  morality  one  would  not  allow  the  repre- 
sentative of  one's  family  to  lie  systematically  to 
neighbours  in  the  interest  of  the  family.  How 
far  the  average  man  would  go  in  preventing 
immorality  from  which  he  might  benefit  we 
cannot  tell.  Not  long  ago  a  certain  company 
manufactured  machines  according  to  their  rivals' 
pattern,  so  constructed  that  these  imitations 
would  break  down.  The  consequence  was  that 
the  rival  machine  soon  had  the  reputation  for 
breaking  down  ;  and  the  company  which  so 
skilfully  and  indirectly  advertised  gained  great 
wealth.  But  we  never  heard  of  any  of  the 
actual  gainers  protesting  against  this  method. 
In  State  affairs  we  do  not  think  there  was 
any  German  protest  against  the  violation  of 
Belgian  neutrality  :  there  was  practically  no 
Belgian  protest  against  the  government  of  the 
Congo  in  its  worst  days.  And  in  no  civilised 
State  is  there  yet  any  combined  or  forcible 
protest  against  immoral  official  actions  which 
either  we  will  not  look  at,  or  which  we  see  and 
see  only  in  their  good  results  for  ourselves. 
Examples    would   cut   too    closely   in    a   time   of 


NEEDS   OF   THE   STATE  219 

difficulty  and   crisis.     We    may  leave    them    for 
the  reader  to  find. 

The  State,  then,  needs  in  normal  times  an 
organised  and  official  maintenance  and  develop- 
ment of  the  inter-relation  with  other  States, 
based  upon  a  new  conception  of  the  nature  of 
States.  And  it  needs  most  of  all  the  establish- 
ment and  consistent  maintenance  of  a  moral 
attitude  by  its  representatives  and  an  increased 
moral  responsibility  in  all  its  citizens. 


CHAPTER   XII 

THE    COMITY    OF    NATIONS 

Owing  to  the  necessity  for  an  atmosphere  of 
mutual  trust  in  times  of  peace,  for  the  interchange 
of  ideas  or  of  trade,  the  problem  arises  as  to  the 
new  moral  attitude  of  modern  States  :  and  owing 
to  the  insecurity  of  conventions  in  times  of  war 
the  problem  arises  as  to  the  possibility  of  main- 
taining moral  relations  in  the  face  of  possible 
defiance  by  one  group  of  principles  recognised 
by  other  groups.  We  pass  then  from  what  the 
citizen  thinks  of  his  own  State  to  what  he  thinks 
of  other  States. 

It  must  be  noticed,  to  begin  with,  that  moral 
restrictions  to  physical  force  are  more  and  not 
less  insecure  as  States  become  larger,  since  it  is 
more  and  more  difficult,  so  powerful  is  the  in- 
stitutional machine,  for  the  citizen  even  to  know 
what  is  being  done  in  his  name.  Governments 
have  a  very  great  power  over  the  information 
supplied,  and,  in  proportion  as  the  average  man 
is  far  removed  from  the  actors  in  any  great 
affair,  in  that  proportion  he  is  unwilling  to  adopt 

aao 


THE   COMITY   OF   NATIONS       221 

responsibility.  So  that  the  very  complexity  of 
modern  world-politics  might  induce  the  average 
citizen  not  to  think  of  other  States  at  all  except 
in  times  of  crisis,  or  to  leave  the  management 
of  state-relationship  entirely  in  the  hands  of  a 
few.  This  might  involve  the  impossibility  of 
securing  a  moral  relationship  between  States,  in 
so  far  as  citizens  will  not  extend  their  moral 
imagination  to  cover  the  action  of  other  States 
than  their  own. 

There  are  indications,  however,  that  States 
have  been  prepared  to  act  together  on  moral 
issues.  We  may  take  as  an  example  of  this, 
first,  the  so-called  Concert  of  Europe.  The 
historical  facts  with  regard  to  this  phrase  are 
well  known.  It  is  said  to  have  been  invented 
at  a  time  when  established  Governments  feared 
the  destructive  power  of  the  French  Revolution. 
There  was  then  an  idea  that  Governments  should 
act  together  in  suppressing  what  was  believed  to 
be  the  fundamental  immorality  of  the  Revolu- 
tionaries. But  the  idea  of  concerted  action 
disappeared  before  the  sinister  diplomacy  of 
Napoleon.  Each  State  fought  for  itself,  at  least 
for  a  time.  In  1 8 1 5  the  Congress  of  Vienna 
again  expressed  a  tendency  towards  concerted 
action  on  certain  generally  accepted  principles. 
The  next  step  was  taken  in  the  Holy  Alliance, 
to  which  England  found  it  impossible  to  adhere, 


222      THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

since  the  principles  upon  which  concerted  action 
was  to  be  based  were  practically  those  of  dynastic 
despotism  if  not  those  of  theocracy. 

Until  about  1840  nearly  all  concerted  action 
among  the  European  States  was  more  or  less 
definitely  aimed  at  France  :  for  France  was  the 
embodiment  of  militarism.1  From  that  date,  how- 
ever, the  phrase  u  Concert  of  Europe  "  always 
connoted  action  with  reference  to  south-eastern 
Europe  : 2  and  from  that  date  onwards  there  was 
the  beginning  of  recognition  by  Governments  of 
the  existence  of  nationality.  A  new  principle, 
not  that  of  theocracy,  was  becoming  a  basis  for 
common  action. 

Greece  had  been  established  as  a  State  in  1827.3 
In  1 86 1  Roumania  became  partly  independent  of 
Turkey,  in  1862  Servia ;  in  1875  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina  revolted  against  Turkey.  England 
had  been  committed  by  Disraeli  to  opposition 
during  these  years  against  the  principle  of  nation- 
ality, because  of  the  supposed  English  need  of 
supporting  Turkey.     But  at  last  even  England, 

1  By  militarism  I  mean  the  subordination  of  all  the  youthful 
energies  of  the  State  to  action  for  physical  attack  and  defence. 

2  For  the  change  of  attitude  see  Chapter  I  in  The  European 
Concert  in  the  Eastern  Question,  by  T.  E.  Holland.  Superviison 
in  the  near  East  has  been  "  systematically  exercised  since 
1856." 

3  Cf.  Holland  (Joe.  cit.,  Ch.  II).  Greece  was  only  recognised 
as  a  State  in  1830,  though  the  battle  of  Navarino  practically 
gave  her  independence. 


THE   COMITY   OF   NATIONS       223 

in  1877,  signed  a  protocol  in  agreement  with 
the  other  Powers  of  the  European  Concert,1 
warning  Turkey  of  the  general  interest  in  "  the 
well-being  of  the  Christian  populations."  Turkey 
was  disdainful  and  Russia  declared  war.  The 
Congress  of  Powers  at  Berlin  (July  1878)  estab- 
lished Bulgaria,  and  freed  Servia  and  Roumania 
from  tribute  to  Turkey.2  The  Powers  seemed 
to  be  united  in  principle.  But  in  spite  of  Con- 
ferences of  the  Powers  in  1880  and  1881,  the 
Turks  did  what  they  pleased.  In  1897  British 
and  French  warships  in  the  name  of  European 
principle  bombarded  Christian  villages  in  Crete 
to  support  the  Turks  :  but  they  intervened  in 
May  of  that  year  to  save  Greece.  Massacres  in 
1896  and  1897  were  left  unpunished  by  the 
Powers,  but  each  Power  sought  to  invoke 
common  principle  as  a  cover  for  private  gain. 

What  is  of  interest  here  is  not  the  actual 
ineffectiveness  of  the  European  Concert.  It  pro- 
posed much  and  did  little.     The   performers  of 

1  The  signatories  were  Great  Britain,  Germany,  Austria, 
France,  Italy,  Russia  and  Turkey.      Cf.  Holland,  p.  277. 

2  At  this  date  there  are  counted  six  Great  Powers  acting 
together.  The  Russian  diplomacy  compares  well  throughout 
these  years  with  that  of  Lord  Beaconsfield.  No  principle  seems 
to  have  guided  the  latter  except  an  extended  selfishness  :  and 
he  all  but  wrecked  even  the  little  the  European  Concert  could 
do.  In  spite  of  him,  however,  the  Great  Powers  held  together 
at  least  in  principle.  His  most  immoral  act  in  our  behalf  took 
place  in  1878,  in  the  Cyprus  Convention. 


224     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

the  Concert  had  each  an  axe  to  grind,  and  an 
axe  is  an  unmusical  instrument.  The  result  was 
discord.  But  the  vague  feeling  remained  that 
civilised  States  could  act  together  on  certain 
general  principles,  without  alliance  and  without 
the  stimulus  of  war  directed  against  themselves. 
The  inherited  immorality  of  Renaissance  diplo- 
macy prevented  any  common  principle  being 
established;  and  common  action  was  never  done 
for  an  unselfish  end.  But  the  growth  of  social 
morality  was  transforming  even  the  Concert  of 
Europe  and  sickening  even  diplomatists  with  the 
extended  egoism  of  "  foreign  "  policy. 

Such  feelings  had  a  still  more  interesting  embodi- 
ment in  the  Hague  Conference  of  1899.  At  that 
first  Conference  twenty-six  different  States  were 
represented  and  the  Concert  of  Europe  was  seen 
to  be  transformed  into  a  Council  of  the  World. 
At  the  Conference  in  1907  forty-four  different 
States  were  represented.  A  Tribunal  was  estab- 
lished by  sixteen  Powers  at  the  Hague  in  July 
1899;  at  which  representatives  of  forty-four 
nations  are  entitled  to  sit.  At  this  court  since 
1902  about  twelve  cases  have  been  decided,  which 
in  former  days  might  easily  have  been  reasons  for 
warfare. 

A  further  example  of  the  same  tendency  to 
concerted  action  upon  agreed  principles  may  be 
seen    in   the   Partition   of   Africa.     Division   had 


THE   COMITY   OF   NATIONS       225 

begun  by  the  entry  of  France  into  Tunis  and 
the  military  occupation  of  Egypt  in  1882  by  the 
British.  German  East  Africa  was  established  in 
1884.  An  agreement  was  signed  between  Great 
Britain  and  Germany  in  November  1886,  followed 
by  minor  agreements  and  the  greatest  in  1890. 
Bismarck  had  by  this  time  lost  power  and  was 
not  able  to  engineer  anti-English  feeling  in 
Germany.  By  the  1890  agreement  Germany 
received  Heligoland  and  Great  Britain  the  Zan- 
zibar Protectorate  :  but  most  important  for  our 
present  argument  was  the  settlement  of  frontier 
disputes,  especially  as  regards  Uganda.  With 
France  we  signed  agreements  in  1898  and  1904  : 
and  the  whole  situation  has  shown  the  possibility 
of  peaceful  arrangements  between  those  who  might 
have  been  led  into  war,  if  the  danger  had  not  been 
foreseen  and  avoided. 

The  French,  Portuguese  and  Italians  have  large 
amounts  of  African  land  under  their  control,  and, 
whatever  may  be  said  of  the  exploiting  of  natives, 
at  least  there  has  been  very  little  bloodshed  of  the 
official  and  traditional  kind.  It  has  been  remarked 
that  the  gain  is  immense  if  we  compare  this 
method  with  the  long-continued  contest  in  the 
Partition  of  America.  For,  in  effect,  civilised 
States  foresaw  the  possibilities  of  future  conflict 
in  Africa  and  avoided  at  least  one  cause  of  conflict 
by  agreeing  upon  boundaries  without  fighting  to 
8 


226      THE    MORALITY    OF   NATIONS 

discover  where  they  should  be.  The  result  was 
such  as  this  :  the  British  in  East  Africa  actually 
were  lent  a  steamer  and  arms  by  the  Germans 
in  order  to  suppress  marauding  tribes,  and  the 
Germans  received  help  from  the  British.1 

Such  events  have  led  some  to  suppose  that 
there  might  be  continuous  concerted  action  be- 
tween civilised  States  on  certain  general  principles. 
It  is  imagined  that  there  might  even  be  a  sort  of 
international  police  force,  to  do  for  criminal  States 
what  the  policeman  does  for  the  private  criminal. 
It  is  said  that  International  Law,  and  perhaps  even 
international  morality,  needs  a  "  sanction,"  and 
clearly  no  sanction  is  possible  until  delinquent 
States  can  be  punished.  Undoubtedly  such  a 
force  would  be  desirable.  But  law  is  not  based 
upon  force.     Law  gives  force  its  direction. 

Even  within  every  State  law  is  not  dependent 
upon  force,  but  force  upon  law.  For  although 
force  may  be  required  to  coerce  criminals,  it  is  not 
so  required  in  order  to  make  the  majority  "  keep 
the  law."  Law  is  dependent  for  its  effectiveness 
much  more  upon  acquired  habit  than  upon  force  ; 
and  in  fact  this  acquired  habit  is  such  that  it  never 
enters  the  head  of  the  ordinary  man  that  he  might 
steal  or  murder.  This  habit  is  itself  based  upon 
a  kind  of  half-reasoned  sentiment  which  is  the 
very  life-blood  of  civilised  society.  But  if  this  is 
1  Especially  in  the  revolt  of  natives  in  1888. 


THE   COMITY   OF   NATIONS       227 

so  within  the  State,  the  same  must  be  the  situation 
as  between  citizens  of  different  States.  Force  may- 
come  after  to  maintain  the  law,  law  may  come 
after  to  express  the  habit,  but  the  half-reasoned 
sentiment  must  come  first.  For  some  time  before 
it  becomes  fixed  in  a  habitual  attitude  or  group  of 
actions  this  sentiment  may  be  fitful  and  insecure  ; 
but  it  is  already  in  existence  among  the  few,  and 
it  may  spread  not  only  in  spite  of  war  but  even 
through  war.  It  is  the  natural  result  of  human 
contact,  and  war  has  brought  great  numbers 
together,  even  in  opposition,  who  could  not  have 
met  "foreigners  "  in  our  clumsily  arranged  peace. 

The  half-reasoned  sentiment  is  one  of  funda- 
mental trust  in  citizens  of  other  States,  and  as  a 
confirmed  attitude  it  may  be  the  real  force  in  that 
international  courtesy  which  goes  beyond  mere 
law  and  even  beyond  the  strict  conceptions  of 
national  duty. 

But  this  true  Comity  of  Nations  can  only  be 
established  upon  a  basis  of  acquired  habit  among 
the  inhabitants  of  different  civilised  groups — a 
habit  of  thought  and  action  which  would  simply 
make  the  relationship  human  across  the  frontiers 
of  States,  and  might  not  even  imply  a  continual 
interchange  of  views  and  goods.  It  is  a  matter  of 
attitude,  or  the  establishment  of  a  hypothesis 
which  might  perhaps  underlie  all  the  superficial 
economic    or    political    interchange.       For    even 


228     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

within  our  vast  States  of  modern  times  the  actual 
interchange  between  citizens  is  not  in  fact  very- 
great  ;  but  the  hypothesis  governs  all  our  actions 
that,  whenever  there  is  need,  this  basal  human 
relationship  is  there  to  be  depended  upon.  So 
even  in  our  great  modern  cities  one  never  knows 
many  of  the  people  living  in  the  same  street  ;  but 
an  attitude  of  mind  in  all  the  inhabitants  is 
established,  so  that  we  do  not  expect  to  be  stabbed 
in  the  back  by  our  neighbour.  One  may  never 
have  said  a  word  to  the  inhabitant  of  the  house 
next  door,  but  our  hypothesis  of  civilised  life 
makes  us  all  act  as  though  a  human  relationship 
were  there  all  the  time.1  So  also  with  nations, 
there  may  be  no  need  of  actual  contact  with 
foreign  races,  when  we  have  at  last  discovered  we 
have  nothing  to  fear  from  them,  in  order  that  we 
shall  feel  how  absolutely  we  can  depend  upon  the 
human  relationship  surviving  all  the  conflicts  of 
State  interests,  all  the  governmental  quarrels  and 
all  the  financially  engineered  panics. 

We  seem  to  speak  of  Utopia  when  such  an 
attitude    is    explained.       Idealists    sigh    for    the 

1  The  human  relationship  to  be  relied  on  comes  out,  of 
course,  chiefly  in  common  danger  or  in  sympathy,  as  when 
our  neighbour's  house  is  on  fire.  So  among  nations  an  earth- 
quake in  a  foreign  land  soon  proves  the  existence  of  a  human 
relationship.  In  such  moments  the  mere  governmental  insti- 
tutions are  subordinated  and  yet  not  neglected  ;  but  to  make 
such  subordination  more  permanent  should  not  be  very  difficult. 


THE   COMITY    OF   NATIONS      229 

Comity  of  Nations.  But  it  is  already  in  existence. 
It  is  only  the  Comity  of  States  which  seems  im- 
possible :  for  distinct  nationality  is  no  bar  to 
comity.  In  the  United  States,  for  example,  Ger- 
mans and  English  and  Turks  and  Greeks  and 
Russians  and  Austrians  find  it  possible  to  enter 
into  moral  relationship  despite  diversity  of  race.1 
In  Canada  French-born  citizens  are  friendly  with 
English  ;  and  now,  in  this  war,  even  Indians 
appear  to  have  entered  into  an  emotional  comity 
with  Englishmen.  It  is  not  race,  language  or 
tradition  which  is  a  bar  to  comity  ;  not  religion, 
education  or  trade,  but  only  one  institution — the 
State.  We  have  already  shown  what  fantastic 
ideas  concerning  the  State  are  generally  current, 
and  perhaps  the  impossibility  of  a  comity  between 
Governments  is  due  in  part  to  the  false  ideas  upon 
which  Governments  live.  But  when  we  have 
destroyed  even  the  absolutism  and  isolation  of 
the  theoretical  State,  there  may  still  remain  the 
idea  that  the  State  must,  sooner  or  later,  declare 
war. 

It  is  worth  while  to  ask  whether  this  is  essential 
to  the  State  or  only  a  transitory  effect  of  past 
history,  or  perhaps  only  the  result  of  a  false  idea 

1  In  the  War  of  Greece  against  Turkey  (191  3),  Greeks  and 
Turks  who  had  been  working  together  in  the  United  States 
returned  to  Europe  in  the  same  ships  ;  and  on  landing,  Greeks 
at  Athens  and  Turks  at  Constantinople,  marched  to  fight  one 
another. 


23o     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

as  to  what  the  State  is.  At  first  sight  it  is  strange 
that  only  one  institution  among  all  should  find  it 
impossible  to  decide  some  of  its  disputes  with 
other  institutions  of  the  same  kind  upon  moral 
grounds.  These  institutions  only  are  still  reduced 
to  physical  conflict. 

It  is  not  simply  because  the  moral  criteria  by 
which  we  may  decide  how  conflicting  interests 
ought  to  be  arranged  are  not  clear.  It  is  not 
necessary  to  fight,  if  we  cannot  decide  the  justice 
of  a  case.  The  moral  criteria,  for  example,  are 
by  no  means  clear  when  there  is  a  conflict 
of  interest  between  a  capitalist  company  and  a 
trade  union  ;  but  we  have  not  yet  adopted  the 
"  appeal  to  arms "  for  such  a  dispute.1  Even 
if  no  decision  can  be  reached  and  no  power  above 
each  is  able  to  enforce  a  decision,  we  do  not  so 
far  find  it  necessary  to  "  declare  war."  Nor  do 
we  any  longer  "  declare  war "  because  another 
group  of  men  and  women  differs  from  us  in 
religion.     We  see  that  religious  institutions  may 

1  There  may  be  revolutionaries  who  really  mean  what  the 
phrase  class-war  seems  to  mean  ;  and,  I  confess,  I  see  no 
logical  objection  to  physical  conflict  of  other  institutions  if  the 
physical  conflict  of  States  is  regarded  as  reasonable.  It  is  sup- 
posed that  killing  in  war  is  not  the  act  of  the  individual  ;  but 
it  would  not  be  the  act  of  the  individual  if  his  trade  union 
directed  him  to  kill.  This  is  not  abstract  speculation.  A 
capitalist  company  in  West  Virginia  has  actually  directed  its 
officers  to  shoot  down  strikers,  and  it  was  done.  Not  the 
State,  as  in  England,  but  another  institution  has  used  arms. 


THE   COMITY   OF   NATIONS       231 

arrange  differences  without  an  appeal  even  to  the 
God  of  battles.  We  do  not  fight  if  universities 
disagree,  or  scientific  or  artistic  societies.  All 
other  institutions  arrange  their  differences  upon 
some  plan  which  omits  even  the  possibility  of 
war ;  and  no  other  institution  arms  its  members  in 
case  of  aggression  by  other  like  institutions — but 
the  State  only  is  armed  and  "  appeals  "  to  arms. 
This  is  fact,  and  it  is  useless  to  say  that  the  State 
ought  not  to  go  to  war.  The  first  need  is  to 
discover  why  it  does  go  to  war,  even  occasionally. 
And  this  is  in  part  due  to  what  the  average 
citizen  thinks  of  other  States  :  for  he  is  not  armed 
because  of  the  nature  of  his  State,  but  because  of 
what  he  believes  to  be  the  nature  of  some  other. 

The  obstacles  to  the  establishment  of  a  new 
moral  attitude  across  the  boundaries  of  States  are 
chiefly  in  the  imagination.  Here  also  we  are 
hampered  by  inherited  superstitions,  which  may 
once  have  represented  facts,  but  do  so  no  longer. 
The  reason  why  the  State  "  must  appeal  to  arms  " 
is  not  because  of  the  lack  of  a  superior  power, 
nor  because  of  "  natural  expansion,"  but  simply 
because  of  what  "that  other"  State  is  commonly 
supposed  to  be  :  and  the  common  supposition 
makes  the  State  actually  to  be  such,  although 
another  idea  might  transform  it. 

The  view  taken  of  a  State  from  the  outside  has 
never  adequately  been   considered.     Plato  never 


232     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

thought  of  his  ideal  commonwealth  from  the 
point-of-view  of  those  who  did  not  belong  to  it  : 
and  at  the  end  of  political  theorising  our  thinkers 
never  put  themselves  in  the  position  of  those 
who  do  not  belong  to  this  or  that  State.  But 
no  object  of  study  can  be  understood  by  such  a 
method  of  "  introspection  "  only.  We  must  con- 
sider what  the  average  man  thinks  of  States  not 
his  own.1  Every  man,  except  the  philosopher, 
is  usually  aware  that  other  States  do  or  design 
certain  actions,  and  it  is  in  view  of  these  that  he 
acts  in  behalf  of  his  own  State.  For  "  the  State  " 
to  him  means  that  organised  group  over  there,  as 
he  means  by  a  "  man  "  not  himself  only  but  other 
people. 

And  when  we  consider  any  State  from  the  out- 
side what  do  we  see  ?  We  see  first  the  astonishing 
fact  that  whereas  every  other  civilised  institution 
does  not  expect  physical  aggression  upon  its 
members,  the  State  alone  is  armed.     No  civilised 

1  The  psychological  argument  should  be  clear.  We  come 
to  conclusions  about  ourselves  because  of  what  we  think  of 
others  ;  just  as  much  as  we  interpret  the  expressions  of  others 
by  inner  experiences  of  our  own.  Avenarius  even  held  that 
our  soul-body  hypothesis  was  really  due  to  our  theory  for 
explaining  other  people ;  which  we  then  applied  to  ourselves. 
I  argue,  then,  that  the  nature  of  the  State  is  understood  by  the 
average  man  from  his  observation  of  other  States  (of  which  he 
knows  almost  nothing),  which  is  then  applied  to  his  own. 
Philosophers,  not  noticing  this,  have  left  the  mistakes 
uncorrected. 


THE   COMITY   OF    NATIONS       233 

State  is  confessedly,  and  viewed  from  within,  ag- 
gressive ;  for  even  if  its  guides  inculcate  aggres- 
sion, its  own  people  are  never  asked  to  fight  for 
anything  but  self-defence.  But  viewed  from  out- 
side, the  State  being  obviously  armed  and  "  we  " 
being  as  obviously  not  aggressive,  the  armament 
must  be  to  attack  us.  If  there  is  need  of  defence 
there  must  be  evidence  of  intended  aggression. 
So  that  every  citizen  looking  at  another  State 
expects  to  be  attacked — for  what  purpose  is  not  very 
clear  :  but  it  is  necessary  to  prepare  to  defend 
himself.  Men  do  not  prepare  to  fight  for  their 
Church  or  university  or  trade  union,  whatever 
of  value  they  may  derive  from  such  institutions. 
They  are  called  on  to  fight  only  for  their  State. 
They  may  be  even  fighting  against  members  of  their 
Church  or  their  trade  union  ;  but  it  is  conceived 
that  it  is  their  duty  none  the  less.  And  it  is  their 
duty,  until — until  men  begin  to  perceive  that  the 
arming  of  all  States  for  pure  self-defence  against 
other  States  which  protest  that  they  only  desire 
self-defence,  is  perilously  like  low  comedy.  But 
indeed,  the  truth  is  that  the  State,  viev/ed  from 
the  outside,  is  still  an  armed  band.  Another  State 
than  ours  is  aggressive  :  there  is  evidence  to  prove 
it.  Ours,  therefore,  must  be  defensive,  that  is  to 
say  "  armed ; "  and  that  provides  evidence  for  other 
States  to  regard  ours  as  aggressive  ;  and  so  the 
illusion  grows  as  to  the  nature  of  the  State.     A 


234     THE    MORALITY    OF   NATIONS 

man,  being  frightened,  may  do  something  by  which 
he  frightens  himself  still  more  or  gives  himself 
good  ground  for  fear.  Illusion  makes  you  jump  : 
your  jump  makes  you  hit  your  head,  and  hitting 
your  head  is  a  proof  that  there  was  danger  ! 

Let  us  put  it  concretely.  Here  is  an  alien 
citizen  who  belongs  to  a  Church  which  is  not 
mine,  a  trade  not  mine,  or  a  cultural  society  not 
mine.  I  do  not  expect  him  to  attack  me  as  a 
Lutheran,  or  as  an  engineer,  or  as  a  graduate  of 
Harvard;  but  as  a  good  citizen  I  suspect  him.  I 
really  think  that  force  would  be  out  of  place  in 
the  attempt  to  make  me  a  Lutheran  or  an  engineer 
or  a  Harvard  man,  although  I  might  be  made  any 
of  these  by  some  other  means  ;  but  I  think  force 
would  be  not  unlikely  to  be  used  in  the  attempt 
to  make  me  accept  some  other  person's  political 
institutions. 

And  I  am  probably  right.  He  stands  armed  : 
and  where  one  State  is  armed  all  States  will  be 
armed.  If  one  Church  were  armed,  all  would  be. 
Why,  then,  is  even  one  State  armed  ?  Because 
of  the  nature  of  the  State  ?  No.  Only  because 
in  political  imagination  we  are  still  in  the  early 
Middle  Ages,  or  perhaps  even  the  Dark  Ages. 
We  continue  to  say  the  State  is  what  it  is  not. 

For  some  centuries  men  believed  that  the  earth 
was  the  centre  of  the  universe.  And  when  some 
few  said  it  was  not,  many  were  greatly  pained  at 


THE    COMITY    OF    NATIONS      235 

the  apparent  insolence,  and  the  established  guides 
elaborately  "proved"  that  it  was.  But  the  sky 
did  not  fall  when  the  new  beliet  was  everywhere 
accepted  :  and  perhaps  nothing  very  dreadful 
would  happen  it  we  began  to  act  as  if  the  State 
were  no  more  an  armed  band  than  any  other  of 
the  many  institutions  we  use.  And  by  such 
action  we  do  not  mean  the  laying  down  of  our 
arms,  but  the  believing  in  the  protestation  of 
our  neighbours  that  they  are  not  aggressive,  and 
leaving  it  to  them  to  prevent  their  guides  leading 
them  into  aggression.  It  would  be  a  dangerous 
policy,  but  the  sky  would  not  fall.  As  for  dis- 
armament or  even  the  restriction  of  armament, 
that  is  a  problem  for  practical  politics,  and  it  is 
almost  as  important.  Of  course,  if  you  give 
a  man  murderous  weapons,  he  may  be  inclined  to 
use  them  :  but  the  civilised  man  has  acquired  a 
habit  of  mind  which  would  make  the  use  of  them 
very  unlikely.  The  fundamental  problem,  there- 
fore, is  the  transformation  of  the  imaginative  out- 
look, not  the  taking  away  of  murderous  weapons. 
It  seems  to  be  true  that  one  State  cannot  beain. 
The  same  argument  would  show  that  we  could 
never  have  reached  our  normal  disarmament  of 
individuals  within  the  State.  But  what  produced 
the  change  was  not  the  law  or  police.  Gradually 
men  began  to  perceive  that  there  was  no  need  of 
arms,  that  criminals  were  few,  and  that  a  friendly 


236     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

attitude  towards  other  men  led  to  no  alarming 
consequences.  Comity  took  the  place  of  armed 
peace  :  and  we  may  suppose  some  one  or  some 
few  must  have  begun  it.  The  change  did  not 
take  place  by  the  laying  down  of  arms,  but  by 
the  transformation  of  sentiment  among  those  who 
still  bore  arms,  until  arms  were  subordinated  and 
eventually  forgotten.  Meantime,  no  external 
change  could  perhaps  be  noted,  and  all  men 
seemed  to  live  in  accordance  with  the  inherited 
illusions  which  were  really  believed  in  only  by  a 
few. 

Living  among  madmen  who  agree,  it  is  best  to 
agree  with  them;  unless,  perhaps,  there  is  some 
cure  for  their  madness,  or  unless  the  majority  are 
not  really  mad  but  are  simply  persuaded  to  believe 
in  the  illusions  of  the  few  who  are.  We  are 
enslaved  by  the  black  magic  of  dead  words,  and 
we  can  only  be  rescued  by  the  white  magic  of 
some  new  word.  But  that  is  the  office  of  poets. 
The  task  of  analytical  philosophy  is  done  when 
the  current  hypotheses  have  been  examined. 

When,  however,  the  mistaken  results  of  the 
primitive  view  of  the  State  from  the  outside  are 
corrected  there  is  no  reason  why  a  permanent 
comity  of  organised  nations  should  not  be  estab- 
lished. For  then  the  citizen  will  consider  other 
States  not  as  possible  aggressors  but  as  moral 
equals  of  his  own.     He  will,  that  is  to  say,  believe 


THE   COMITY   OF   NATIONS        237 

the  protestation  of  other  citizens  that  they  arm 
only  for  defence,  and,  knowing  that  he  himself  is 
not  aggressive,  he  will  either  lay  down  his  own 
arms  or  perhaps  preserve  them  as  a  decorative 
symbol  of  the  past. 

For  already  a  certain  amount  of  mutual  trust 
has  been  established  by  the  years  of  peaceful 
commerce,  and  no  one  who  is  really  aware  of  the 
interdependence  of  all  institutions  can  go  back  to 
the  savage  suspicion  of  foreigners.  Such  trust 
between  citizens  of  diverse  States  has  not  been 
more  abused  than  trust  between  citizens  of  the 
same  State.  It  may  be  betrayed  in  a  few  in- 
stances :  but  the  world  has  held  together.  When, 
therefore,  we  point  to  a  permanent  comity  even 
between  States  we  are  not  speaking  of  Utopia, 
but  are  seeking  to  develop  a  movement  which  has 
already  begun.  Nor  will  even  diplomatic  subtle- 
ties be  able  to  keep  us  back  :  for  trust  between 
the  citizens  of  diverse  States  is  trust  between  the 
States,  and  the  official  Governments  will  soon 
have  to  submit  to  the  new  situation. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

CONCLUSION 

There  are  some  general  principles  which  seem 
to  follow  from  the  argument  we  have  so  far 
developed.  One  has  reference  to  the  relation 
between  institutions  and  social  sentiments,  another 
relates  to  the  assimilation  and  differentiation  of 
institutions.  By  a  social  sentiment  we  mean  a 
half-emotional,  half-reasoned  habit  of  action,  which 
may  imply  an  established  attitude,  but  is  very 
often  not  conscious  until  there  is  a  crisis, — either 
danger  or  a  new  and  strange  experience.  Such 
social  sentiments  are  family  affection,  club  or 
college  loyalty,  patriotism,  human  sympathy  felt, 
without  regard  to  frontiers,  at  the  news  of  an 
earthquake,  and  innumerable  vaguer  habits  of 
action  or  inhibition  expressed  in  such  phrases  as 
"  women  and  children  first,"  "  noblesse  oblige," 
"  the  things  no  fellow  can  do." 

It  has  been  seen  that  an  institution  generally 
follows  upon  a  social  sentiment  and,  being  estab- 
lished, transforms  the  sentiment.  Thus  the 
Church  or  the  State  follows  upon  habits  of  action 

238 


CONCLUSION  239 

or  inhibition  ;  and,  although  when  established  they 
maintain  or  develop,  they  do  not  create  such 
habits.  Law  and  government  did  not  create 
civilisation  ;  but  civilisation  created  law  and 
government.  This  alone  will  explain  why  law 
maintains  one  action  and  forbids  another. 

It  is  not  necessary  here  to  go  back  to  the 
possible  origins  of  the  State.  We  have  dealt  in 
an  earlier  chapter  with  the  progressive  differentia- 
tion of  functions  and  their  distribution  among 
many  different  institutions  as  life  becomes  more 
civilised.  What  is  now  of  interest  is  to  mark  the 
interplay  between  free  sentiment  and  established 
institutions.  For  this  is  fundamental  to  the 
group-morality  of  which  we  have  been  speaking. 
The  organisations  or  institutions  which  unite  or 
divide  men,  which  may  or  may  not  make  immense 
differences  in  their  moral  attitude — these  both 
maintain  social  sentiment  and  are  maintained  by  it. 
When  such  sentiments  change  they  may  trans- 
form the  institutions  ;  but  they  may,  on  the  other 
hand,  not  be  strong  enough,  and  may  themselves 
be  transformed  by  the  established  tradition.  Moral 
progress  depends  upon  such  transformations. 

Let  us,  however,  first  consider  the  interplay  of 
sentiment  and  institution  in  the  case  of  individuals 
of  any  one  group.  For  the  same  law  will,  no 
doubt,  with  some  modification,  be  applicable  to 
organised  groups. 


24o     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

Sentiment  maintains  institutions.  Social  feeling 
combined  with  habitual  action  or  inhibition  is  the 
real  guarantee  for  the  continued  existence  of  any 
form  of  organisation  ;  and  although  a  traditional 
institution  may  exist  for  many  commonplace  years 
without  any  appeal  to  such  sentiment,  a  time  of 
crisis  will  soon  prove  whether  or  not  the  life-blood 
is  flowing  still  in  the  old  body.  In  the  religious 
sphere,  perhaps  English  Monasticism  in  the  six- 
teenth century  was  an  example  of  this.  The  royal 
power  would  not  have  sufficed  to  suppress  the 
monasteries  unless  these  had  already  lost  their 
hold  upon  the  popular  imagination.  In  the 
political  sphere,  the  kingship  in  France  in  1 79 1  is 
an  instance  of  the  same  kind.  For  some  time 
the  Revolution  was  an  appeal  to  the  king  against 
"  wicked  advisers "  :  and  although  the  ancien 
regime  of  land-owning  was  hated,  the  king  re- 
tained the  affection  of  the  people.  Had  Mirabeau 
lived,  the  sentiment  might  have  transformed  the 
institution.  As  it  was,  the  sentiment  was  alienated 
and  the  bloodless  body  of  royalty  fell. 

Hence  it  is  that  education  is  given  so  important 
a  place  in  the  iroXig  of  Plato  and  Aristotle.  In 
Plato  it  becomes  the  chief  business  of  the  magis- 
trate : 1  and  in  the  Laws  the  State  is  not  secure 
till  the  ministry  for  education  is  higher  in  rank 
than  the  ministry  for  war.  Aristotle  is  even 
1  Statesman,  306  seq. 


CONCLUSION  241 

more  clear.  The  importance  of  the  formation  of 
social  sentiment  is  the  ground  for  the  treat- 
ment of  education  at  the  end  of  the  Politics ; l 
and  education  in  this  sense  is  said  to  be  the 
one  security  against  revolutions.2  The  stability 
of  the  State  is  seen  to  depend  upon  the  social 
sentiment  of  the  citizens. 

Institutions  maintain  sentiment  and  habits  of 
mind  or  action.  For  all  men  most  of  the  time 
and  most  men  all  of  the  time  are  so  institution- 
alised that  if  by  some  impossible  freak  one  could 
remove  the  institutions,  they  would  feel  that  part 
of  themselves  was  gone.  No  one  who  has  not 
lived  on  the  fringe  of  civilisation,  where  institu- 
tions are  less  omnipresent,  can  understand  how 
much  of  ordinary  thought  and  action  is  simply 
the  expression  of  an  established  institution.  This 
is  more  recognised  in  literature  than  in  Ethical 
theory.  "  Few  men  realise  that  their  life,  the 
very  essence  of  their  character,  their  capabilities 
and  their  audacities,  are  only  the  expression  of 
their  belief  in  the  safety  of  their  surroundings. 
Their  courage,  their  composure,  their  confidence  ; 
their  emotions  and  principles  ;  every  great  and 
every  insignificant  thought  belongs  not  to  the 
individual  but  to  the  crowd  :  to  the  crowd  that 
believes  blindly  in  the  irresistible  force  of  its 
institutions  and  of  its  morals,  in  the  power  of  its 

1  Pol.,  1337a  .tf?.  2  Pol,  1310a. 


242     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

police  and  of  its  opinion.  But  the  contact  with 
pure  unmitigated  savagery,  with  primitive  nature 
and  primitive  man,  brings  sudden  and  profound 
trouble  into  the  heart.  .  .  .  To  the  negation  of 
the  habitual,  which  is  safe,  there  is  added  the 
affirmation  of  the  unusual,  which  is  dangerous  ;  a 
suggestion  of  things  vague,  uncontrollable  and 
repulsive,  whose  discomposing  intrusion  excites 
the  imagination  and  tries  the  civilised  nerves  of 
the  foolish  and  the  wise  alike."  * 

Doubtless  even  the  fully  moralised  man  who 
never  thinks  of  stealing  or  murdering  owes  the 
current  direction  of  his  thought  in  part  to  the 
Law  ;  and  for  the  great  majority,  who  never 
think  out  the  reasons  for  action  or  for  inhibitions, 
the  Law  is,  perhaps  unconsciously,  the  guide. 
The  moral  man  is  ahead  of  the  Law,  the  non- 
moral  behind  it. 

Further,  a  group  consists  of  men  and  women 
of  many  different  ages.  It  seems  probable  that 
social  sentiment  is  regarded  as  stronger  by  the 
young  and  may  be  stronger  for  the  young  ;  and 
institutions  are  thought  of  chiefly  by  the  old,  and 
they  may  indeed  be  more  important  for  the  old. 
The  change  in  Plato  is  striking.  In  the  Republic 
he  relies  almost  entirely  upon  sentiment  embodied 
in  very  vague  laws,  in  the  Statesman  the  two  are 
almost  equal,  in  the  Laws  he  relies  almost  entirely 
1  Joseph  Conrad,  An  Outpost  of  Progress. 


CONCLUSION  243 

upon  detailed  regulations.  And  this  follows  from 
the  tendency  of  the  young  to  admire  change  and 
of  the  old  to  admire  stability,  of  the  young  to 
subordinate  traditional  habit  to  feeling  and  of  the 
old  to  subordinate  feeling  to  habit. 

But  sentiments  change.  We  may  cite  as  an 
instance  the  change  of  attitude  since  the  eighteenth 
century  between  husband  and  wife  or  parent  and 
child,  although  one  cannot  tell  how  many  people 
in  how  many  nations  have  really  adopted  the  new 
attitude.  At  any  rate  some,  and  those  not  the 
least  important,  since  they  are  generally  the  trans- 
formers of  institutions,  no  longer  treat  man  and 
woman  as  merely  male  and  female  :  and  it  is 
recognised  by  these  also  that  the  rights  of  children 
and  the  duties  of  parents  are  far  more  important 
than  the  duties  of  children  and  the  rights  of 
parents.  But  even  if  the  sentiment  has  changed, 
there  is  no  register  of  the  change  in  institutions. 
We  go  on  with  our  old  marriage  and  divorce  laws 
and  our  old  educational  systems.  The  natural 
result  of  a  change  of  sentiment  would  be  a 
gradual  transformation  of  institutions,  for  although 
a  few  may  live  for  a  little  according  to  some  ideas 
which  have  not  been  made  into  laws,  the  many 
will  not  change  unless  they  are  changed.  And 
most  men  can  more  easily  be  reached  from  the 
outside  :  that  is  to  say,  they  will  adopt  a  new 
method  of  walking  when  a  new  kind  of  road  is 


244     THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

made,  but  they  will  not  be  able  to  maintain  a  new 
habit  without  a  new  law.  Now  one  of  the  most 
interesting  facts  in  the  development  of  morality 
is  that  the  "sanction  "  of  law  has  become  less  and 
less  violent.  We  no  longer  mutilate  or  brand 
offenders,  but  the  morality  of  individuals  is  not 
lower.  So  that  the  amount  of  force  required  as 
sanction  is  considerably  less  as  civilisation  pro- 
gresses. And  this  is  of  immense  importance  to 
the  question  of  a  sanction  for  international  moral- 
ity ;  for  it  would  seem  that  the  force  required  as 
sanction  in  this  highly  developed  situation  is  very 
small  indeed.  Institutions  change  because  of 
changing  sentiment  ;  but  the  institutional  change 
is  subtler  and  less  noticeable  the  higher  the 
development  of  sentiment  becomes.1 

When  we  turn  to  the  morality  of  nations  or  of 
citizens  as  related  to  citizens  of  other  States,  we 
find  that  the  present  situation  is  one  of  transition 
between  a  barely  organised  relationship  and  an 
international  institution  such  as  might  embody 
and  develop  a  comparatively  recent  social  senti- 
ment. No  such  institution  may  come  into 
existence,  at  least  of  so  positive  and  powerful  a 
kind  as  the  States  of  the  world.  The  tendency 
towards  the  new  embodiment  of  social  sentiment 

1  The  reform  of  political  corruption  in  England  since  the 
eighteenth  century  is  an  example  of  a  changing  sentiment  subtly 
affecting  an  institution. 


CONCLUSION  245 

may  be  frustrated  either  by  turning  it  in  other 
directions  or  by  absorbing  it  in  the  older  institu- 
tions :  and  nothing  more  definite  may  appear  than 
a  Hague  Tribunal  or  a  council  of  Conciliation. 
Very  obviously  the  social  sentiment  of  a  few  is,  so 
far,  in  advance  of  the  established  practice  in  the 
relationship  of  States.1  This,  however,  will  be 
ineffective  unless  it  can  be  embodied  in  some 
definite  institutional  change.  It  is  useless  to 
prophesy.  Perhaps  the  States  of  the  world,  by 
warlike  alliance,  by  recurrent  war  and  by  the 
consequent  return  towards  barbaric  isolation,  will 
approximate  to  the  hideous  imaginings  of  the 
philosophers  ;  but  perhaps  they  will  change  in  the 
direction  in  which  other  institutions  have  de- 
veloped, and  arrange  their  differences  otherwise 
than  by  war.  Whichever  the  future  holds  in  store 
for  our  children,  it  is  as  well  for  us  now  to  recog- 
nise the  modifications  which  changing  events  have 
already  made  in  the  nature  of  the  highest  political 
institutions,  so  as  not  to  be  entrapped  in  the 
subtleties  of  our  forefathers  :  and  it  is  as  well  also 
to  acknowledge  that  our  institutions  are  still 
changing  more  rapidly  than  the  concepts  by 
which  we  manage  them. 

1  It  is  quite  possible  that  the  advanced  social  sentiment  is 
more  widespread  than  is  usually  thought.  The  voice  of  the 
newspapers  is  generally  the  ghostly  voice  of  a  past  age  which  is 
thought  by  editors  to  represent  what  is  generally  accepted. 


246     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

The  State  is  not  as  bad  as  the  philosophers  have 
imagined  it  to  be.  It  is  not  an  isolated  armed 
band.  But  it  is  not  as  good  as  it  might  be. 
There  is  much  room  for  a  modification  of  political 
institutions  by  new  sentiments.  In  the  contriving 
of  new  institutional  schemes,  however,  whether  for 
changing  the  State  itself  or  its  relation  to  other 
States,  we  should  not  lose  sight  of  the  social  senti- 
ment which  changes  and  may  be  changed,  so  subtly 
that  the  gods  of  one  generation  may  be  the  devils 
of  the  next. 

With  regard  to  the  assimilation  and  differen- 
tiation of  institutions  of  the  same  order,  when  they 
are  in  continuous  contact,  there  appears  to  be  an 
assimilation  in  externals  and  a  differentiation  of 
internal  character.  This,  as  we  have  seen,  is  the 
rule  for  individuals.  We  are  more  alike  than  our 
grandfathers  were  in  clothes  and  speech,  but  less 
alike  than  they  were  in  creeds  and  thought.  This 
diversification  is  due  to  the  greater  diversity  of 
occupation  in  modern  times.  And  in  institu- 
tions also  there  seems  to  be  the  same  distinc- 
tion between  external  administration  and  internal 
character. 

For  example,  in  religious  institutions,  ever  since 
the  old  social  exclusiveness  broke  down,  there  has 
been  an  increasing  assimilation  between  the  Church 
of  Rome  in  England  and  the  English  Church. 
Each  has  adopted  some  of  the  external  features  of 


CONCLUSION  247 

the  other.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  each  has 
become  more  conscious  of  whatever  is  distinctive 
in  its  spirit  or  inner  character.  And  the  conscious- 
ness of  distinct  character  has  led  each  to  be  more 
friendly  to  the  other.  In  the  same  way  municipal 
administration  has  become  more  alike  in  different 
towns,  but  the  character  of  the  towns  has  been 
diversified  owing  to  the  varieties  of  industry  ;  and 
this  diversity  has  bound  the  towns  together,  where- 
as their  old  similarity  caused  separation.  The 
supreme  political  institution,  in  contact  with  others 
of  the  same  order,  shows  the  same  development. 
States  are  more  like  one  another  in  military 
organisation,  in  police  supervision  and  in  their 
relations  to  trade  than  they  were  when  contact  was 
not  normal  and  continuous.  Even  their  legislative 
methods  seem  to  become  more  alike  :  and  in 
government — monarchies  approximate  to  republics 
and  republics  to  monarchies. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  is  no  sign  that  the 
assimilation  of  institutions  in  these  points  is  oblit- 
erating the  distinction  between  States  ;  and  not 
merely  are  the  States  distinct,  but  they  differ.  At 
first  sight  similarity  of  law  and  even  parliamentary 
institutions  might  seem  to  make  it  a  matter  of 
indifference  under  what  government  one  lived  ; 
and  such  indifference  would  be  natural  in  a  semi- 
savage  or  a  loafer  ;  but  our  keenness  of  perception 
has  increased  and  the  really  civilised  man  is  able  to 


248      THE    MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

notice  a  difference  of  "  atmosphere "  even  when 
the  externals  of  two  States  are  very  much  alike. 
We  belong  to  one  State  or  another  because  of  this 
indefinable  "  atmosphere."  Even  if  French  law 
and  government  became  more  like  English  than 
it  is  now,  France  would  not  be  England,  not  only 
because  of  distinct  language  but  politically  also. 
And  the  political  diversity  would,  in  part  at  least, 
be  due  to  the  difference  in  occupation  or  in 
products  which  a  difference  of  climate  or  soil 
might  make  necessary. 

Whatever  the  institution  may  be  which  comes 
out  of  the  growing  sentiment  of  comity  between 
all  nations,  it  will  certainly  not  be  a  State.  There 
could  not  be  a  World-State.  In  the  first  place, 
the  constituent  elements  of  this  institution  will 
not  be  individuals  but  groups.  The  political 
equality  of  all  distinct  state-groups  will  be  the 
basis  of  association,  and  thus  a  new  sense  will  be 
given  to  Renaissance  Sovereignty. 

The  States  of  the  world  would  then  be  bound 
together  not  only  by  their  similarity  in  methods 
of  government,  but  also  by  their  diversity  of 
character.  The  economic  interdependence  would 
be,  as  we  have  already  seen,  more  complete 
as  material  inventions  become  more  numerous. 
But  there  would  also  be  the  new  and  more 
civilised  comity  of  nations  of  different  characters, 
since  the  savage  dislikes  what   is   different  from 


CONCLUSION  249 

himself    but    the    civilised    man    is    attracted    by- 
diversity. 

Again,  it  is  sometimes  said  that  as  "  England  " 
has  resulted  from  subordination  of  the  local  in- 
terests of  Yorkshire,  Devonshire,  London  and  the 
rest,  so  the  separate  States  will  be  subordinated  to 
some  vaster  institution.  But  the  metaphor  is  mis- 
leading. The  new  process  cannot  be  the  same  as 
the  earlier  process  in  any  essential  points  :  for, 
first,  Yorkshire  and  the  rest  never  had  a  fully 
developed  political  life  of  their  own.  And  even 
the  analogy  of  England  and  Scotland  or  Prussia 
and  Bavaria  will  not  do.  For  the  component 
elements  in  what  is  now  a  larger  whole  were  not, 
before  the  union,  modern  States  in  a  complex  of 
world-politics.  The  new  situation  has  arisen 
since  any  subordination  of  parts  of  which  we  have 
evidence  in  history.  The  elements,  then,  in  the 
new  Union  are  unique  in  kind,  and  their  unity 
cannot  be  modelled  upon  the  unions  of  the  past. 
The  new  Union  of  the  States  of  the  world  may 
very  well  be  "  looser  "  institutionally  and  stronger 
sentimentally.  That  is  to  say,  in  this  matter  we 
may  perhaps  have  reached  a  stage  when  we  can 
produce  an  institution  as  different  from  even 
the  modern  State  as  that  is  different  from  the 
Greek  noKig  ;  an  institution  which  would  hold 
together  rather  because  of  the  changed  social 
sentiment    in    citizens    of     diverse    States    than 


250     THE   MORALITY   OF   NATIONS 

because  of  the  amount  of  force  by  which  it  can 
be  supported. 

Perhaps  this  is  not  practical  politics,  but  perhaps 
also  what  seems  the  veriest  dream  of  idealists 
may,  after  all,  be  practical  politics.  If  there  is 
one  proposition  which  it  is  safe  to  deny  it  is  the 
creed  of  those  who  pride  themselves  on  being 
practical,  that  what  has  occurred  will  occur,  or 
that  nothing  can  be  done  but  what  has  been  done. 
One  may  imagine  the  Renaissance  diplomatist 
proving  that  what  now  commonly  exists  could 
not  possibly  come  to  be  ;  as  mathematicians  once 
proved  flying  to  be  impossible.  The  future  is 
open.  And  the  most  skilful  statesman  will  be 
he  who  is  able  to  apply  some  new  hypothesis 
and  discover  truths  in  the  relationship  of  States 
of  which  we  have  not  the  faintest  suspicion. 
The  practical  morality  of  nations  may  be  as 
different  in  a  few  years'  time  as  the  conceptions 
of  the  few  in  many  nations  now  are  from  those 
of  the  unthinking  majority. 

The  result  will  not  be  a  formula  or  a  code  : 
for  even  if  International  Law  becomes  more  and 
more  exact  or  extensive,  international  morality 
will  never  be  quite  completely  expressed  in  it. 
The  expressions  of  the  Law  will  perhaps  be 
somewhat  in  advance  of  the  morality  of  some 
States,  but  they  will  always  be  inadequate  to 
render  the  full  meaning  of  the  moral  sentiments 


CONCLUSION 


251 


of  others.  And  within  every  State  there  will 
always  be  many  who  take  their  morality  from 
the  law  and  a  few  who  make  the  law  by  their 
morality.  For  the  morality  of  nations  no  less 
than  that  of  individuals  is  a  continually  developing 
art  of  life. 


INDEX 


Alliance,  120 
Ambassadors,  100 
Arbitration,  1S9 
Aristotle,  62,  240 
Armament  Firms,  82 

Balance  of  Power,  no,  122 
Beaconsfield,  117 
Belgium,  6,  II,  103 
Berlin  Treaty,  102 
Bismarck,    11,   107,   115,    1 

142 
Bluntschli,  63 
Board  of  Trade,  84 
Bodin,  47 
Bologna,  91 
Bulgaria,  169 

Cabinet,  109 
Cabinet  Government,  94 
Capital,  87 

Communication,  J7,  78 
Concert  of  Europe,  221 
Conventions,  160 
Creditor  States,  88 
Crimean  War,  141 

Darwin/95 
Debtor  States,  88 
Denmark,  9 
Diplomacy,  99 
Disraeli,  117 

Education,  94,  240 
Ehrlich,  92 
Eliot,  88 


4i, 


Embassies,  100 
Empires,  70,  71 
Entente,  129 
Expansion,  81,  146 

Falkland  Islands,  168 
Fashoda  Episode,  145 
Finance,  83 
Foreign  Office,  71 
Foreign  Policy,  96 

German  Empire,  9 

German  Militarism,  144 

Germany,  6,  144 

Greek  Polis,  30 

Green,  182 

Grotius,  47,  57 

Group  Morality,  1,  2,  210,  217 

Hague,  224 
Harnack,  9 
Hegel,  46,  50,  51,  53 
History,  201 
Hobbes,  92 
Hugo  de  Groot,  3 

Imperialism,  67,  69 
Innocent  III,  167 
International  Rivalry,  139 

Law,  161 

Italy,  6 

Kultur,  35 

Law,  4,  242 
Lawrence,  101,  171 


253 


^54 


INDEX 


Liberty,  38 
Lister,  90 
Louis  XI,  100 
Loyalty,  61 

Machiavelli,  146,  207 
Marx,  46,  63 
Mazzini,  10,  105 
Mediaeval  Rcgtwm,  31,  34 
Mill,  46,  63 
Mommsen,  90 
Montpellier,  91 
Morality,  191,  192 
Municipal  control,  94 

National  Insurance,  94 
Nationalism,  66,  67,  68,  69 
Nationality,  5,  6,  229 
Nations,  5,  6,  12,  13 
Napoleon  III,  11 
Napoleonic  Wars,  8 
Neutrality,  163 
Nineteenth  Century  State,  26 
Non-combatants,  164 

Order,  38 
Oxford,  91 

Palmerston,  108 

Paris,  91 

Parliamentary  Government,  94 

Pasteur,  90 

Patriotism,  61 

Plato,  48,  49,  50,  242 

Property,  162 

Prussia,  141 

Radium,  92 

Red  Cross,  161,  166 


Regionalism,  67,  68,  69 
Renaissance  State,  26 
Sovereign  State,  32 

St.  Dominic,  91 

St.  Francis,  91 

Salerno,  91 

Serbia,  101 

Sidgwick,  46,  63,  118 

Slavs,  24 

Socialists,  185 

Specialisation  of  function,  155 

Spencer,  30,  46,  52 

State  organisation,  67 

Statistics    (Board   of   Trade), 

85-88 
Stubbs,  109 

Town  planning,  94 

Trade,  84 

Treaties,  102 

Treaty  with  U.S.A.  (1914),  188 

Treitschke,  98 

Triple  Alliance,  124 

United  States,  113,  188 

Victoria,  114 

Volunteer  Movement,  145 

Von  Biilow,  8 

War,  16,  159,  232 
Weapons,  167 
Weismann,  95 
World-politics,  80,  132 
Wyclif,  91 


Printed  in  Great  Britain  for  the  University  of  London  Press,  Ltd  ,  by 
Richard  Clay  &  Sons,    Ltd.,     London  and  Bungay. 


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